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Abstract
MILITARY SCHOOL HISTORICAL TRENDS IN EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CURRENT POTENTIAL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
John Alfred Coulter II
Chair of the Dissertation Committee: Dr. Judith E. Beauford
This study examined military schools in the United States from events which
resulted in the establishment of the United States Military Academy at West Point to
2011. From 1802 to 2011, 834 military schools have operated in the United States,
privately and publicly funded, and including teaching components for elementary,
secondary, and college levels. The importance of understanding this subject has grown as
the number of military charter and public secondary schools has increased tenfold since
1999. This study’s purpose was four fold, the first of which is to identify those men who
have had the greatest impact on military schools in the United States. The second purpose
was to illustrate that the military schools were not an educational format largely restricted
to the South. The third purpose was to identify those social, political, and economy
events which impacted military schools. The final purpose of this study was to establish
evidence that from 1999 to 2011 the popularity of the military school format made a
return. Additionally the study provided an analysis of the military school culture and an
examination of the efficacy of public and charter military secondary schools compared to
similar nonmilitary public and charter schools.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
With the establishment of the Military Academy at West Point, a new educational
format that included military training was introduced in the United States. From 1802 to
2011, 834 military schools have operated in the United States. These schools, both
privately and publicly funded, include teaching components for elementary, secondary,
and college levels. The importance of understanding this subject has grown as the number
of military charter and public secondary schools has increased tenfold since 1999. To
date, a holistic look at the origin, history, and culture of military schools has not been
fully developed.
This study’s purpose is four fold, the first of which is to identify those men who
have had the greatest impact on military schools in the United States. The expansion of
the military format and development o f the military school culture is largely the product
of four educators and associated alumni of three institutions: Alden B. Partridge (1785—
1854), founder o f Norwich University; Sylvanus Thayer (1785-1872), Superintendent of
West Point; Francis H. Smith (1812-1890), Superintendent of Virginia Military Institute;
and Stephen B. Luce (1827—1917), champion of the maritime academy education.
The second purpose of this study is to illustrate that the military schools were not
an educational format largely restricted to the South. Historians traditionally have
attributed the popularity of military schools to the southern culture and regional
orientation. On the contrary, military schools have had a wide regional representation
across the United States. The popularity of military school, rather than being a product of
Southern culture, should be attributed to historical, economic, and cultural events that
stretch far across the nation.
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The third purpose of this study is to identify those social, political, and economy
events which impacted military schools between 1802 and 2011. Webb (1958) provided a
19th century study which served as a starting point for this study. It was Webb’s hope that
others would “dig deeper into the history of military education, a field hitherto ignored
and neglected by educational historians” (p. iv). Likewise, Hadley (1999) identified the
need for future research to address the historical “social, economic, cultural or political
circumstances” (pp. 195-196) that impact military schools and to pull together
meaningful statistics to provide greater understanding of military school failures. His
work proved to be the first comprehensive list of military schools and was a starting point
for the formation of the list of 834 military schools and their years of operation addressed
in this study.
The final purpose of this study is to establish evidence that from 1999 to 2011 the
popularity of the military school format made a return. There was a dramatic decline in
the number o f military schools starting in the 1960s. Starting in 1999 public and later
charter military schools made their appearance initially in Chicago and Oakland,
California. This was followed by the establishment of military schools in public
educations across the country.
The military school format is characterized by students as cadets or midshipmen
habitually in uniform and under military discipline. This format started in the United
States when Congress created the United States Military Academy at West Point, New
York. The opening o f West Point in 1802 did not originate that educational environment
but imported it from Europe. The military format has experienced varying periods of
popularity in the educational history of the United States.
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Through an examination of historical cultural, educational, and political events,
trends in the popularity of the military school concept has been explained in this study.
There was steady growth of military schools after the formation of West Point in 1802,
with 171 military schools operating between 1855 and 1866. During this time, the line
between secondary and higher education military institutions was ill defined, with terms
such as institute, academy, and even college titles used freely between the two levels
(Beadie, 2010). But clearly, military schools were dominated by secondary schools with
approximately 128 (75%) at that level.
The growth o f military schools peaked between 1903 and 1926, when at least 278
to 280 military schools operated across the United States. By this time, the line between
secondary and higher education was well defined. Secondary military schools numbered
approximately 257 (about 91% of the military schools in the country). Public education
was firmly established by then; almost all secondary military schools were private
schools.
After the start of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, the 20th century
saw the number of military schools in the United States decline dramatically. In the early
1960s, approximately 203 military schools were operating in the United States.
Antimilitary sentiment “engendered by the Vietnam War was reflected in much public
anathema toward military education” (Hadley, 1999, p. 124). With schools closing or
dropping their military requirements, the number o f military schools declined by 63%. In
1998, only 74 military schools remained in the United States. O f those, 42 were
secondary schools, three of which were public military schools.
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The dramatic decline in the number of military schools in the United States began
its reversal with the opening of the Chicago Military Academy in 1999, 24 years after the
fall of Saigon and the end of the Vietnam War. Since 1999, 38 military schools have
opened in the United States; 15 were public military high schools, 18 were charter
military high schools, and five private military schools. Among the newly established
military schools, 87% were in public education rather than in private schools, the
traditional home of military schools. In 2011, there were 91 military schools, 66 of which
were secondary schools, an increase of almost 55% since 1998. The trend of establishing
new military institutions does not appear to have slowed—the New Orleans Military
Maritime Academy opened in the fall of 2011 in Louisiana.
In 2011, the United States had 22 military schools operating on the college level.
This number included the five federal service academies and 12 military colleges or
universities and five military junior colleges. There were 40 private military schools that
operated on a primary level and secondary level. Two of the private schools were primary
schools and 38 schools were primarily or totally secondary education. There were also
public and charter schools with a military program; this includes 16 public secondary
military schools, and 13 charter military schools. The total number of schools, private and
public (charter included) totals 91 institutions with approximately 50,550 cadets or
midshipmen.
Organization of Chapters
The subsequent chapters are organized chronologically as much as possible with
the initial chapters dealing with the establishment of the United States Military Academy
and three o f the four most influential figures in the military school movement. The two
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chapters that follow deal with the impact of the Civil War on military schools, followed
by a chapter dealing with the establishment of maritime related military schools and the
fourth influential figure in military school movement. The following five chapters
address the social, economic and political events which have impacted military schools
following the Civil War until 2011. The remaining three chapters provide a quantitative
study of the potential for military schools in public secondary education, an overview of
the military school culture, and finally conclusions.
Chapter 2: The Long Road to West Point explains the influences that led to the
establishment of the United States’ first military school, the United States Military
Academy at West Point. It examines the influences of European military education and
the environment shaped by the Revolutionary War, which created the need for a military
school. The actions o f prominent proponents are documented, including Presidents
George Washington and John Adams, General Henry Knox, Alexander Hamilton, and
Marquis de Layette.
Chapter 3: Captain Partridge and the Expansion o f the Military School Concept,
presents Captain Alden Partridge (1785-1854) as the first of the four fathers of the
American Military School concept. Partridge’s strengths and weaknesses are evaluated,
as well as his contributions to the early years of West Point. The chapter further explores
Partridge’s role in the initial establishment of the military school concept beyond the
confines of West Point with his establishment of the American Literary, Scientific and
Military Academy (Norwich University) and Partridge’s crusade to establish military
schools across the United States.
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Chapter 4: Sylvanus Thayer and the Military School Culture describes another
founder of the U.S. military school movement, a man considered to be the father of West
Point. Silvanus Thayer was Alden Partridge’s replacement as superintendent of West
Point and had a very similar educational background. This chapter tracks the difference in
Thayer’s later development as a soldier, leader, and educator. In contrast, Partridge’s
major accomplishments had a focus outside West Point, while Thayer’s had an internal
focus which developed the cultural pattern for military schools in the United States.
Chapter 5: Francis Smith and the Virginia Military Institute tracks the
contributions of one West Point alumnus and his twofold contribution to the military
school movement. First was his establishment of an institution whose standards would be
embraced by southern culture. Second was his expansion o f the number of military
schools in the South by encouraging graduates to pursue teaching as a profession. The
chapter documents military schools that Smith and the alumni of his institution
established prior to the Civil War and explores the southern military school tradition. The
explanation for both the growth and regional southern shift in military schools extends
beyond a southern cultural orientation to militarism. The chapter offers a critique of that
view along with a numerical analysis related to the influence of the military school
movement based upon the influences of Smith and the Virginia Military Institute.
Chapter 6: Civil War examines the impact of the Civil War on the nation’s
military schools, including the impact of cadets serving as drill masters, leaving school
for military service, and school closing (especially in the South) due to the recruitment of
cadets for military service and northern occupation. The chapter also addresses the
contributions of military schools and their alumni to the war efforts of both the North and
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South. The activities o f six schools from the South that participated as military units in
combat are addressed in detail: Virginia Military Institute, the Citadel, University of
Alabama, Georgia Military Institute, West Florida Seminary, and the Confederate Naval
Academy.
Chapter 7: The United States Naval Academy and Stephen B. Luce’s Maritime
Academy Crusade addresses the development of the American nautical and maritime
academies. The chapter explains the origins and influences that affected the establishment
of the United States Naval Academy. From the earliest days o f the Naval Academy,
Stephen B. Luce emerged as a leader. Through his writing, he fostered a nautical
orientation to the military school movement, which helped establish the maritime military
academy. This movement spanned almost a century and included the opening of the New
York Nautical School in 1874, the United States Merchant Marine Academy in 1943, and
the Texas Maritime Academy in 1962. The Maritime Academy, which includes a
collegiate orientation, has become historically one of the most enduring forms of military
school, after the federal service academies. Eight maritime academies have been
established, with six still in operation in 2011. Also addressed in this chapter is the
establishment of the United States Coast Guard Academy, a school influenced by both
the naval academy and maritime academy movement.
Chapter 8: The Lost Cause and General Expansion o f an Educational Format
examines those factors contributing to the revival of the southern military schools after
the Civil War caused the closure of 74% of them. The influence of the social reaction to
the “Lost Cause” in the South and establishment of senior military colleges under the
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Morrill Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 1890, which included the establishment or
transition of 15 agricultural colleges to a military format, is also documented.
The nationwide adoption of the military school format by educators who were not
products of military education is explored, as well as the impact of veterans of the Grand
Army of the Republic (Union Army) and their founding of military schools in the union
states. Associated with this is the adoption of the military school format by the Episcopal
and Catholic Churches and other denominations. The only two African American military
schools’ history is documented as well.
Chapter 9: The Spirit o f 1898 and the Peak o f the Military School covers the
influences o f post-Spanish-American War “Spirit of 1898,” with its militarization of
American culture, through the peak in number of military schools, when some 280
military schools operated in the nation, between 1903 and 1926. Facts contributing to the
end of military school movement expansion are examined including the rise of the
antimilitary feelings centered on the post-world-war pacifist movement, the roaring
twenties and its departure from tradition, and the impact of the Great Depression. Also
addressed are military schools’ contributions to World War I and the dangers of fire in
military schools around the turn of the 20th century.
Chapter 10: The Second World War through the 1950s addresses the positive
cultural climate towards military schools in the 1940s and 1950s. The organization of the
military schools into industrial associations by the Association o f Military Colleges and
Schools starting in 1914, and the National Association of Military Schools established in
1950 are addressed briefly. World War II and the Cold War are addressed in terms of
military school alumni efforts.
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Chapter 11: Vietnam and the Decline o f the Military School explains the dramatic
decline of military schools during and after the Vietnam War. This decline is credited to
changes in the American culture in the 1960s and the antiwar student movement. This
culture also brought about the end of all-male membership in the majority of military
school programs. This change in status addressed both controversial court cases
associated with the Citadel and Virginia Military Institute as well as those institutions
that pioneered the coeducation military school environment.
Chapter 12: Resurgence o f an Old Educational Tradition accounts for the quiet
entrance of three military schools in the early 1980s in Richmond, Virginia; St Louis,
Missouri; and Highlands, New Jersey. It explains the educational setting leading up to the
1999 establishment of the Chicago Military Academy and the dramatic rise in number of
military schools through 2011. The principal opposition groups are identified and their
philosophy and objections are presented. The prominent proponents of the growth of
military schools are also identified and include Mayor Richard Daley, Governor Jerry
Brown, and Secretary of Education Arne Duncan.
Chapter 13: Potential Impact o f Military Schools in Public Secondary Education
explores the question of whether the introduction of the military school format into
secondary public education is a positive force in the development of children. This
question is explored with a statistical analysis of the performance of secondary public and
charter military schools with dropout rates, graduation, attendance, and standardized test
scores. This study uses initial data from 19 of the 28 public or charter military schools in
operation from 2009-2010. They are compared to nonmilitary public schools from their
school district or areas with student bodies of similar socioeconomic status. Because the

10

number of public and charter military schools is so limited, the data only provides
indicators of performance comparisons.
Chapter 14: Military School Culture is devoted to exploring what the culture is,
and is not. It draws on the thread of commonality from federal services academies to
private military secondary prep schools to public military secondary schools including
the nation’s two military primary schools. Differences between the culture of the armed
forces and military schools are explored. The common objectives of development of the
whole cadet in body, mind, and spirit are examined. Those elements of artifacts, espoused
values, and basic underlying assumptions are addressed as well. The similarities between
religious-based schools and military schools are also a topic that links a common format
to that o f the military school.
Chapter 15: Conclusions will identify the four men whose considerable influence
on the military school movement should be identified for recognition as the Fathers of the
American Military School Movement. The chapter will illustrate the distribution of
military schools regionally from 1802 to 2010 and address the popular concept that
military schools are historically largely a part of southern culture. The chapter will
graphically associate the ebb and flow of the number of military schools and the links
between the economic, cultural, and political environment and the popularity of military
schools. Finally, this chapter will answer the question as to whether military schools have
been making a recent comeback in popularity in the United States since 1999.
Definitions
Military School: An institution of education that organizes cadets (all or a portion
of the student body) into a corps under military discipline. It requires all members of the
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corps to be habitually in military uniform when on campus. It has as its objective the
development of the cadet's character through military training and regulation of conduct
according to principles of military discipline (Association of Military Colleges and
Schools of the United States, 2010). The program is not limited to technical skills such as
pilot or nautical navigation, nor is it described as a drug treatment, or behavioral
modification camp. The school may provide elementary, secondary, or college education.
Charter School: An institution of education not state or federally owned but
receiving its charter and most of its funding from the local, state, or federal government.
It is usually owned by an individual or a corporation. Charter schools are similar to
private schools in that they are independent and their students attend by choice. Unlike
private schools, charter schools are accountable to governmental authorities for results
(Finn, 2000).
Neighborhood School: A public school with attendance boundaries. Generally
open to all students who live in the school’s designated area. In some cases students from
other areas may be offered enrollment, but students living within that school’s boundaries
have priority (Chicago Public Schools, 2011).
Magnet School: A public school specializing in a specific subject area, such as
mathematics and science, fine arts, world languages, or humanities. These schools may
require application or lottery selection for attendance (Chicago Public Schools, 2011).
Cadet: A cadet is a military student at a military school. Some schools use the
term midshipmen or midshipwomen. The term cadet is used for military students
regardless of gender or academic class. Some military schools have dual student bodies:
civilian students and military cadets.
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Service Academies: College-level institutions operated under the authority of the
U.S. Federal Government and associated with an armed service or merchant marine. The
cadets or midshipmen are organized into a corps of cadets, brigade of midshipmen, or
similar formation. These institutions grant baccalaureate degrees with the objective of
granting military commissions. Service academies develop cadet character through
military training and regulation of conduct according to the principles of military
discipline. They require all members of the corps to be habitually in military uniform
when on campus.
Senior Military College: College or university that grants baccalaureate degrees
and organizes all or a portion of the student body into a corps of cadets. It requires all
members o f the corps to be habitually in military uniform when on campus. Its mission is
the development of the cadet's character through military training and regulation of
conduct according to principles of military discipline similar to those maintained at the
service academies (Department of the Army, 2011). Unlike service academies post
graduate military service is not a requirement.
Junior Military College: Military school that does not grant baccalaureate degrees
but provides high school and junior college education and organizes all or a portion of the
student body into a corps of cadets. It requires all members of the corps to be habitually
in military uniform when on campus. It has as objectives the development of the cadet's
character through military training and regulation o f conduct according to principles of
military discipline similar to those maintained at the service academies (Department of
the Army, 2011).
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Lost Cause: The literary, intelligential and social conscience of the post-Civil War
South. The Lost Cause encompassed the beliefs held by the white population of the
South that helped them deal with defeat and change. It presented the “wartime sacrifice
and shattering defeat in the best light” (Gallagher & Nolan, 2000, p. 1). The objective
was to justify the actions o f the southern states, and find positive historical interpretation
of the war. It focused on the military rather than the less positive political and social
aspects of the war. General Jubal A. Early is cited as the former Confederate who was
most influential in the shaping of the Lost Cause with a reverential view particularly of
General Robert E. Lee.
Regional Designations: Regional designations are based on the Bureau of
Statistics division of the United States for the census. The North (Northeast is used by the
Census) includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The Midwest contains Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin. The South has Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Because of the number of military schools located in the territory of Puerto Rico and its
geographic location, it was also included in the South. The West has the remaining states
of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
Political Regional Designations: The division of the United States in the Civil
War is addressed in three groups. The Union States, which firmly remained with the
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United States, are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. The Border States, which were divided and had
factions on both sides, are Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri. The
Confederate States are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
Limitations and Delimitations
This study uses the documentation of the 834 military schools to reach
conclusions o f a historical nature based on the schools’ years of operation, founders’
backgrounds and motives, and other contributing factors. In many cases, individual
schools have very limited documentation. For example, the record of Daniel Boone
Military Institute in Kentucky is limited to its act of incorporation and Elm City Military
Institute (likely also known as Stowe Military Academy) in Connecticut is limited to its
act of incorporation and mention in a biography.
Prior to the advent of public education, many military schools were basically oneroom school houses with the number of cadets limited to 15 to 25. The limited historical
footprint of schools, especially those with short life spans, does not always provide the
details required to confirm the exact year of establishment, year of closure, transition to
or from military school format, or founder identifiers. The confirmed dates of operation
have been used to estimate years of operation. Because analysis, particularly prior to
1900, is based on 12-year time spans, accuracy of number of schools operating in any
particular year is minimized.
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The school policies regarding uniform and discipline requirements are largely
unavailable. If schools historically used the term “military” in their title, and no evidence
was found that uniforms and military discipline were not required they are assumed to
have been military schools by the definition provided in the section above and are
included in the statistical examination of the number of operational military schools in
the United States. Another limitation includes difficulty in determining whether early
military schools had elementary, secondary, junior college, or college orientation. Many
of the schools listed actually include multiple levels of education. Prior to the 20th
century, the lines between secondary and higher education were often blurred, and there
is often no attempt to identify schools according to level of education offered.
Finally, Chapter 13: Potential o f the Military School in Public Secondary
Education uses a sample of only 19 public or charter military schools. With such a small
sample size, statistical conclusions cannot be determined. Therefore, performance
indicators in public and charter military schools are limited to dropout rates, graduation,
attendance, and standardized-test scores.
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Chapter 2: The Long Road to West Point
The initial interest in developing military schools in the United States grew from
requirements of the Revolutionary War and the influence of European military schools.
Prior to the war, at least two schools taught subjects related to military engineering,
artillery, fortifications, and gunnery. These subjects were conducted in traditional
academic style and included technical military subjects along with the curriculum of the
time. The school in Westmoreland Potomac, Virginia, was headed by the Reverend
Thomas Smith in 1771; the other was the English Grammar School in New York City,
founded in 1774 (Webb, 1958). There is no evidence that the schools incorporated a
uniformed militarized student body as defined in a military school.
European military schools were established not long before the American
Revolution and several of their graduates served in the Continental Forces of General
George Washington. The most influential were Gilbert du Motier and Marquis de
Lafayette, who attended the military academy at Vincennes near Paris and left there as a
Lieutenant of Musketeers. The school was established in 1751 and had 500 young
noblemen as cadets. Its location was moved to the Champ de Mars in 1765. Napoleon
Bonaparte was a 1785 graduate of Champ de Mars. The current French Military
Academy, St. Cyr, is often cited as influencing West Point’s establishment but was
actually founded by Napoleon in 1802, the same year as West Point. Another French
military school influencing the establishment of American military schools was the Royal
Engineering School of Mezieres, established in 1748 (Langins, 2004).
A Polish Officer serving with the Continental Army who influenced the formation
o f the first American military school was Tadeusz Kosciuszko. He rose to general in the
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Continental Army and was one of the original members of the corps of cadets established
by Poland’s King Stanislaw in 1765. The school was located in Warsaw and addressed
military and liberal arts courses (Lafayette Square, 2008).
The greatest influence that encouraged Americans to professionalize the officer
corps was the enemy. The British officer corps was highly trained via the Royal Military
Academy, Woolwich, which was established in 1741 with the goal of producing "good
officers of Artillery and perfect Engineers” (British Army, 2009, p. 1). They constituted a
very professional leadership group of British engineers and artillery in America that was
the envy of General George Washington’s Chief of Artillery, General Henry Knox.
The memorandum to Congress from General Henry Knox titled Hints for
Improvement o f the Artillery o f the United States,
reflected the envy he had for the British military educational system:
An officer can never act with confidence until they are masters of their profession,
an academy established on a liberal plan would be the utmost service to the
continent, where the whole theory and practice of fortification and gunnery should
be taught; to be nearly on the same plan as that at Woolwich, making allowance
for difference of circumstances; a place to which our enemies are indebted for the
superiority o f their artillery to all who have opposed them. (p. 3)
General Henry Knox wrote John Adams in May of 1776. At the time, Knox was
on the Congress’ Board o f War “suggesting the establishment of academies for educating
young gentlemen in every branch of the military art” (Webb, 1958, p. 2). John Adams
replied, “I am fully aware of your sentiments that we ought to lay foundation and begin
building institutions . . . for promoting every art, manufacture, and science necessary for
the support of an independent state” (Webb, 1958, p. 2). This comment from the future
second President of the United States foretold the place military schools would take, well
beyond the instruction of military art to that of science and liberal education.
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An early indication of the direction military schools would take was from the
report of a Continental Congress Committee to study the state of the army. They arrived
at the Continental Army Headquarters in September, 1776, and spent several days
studying the state of leadership and the army. Their report reflected an army “badly
officered” and even encouraging “soldiers by their examples to plunder and commit other
offences” (Boyington, 1871, p. 176). The committee’s recommendation stressed the
importance “o f having officers of known honor, ability and education.” Their resolution
read “that the Board of War be directed to prepare a Continental Laboratory and a
Military Academy and provide the same with proper Officers” (Boyington, 1871, p. 176).
The recommendation foreshadowed the role that morality, honor, and gentlemanly
conduct would take in the formation of the future military school culture. Expectation
well beyond that of teaching basic theory of war and technical skills of the warrior’s craft
emerged very early.
The memorandum from General Knox and the report and recommendation o f the
committee that visited the Continental Army arrived at the Continental Congress within
days o f each other. Two days after the committee’s report, and three days after the
General’s memorandum, the Continental Congress passed a resolution dated October 1,
1776: “Resolved, that a Committee of five be appointed to prepare and bring in a plan of
a military academy at the Army” (Boyington, 1871, p. 177).
The war would delay the formation o f The United States Military Academy for 26
years until 1802. There were several measures implemented short of a military school
which included allocation of funds for an officer course at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in
1778. This was likely the Corps of Invalids’ school which was for “propagating military
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knowledge and discipline” for officers having “good character, both as citizens and
soldiers” (Webb, 1958, p. 5). A course for engineers and artillerists operated at West
Point for a few years then was terminated in 1780 (McMaster, 1951).
In 1783, after the war had ended, Congress appointed a committee that included
Alexander Hamilton, charged to develop a plan to support General George Washington’s
desire to establish America’s first military schools. General Washington responded to
Hamilton’s request for his views on the project by soliciting the views of his key generals
in New York, as well as foreign officers and the Governor of New York (Webb, 1958).
It was no surprise that General Knox was the strongest advocate o f military
schools:
A perfect knowledge of the principles of war by sea and land is absolutely
incumbent upon people circumstanced as we were, and determined to be free and
independent. From these considerations arose an indispensable necessity of
forming and adopting a complete system of military education. (Webb, 1958, p. 8)
Knox actually advocated the creation of three military schools for the southern, eastern,
and middle regions. General Baron Von Steuben also supported regional military schools,
but his views also called for 90% of graduates to return “to civil life to diffuse military
education among the citizens and become leaders in a well-regulated militia” (Webb,
1958, p. 14). Von Steuben’s views would foretell a future direction of the citizen soldier
concept and military education outside the jurisdiction of the federal government.
Governor George Clinton of New York went a step further and advocated a
military school for each state “where degrees in the arts and science are conferred”
(Webb, 1958, p. 9). Colonel Jean Baptiste Gouvion, a graduate of the French Royal
Engineering School of Mezieres, submitted a series of detailed recommendations that

20

included practical application of techniques, not just theory (Webb, 1958, p. 10). General
Washington forwarded his personal recommendation to Congress which called for an
academy of engineers and artillerists where young gentlemen could be instructed in the
theory o f the art of war. Shortly thereafter, Washington wrote French General Louis Le
Begue Du Portail, another French Royal Engineering School graduate, indicating that
French engineers would be needed for a future military academy when Congress acted on
his recommendations (Webb, 1958).
The next year, in 1784, Baron Fredrick Von Stueben published a pamphlet
outlining his plan for three regional military academies. Two years later, Henry Knox,
Who was then the Secretary o f War, submitted a plan almost identical to that of Baron
Von Steuben to Congress calling for “efficient institutions ... or the military education of
the youth. . . that knowledge acquired therein shall be diffused throughout the
community” (Webb, 1958, pp. 14-15). This action was not taken by Congress nor was
President Washington able to get results after his inauguration in 1790. As President of
the United States, he called on Congress in 1790, twice in 1793, and again in 1796 to
establish a military academy without success (Webb, 1958).
The lack of support by Congress was attributed to two factors: the fear and
disdain of a standing army based the experiences of the British army being used as a
method of repression and the question of constitutionality, which led Thomas Jefferson to
oppose the establishment o f the school. Jefferson opposed the establishment of a federal
military academy because “none of the specific powers given by the Constitution would
authorize it” (Ambrose, 1999, p. 11). His opposition was vigorous when in 1793, the
national military academy was proposed. At the time, Jefferson and others viewed the
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constitutional powers shared with the states much less narrowly than those assigned to
the federal government. The terms “necessary and proper” when exercising powers
shared between the federal and state governments were his point of contention
(McDonald, 2004).
Under the administration of President John Adams, in 1798, the number of cadets
was expanded to 56 by Congress, and four teachers were authorized (Boyington, 1871).
There was no military school established and cadets were assigned to the army as officers
in training. President Adams submitted a report prepared by the Secretary of War, James
McHenry, that estimated the cost o f establishing a military academy. Harrison Otis
presented a bill calling “for establishment of a Military Academy and for organizing the
Corps o f artillerists and engineers” (Webb, 1958, p. 25), but again, the bill was not acted
upon.
Finally, in 1794, an Act of Congress authorized the Corps of Engineers and
Artillerists and “the necessary books, instruments and apparatus for the use and benefit of
the said Corps” (Webb, 1958, p. 18). The rank and number of cadets would number 32.
West Point, New York, was the station of the Army’s Corps of Artilleries and Engineers
(also called the First Regiment of Artilleries and Engineers) and a logical location for the
training (Holden, 1904). The school taught military courses, but it was not really a
military school. The cadets took courses associated with their assignment with the Corps
o f Artilleries and Engineers until 1796, when the building they used burned to the
ground, a theme that became familiar in the future of military schools.
President Washington’s final appeal in 1796 solicited the support of the Senate.
Vice President John Adams, who had supported the military school cause in 1776, signed
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the positive response (Webb, 1958). But action was still years away for the actual
establishment of the school. Twice in January, 1800, Secretary of War James McHenry
submitted reports to Congress through President Adams addressing the need for a
military academy (Boyington, 1871).
The Secretary o f War’s report addressed the concerns of maintaining a large
military force in that “it is important that as much as perfection as possible be given to
that [force] which may at any time exist,” and that these troops should be “perfect in
organization and discipline and dignity of character” (Boyington, 1871, p. 189). The
report called for a military academy which expanded the military school well beyond that
of simply teaching a few courses for artillerists and engineer officers. McHenry’s report
outlined that cadets were to be prepared to become
engineers (including geographical engineers), miners and officers for the artillery,
cavalry, infantry and navy and the school would teach all sciences necessary to
perfect knowledge of the different branches of the military a r t . . . and be provided
with the proper apparatus and instruments for philosophical and chemical
experiment. . . for astronomical and nautical observation and surveying.
(Boyington, 1871, p. 190)
It took the concept of the military school well beyond that which was considered a
preparatory course for military service. It also pointed out the importance of character
development, which would become a central part of the military school ethos. This report
had been largely ignored in its implications for the development and expansion of the
educational concept of military schools across the United States.
Ironically, under the presidential administration o f Thomas Jefferson, on March
16,1802, the House of Representatives passed a bill addressing the recommendations of
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McHenry to put into law the United States Military Academy. The acts that finally lead to
the establishment of the first military school in part read:
shall constitute a Military Academy . . . that the senior Engineer officer present
[at West Point] shall be the Superintendent of the Academy, and authorized the
Secretary of War to procure, at public expense, the necessary books, implements,
and apparatus for the use and benefit of the institution. (Boyington, 1871, p. 192)
McDonald (2004) describes Jefferson’s early opposition to West Point
“essentially as instinctive, but not well-considered, knee-jerk reaction against
Hamiltonian Federalism” (p. 56). But there might have been another reason for
Jefferson’s newfound interest in the concept of a national university. As President he
wanted to establish a national school with an orientation towards science. West Point
offered a means by which he could win over the sectionalists, a group of which he was
formerly a member, with a national military academy. An indication of this potential
support came from Charles Pinckney as he admitted that state militia were ill prepared to
handle the challenges of engineering and artillery duties (Ambrose, 1999).
The school’s establishment was never seen by President George Washington, its
ranking proponent, as he died in 1799. The academy’s supporters included some of the
greats o f early United States history including Secretary of War General Henry Knox,
President John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, General Baron Frederick Von Steuben,
Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, and Secretary of War James McHenry. Also
influential were the military schools of Europe, especially Royal Military College at
Woolwich, and the French Royal Engineering School of Mezieres.
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Chapter 3: Captain Partridge and the Expansion of the Military School Concept
Captain Alden Partridge was bom in Norwich, Vermont, and attended Dartmouth
College in Hanover, New Hampshire. He left as a senior in 1805 to become a teacher.
His departure from Dartmouth was in good standing with recommendations from the
Professor of Mathematics of having “good moral character and is well qualified for
instructing a school” (Baker, 1986, p. 2). But a teaching career was not in his immediate
future as he became a cadet in the Corps of Engineers at the United States Military
Academy at West Point on July 9, 1806.
In the early years the curriculum was still developing as well as the identity of the
school as a military school rather than a technical course that cadet members of the
Engineer and Artillery Corps attended. The transitional state of the school became more
obvious during Partridge’s short time as a cadet. Partridge enrolled as a cadet at West
Point (July 9-October 30,1806). After four months, he was commissioned as a first
lieutenant. He remained at West Point from 1809 to 1817, rising through academy faculty
ranks from military commander of cadets and instructor in mathematics (1808) to
professor of mathematics, was then promoted to captain (1810), and finally promoted to
military commander of the cadets in April, 1813 (Baker, 1986).
Also in 1813, Partridge was promoted to professor of engineering and appointed
superintendent in 1815, where he remained until 1817. Between the years of 1807 and
1815, Partridge was also responsible for the academy during the many absences of the
West Point superintendent, General Joseph Swift. Swift was also the Army’s Chief of
Engineers and his absence was particularly extensive during much of 1812-1813 as he
attended to duties away from West Point during the War of 1812 (Baker, 1986).
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Partridge held significant positions of leadership for eight of his first 15 years at
the academy. Partridge can be credited with two changes that were critical to the growth
o f West Point as a military school. One of those changes was that no cadet was to leave
the academy for detached duty until his academic studies had been completed; secondly,
that upon completion of studies, the institute would issue a certificate signed by the
superintendent and professors (Baker, 1986).
Partridge was even responsible for the trademark gray uniforms. During the War
of 1812, General Winfield Scott led regular army troops dressed in gray uniforms in the
major victory at the Battle of Chippewa. The uniforms were gray because the issue blue
dye was unavailable. To demonstrate West Point’s pride in the regular Army’s victory,
Partridge adopted the gray uniform (Cowley & Guinzburg, 2002).
Even his most ardent critics credit him with “establishing regulations for the
operation of the academy that forced a more balanced curriculum, along with emphasis
on drill. He also initiated the separation of the position of superintendent from the
position of chief engineer. “The evolution o f a military school in the United States came
about with no other school in the country to emulate. It evolved as an institution of higher
education, providing basic engineering training . . . with mathematics and drawing ...
natural philosophy, French and engineering arts” (Manning, 2003, p. 103). The school
grew from 40 authorized cadets in 1802, to 250 cadets in 1812.
However, Partridge’s relations with the faculty, both civilian and fellow military
officers, were not good. Initially problems at West Point were twofold: the dual nature of
the cadets’ responsibilities during the earlier years coupled with the leadership’s lack of
experience with the military school concept. Cadets were assigned duties to support their
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regiments, which took them away them from their academic duties. It was not that
Partridge and Swift did not seek the best for their academy; it was that they were not sure
what a military school should be, and neither Partridge nor Swift had the background or
experience of working in a well-established military school. The majority of Partridge’s
educational experience was at Dartmouth and Colonel Swift’s was at Harvard.
The experience needed to run a military school could have come from George
Washington’s desire for the academy in 1783. Washington clearly desired a school where
French engineers with their experience from the Royal Engineering School of Mezieres
would teach and initially run West Point (Webb, 1958). But the Army’s Officer Corps
fought this idea even after the War of 1812. Captain Partridge supported the opposition of
French officers taking leadership positions in the Army. Interestingly, General Swift
recommended that General Simon Bernard replace Captain Partridge as superintendent at
West Point in 1816 (Baker, 1986). General Bernard was a French officer and a graduate
of another French military school, Ecole Polytechnique, which was founded in 1794 and
was a military school from 1804—1970 (Ecole Polytechnique, 2010).
Captain Partridge’s lack of success with the academy faculty was further
compounded by members of the faculty who complained not to General Swift, but
directly to the Secretary o f War, William Crawford, about Partridge’s leadership.
Members of the faculty supported the separation of scholastic and military duties.
Partridge’s vision was that a cadet’s academic and military chain of command should
function as one (Baker, 1958). The ongoing conflict with the faculty led to a court of
inquiry and finally Partridge’s court martial and permanent removal from West Point and
active military service.
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The downfall o f Partridge at West Point came quickly after a visit to the academy
by the President of the United States, James Monroe. The Secretary of War involved the
President and, unfortunately for Partridge, he had not made an ally of either. Monroe
suggested, in no uncertain terms, that Partridge should be replaced by Major Sylvanus
Thayer. “I do not think much of your Captain Partridge and would prefer to see Major
Thayer in his place” (Baker, 1958, p. 81). The President directed that a court of inquiry
be conducted.
General Swift, who was chief of engineers and still had oversight over the
academy, gave Partridge an option o f assuming duties away from West Point or taking
leave until the court of inquiry occurred. In accordance with the President’s wishes, the
academy changed command on July 28,1817, and Partridge departed for Vermont. After
33 days, on August 30, Partridge’s better judgment failed him and he returned against
orders and personally logged his return to West Point as having “taken upon himself
[Partridge] for the present, the command and superintendence o f the institution, as senior
officer of engineers present” (Baker, 1958, p. 83).
Up until this point, Partridge still had a promising career in the Corps of
Engineers and was only facing a court o f inquiry. He could have been in the army long
after Monroe’s administration was out of office, but as a result of his actions of August
30, General Swift placed him under arrest and a court martial was convened (Baker,
1958).
Partridge was found guilty of disobeying orders in that he assumed command of
West Point following the appointment of Thayer as headmaster. He also was found guilty
o f issuing illegal orders. As a small consolation for Partridge, the court president, General
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Winfield Scott, requested “in consideration of the zeal and perseverance which the
prisoner [Partridge] seems uniformly to have displayed in discharge of his professional
duties . . . leave to recommend him to clemency of the President of the United States”
(Baker, 1986, pp. 89-91). In accordance with the judgment, Partridge resigned from the
army in disgrace on April 15,1818.
There are two basic points of view regarding Captain Alden Partridge, one being
that he “possessed few leadership qualities and as a result alienated the academic staff’
(Manning, 2003, p. 103) and the other that he was the victim of a political struggle
between the Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers, which influenced the
President’s ruling against him. There was no clemency for Partridge as the Army did not
want to return to the issue involving the civilian authorities and further negative public
attention (Baker, 1958).
These events, despite their negative connotations, resulted in the emergence of
parallel efforts to refine and expand the military school culture and concept in the United
States. The first was the beginning of a second career by Alden Partridge, who
established and led a successful university. Perhaps of even more historical significance,
he started a nationwide crusade for the establishment of military schools outside the
federal government’s administration.
The second parallel effort brought about by the departure of Alden Partridge from
West Point was the appointment of Sylvanus Thayer as superintendent at West Point. He
would lead that institution from 1817 to 1833, and firmly establish an ethos and standard
o f education that led to the expansion of the military school concept well into the current
century.
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According to Baker (1986), the court martial left Partridge with “severe emotional
scars” (p. 94) and he became suspicious of the federal bureaucracy. He immediately
moved forward to find redemption for his reputation through the founding of an alternate
military school. The American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy, later known as
Norwich University, was founded in 1819 in Norwich, Vermont, with its first cadet
enrolled on September 4, 1820. Partridge opened the doors of the new school with a
faculty of six to include himself, a chaplain who taught ethics, a professor o f chemistry,
two professors teaching languages (English, Greek, and Latin), and a professor of
practical sciences (geometry, topography) who also acted as master of the sword
(physical fitness). Partridge taught mathematics, philosophy, and military science (Ellis,
1898).
The American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy gave Partridge an
opportunity to develop cadet regulations and standards that reflected his own philosophy
without political interference. The rules of standards in the 1826 prospectus of the school
included rules against “prevarication or falsehood” which lead to immediately cadet
dismissal (American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy, 1826, p. 25). These
standards were an early foreshadowing of what is now a common part of the military
school culture that includes codes against lying, cheating, and stealing.

Partridge’s reputation was reestablished through his competence as a scientist and
mathematician. Samuel Latham Mitchill, who was considered the Father of American
chemistry, stated Partridge’s “scientific zeal and proficiency I have often given a very
favorable opinion” (Baker, 1958, p. 111). Mitchill called his contributions to learned
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journals valuable and encouraged him to take on a survey of the eastern United States
(Smith, 1922).
Enrollment at the new school indicated that the public, at least in his state, either
overlooked or sided with him on the West Point scandal. In the first year of operation,
there were 100 cadets; in the second year, 140; and by the sixth year, no less than 197
cadets (Ellis, 1898). This enrollment compared very favorably with West Point, where
authority was given to increase the cadet corps to 250 in 1819 (Lowrie, 1832). Cadets at
Norwich were uniformed in dark blue with three rows of bullet buttons, in contrast to
West Point’s gray attire (Ellis, 1898).
Although in the beginning most cadets were from New York or New England, by
1826,100 of the 293 cadets were from the South. Partridge actively sought out cadets
from across the country and particularly from the South (Baker, 1986). One reason for the
large southern enrollment may have been the antimilitary attitude in New England after
the War of 1812. As late as 1834, there was a strong antimilitary feeling in the north and
a tide of contemporary social influence against the military setting of Norwich
University. Critics of Norwich regarded it as “not only as out of tune with the age, but
also as a promoter o f that wild war spirit” (Poirier, 1999, p. 7).
Captain Alden Partridge is best known as the Father of Norwich University and as
the Father of the Reserve Officer Training Program (ROTC). Norwich University is the
second oldest military school in the United States, having operated for more than 192
years. It is also the only privately owned military college in the country and in 2010, had
a student body of 2,100 undergraduates and 1,200 graduate students, of which 1,123 were
members of the corps of cadets.
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In forming his first school and those that followed, Partridge was guided by his
analysis of the shortcomings he saw in education and defense in the United States. This
analysis was both a product of his educational experiences at Dartmouth and West Point,
with its focus on engineering and a concern for the leadership of the state militias.
Outside West Point, there was no military school in the United States before Norwich’s
establishment. West Point was strictly focused on providing officers for the regular army,
and until Norwich, there was no school providing professional military education for
officers o f the militia.
Partridge saw five significant shortfalls in educational institutions of the time. The
first was that the classical education of the time was “not sufficiently practical nor was it
properly adapted to the various duties an American citizen may be called upon to
discharge” (Russell, 1826, p. 395). He criticized the liberal colleges and universities for
their emphasis on Latin and Greek languages at the expense of English and practical
technical subjects. Second was the total neglect of physical education for “preservation of
health . . . capable of enduring exposure, hunger and fatigue” (Russell, 1826, p. 396).
Third was the amount o f idle time allowed students, which he considered “injurious to
their constitutions and destructive to their morals” (Russell, 1826, p. 396) rather than
utilizing the time for improvement of the mind and body.
The fourth defect in education, according to Partridge, was the freedom of
students to use their wealth to engage in activities encouraging moral corruption. His fifth
objection was that courses of studies were too limited and did not fully utilize students’
capacity or inclination for the acquirement of knowledge. His final objection was that the
course of studies was based on a prescribed length o f time rather than the student’s rate
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and capability of progress (Russell, 1826). At the same time, Partridge saw a critical
shortcoming in the nation’s approach to leader preparation in the state militia.
These conclusions were made by Partridge even before his departure from West
Point. In 1815, he wrote the Secretary of War, Alexander J. Dallas, concluding that West
Point alone was insufficient to meet the demands of the nation’s military forces, which
were largely state militias. His plan called for diffusion of military science throughout the
country in order to provide sound officers to the militia and educate the midshipmen of
the Navy in a more professional manner (Baker, 1986). The plan also included three
additional military academies patterned after West Point to support the Eastern, Southern,
and Western regions, with an enrollment of 150 federally funded cadets and 250 privately
funded cadets, for a total o f 400 per academy. This would allow those cadets who desired
a civilian career and association with the militia to initially enter the militia with the same
preparation as those cadets going into the regular Army. His plan was not well received
and the concept of privately paying young men attending one of the military academies
was considered controversial (Baler, 1986).
Between 1815 and 1816, Partridge sought political supporters for his plan.
Congressman Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky was the chairman of the Military Affairs
Committee and became a supporter. He concurred with Partridge’s plans with the
exception of the privately funded cadets not bound for the regular Army. This part of the
plan was central to Partridge’s desire to expand the professional military training to the
militias (Baker 1986). This was a fundamental issue for Partridge and has since become
part o f the Citizen Soldier concept in the United States. Partridge would eventually be
associated with the Citizen Solider concept and years later be known as the Father of
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Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). ROTC was not established in the United States
until 1916. But Partridge’s work following his release from West Point brought military
education out of the confines of the United States Military Academy and helped produce
military officers for the nation for more than 100 years before the federal government
established a formal program for military officer education outside West Point.
Between 1820 and 1842, 43 new military schools opened beyond the confines of
West Point. This was the beginning of military school expansion in the U.S. education
system and was initially led by Captain Alden Partridge. Starting in the late 1820s,
Captain Partridge traveled across the United States lecturing about his educational
philosophy and led efforts to start military schools across the country. Between 1819 and
1853, Captain Partridge had a direct hand in the establishment of 18 military schools, by
personally starting the institutions himself, sending educators, or visiting to establish or
transition schools to the military format.
These schools included the American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy
(Norwich University) and the following schools with those marked with * as transitioning
to the military format (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Military Schools Established by Captain Partridge after Norwich University
Opened or
Transition

School

Location

1827

Western Literary, Scientific and Military Academy

Buffalo, NY

1827

Literary Scientific and Military Academy

Perth Amboy, NJ

1828

New Jersey Institute

Orange, NJ

1828*

Dinwiddie (Hatch) Military Academy

Danville, VA

1828

American Institute

Washington, DC

1828

Virginia Collegiate Institute

Portsmouth, VA

1829*

Jefferson Military College

Washington, MS

1830

North Carolina Classical Literary, Scientific and Military

Oxford, NC

Institute (M.I.)
1830

North Carolina Classical Literary, Scientific and M.I.

Fayetteville, NC

1839

Virginia Literary, Scientific and Military Academy

Portsmouth, VA

1842

PA Literary, Scientific and Military Academy

Bristow, PA

1844

Raleigh Military Academy

Raleigh, NC

1844*

North Carolina Literary, Scientific and Military Academy

Raleigh, NC

1844

Missouri Literary, Scientific and Military College

Saint Louis, MO

1846

Wilmington Literary, Scientific and Military Academy

Wilmington, DE

1849

Gymnasium and Military Institute

Pembroke, NH

1853

National Scientific and Military Collegiate Institute

Brandywine, DE

35

Partridge’s negotiations were not always successful in the establishment of
military schools. Much of his success was based on his personal reputation and his ability
to provide quality professors. In 1827 Judge Henry Shippen suggested that military
training be part of the Allegheny College program. Shippen was a veteran of the War of
1812 and had been a major with the Pennsylvania Division (Honeyman, 1921). Shortly
thereafter Shippen became president of the college board and suggested that a “military
academy, similar to that at West Point or one run by Captain Alden Partridge . . . would
be useful to this community and more likely to receive legislative aid” (Smith, 1916, p.
59). In 1828 Partridge visited the school, and the next year the issue of conversion of the
school and Captain Partridge’s financial commitment was discussed by the board. James
McKay represented Partridge and committed to sharing any initial loss equally between
Partridge and the board as a group. As a guarantee McKay requested a $500 commitment,
but the Allegheny College board only offered $350 and “thus by a kind Providence, in
due time, Alleghany was delivered from the military experience” (Smith, 1916, p. 61).
Norwich University between 1819 and 1911 had 70 of its alumni working as
faculty in military schools. In addition to the 17 military schools listed on the previous
page, the alumni of Norwich University founded or helped transform five military
schools: Pennock Military and Classical School, Rutland, Vermont in 1824; Arrow
Military Academy, Arrow Rock, Missouri in 1839; Mount Sterling Literary and Military
Academy in Old Fort Mason, Kentucky in 1847; Russell Military Academy, New Haven,
Connecticut in 1840; and Highland Academy to Highland Military Academy, Worcester,
Massachusetts in 1857 (Ellis, 1911). There were a total of 23 military schools associated
with Partridge and his students prior to the Civil War.
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Prior to the establishment of the Virginia Military Institute in 1839 and the
Military College of South Carolina in 1841, Captain Partridge and the alumni of Norwich
University were critical to the expansion of the military school concept beyond West
Point. Norwich University educated not only cadets from the Northern States and New
England but also the South. After the establishment of Norwich, the reputation of his
schools, cadets, and alumni helped expand the military concept throughout the United
States. Captain Alden Partridge’s personal efforts to spread the military concept set the
stage for a format of military education that would eventually include 834 schools.
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Chapter 4: Sylvanus Thayer and the Military School Culture
Captain Alden Partridge’s replacement as Superintendent of West Point was
Major Sylvanus Thayer. As part of Partridge’s campaign to create multiple regional
military academies after his departure, he was publicly critical of West Point. This
dismayed and turned many, if not the majority, of West Point Alumni against him
(Wineman, 2006). After the court martial, Thayer and Partridge had a very bitter
relationship. In fact Thayer degraded Partridge until the day he died (Baker 1986).
But the two educators had many things in common. Both had attended Dartmouth
College. Where Partridge departed his senior year, Thayer left just prior to the graduation
ceremony where he was valedictorian of the Dartmouth class of 1807. Thayer, like
Partridge, attended West Point for a brief time as a cadet, Thayer for one year and
Partridge for three months. Both Thayer and Partridge were faculty members together in
1810 teaching mathematics (Baker, 1958; Manning, 2003).
The War o f 1812 ended the similar experience between the two. Thayer left West
Point for service where he distinguished himself “for actions at Canary Island and in the
Defense of Norfolk” (Kammen, 1996, p. 7) in 1814 for which he was promoted to major.
Service in combat is no small point of honor among military men.
It was not uncommon to have military officers who had not served in combat to
be looked upon less than favorably by their contemporaries. Combat experience, both
from the practical viewpoint and the bankroll of credibility, helped Thayer with his work
at West Point. The other benefit o f his service was seeing the poor performance of the
American Officer Corps, largely untrained and without the benefits of West Point, likely
giving him vision o f the importance of the West Point mission.
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But the biggest advantage Thayer had was his personal experience with a
European military education. Between 1815 and 1817, Thayer and Colonel William
McRee studied the French military school, Ecole Polytechnique, and collected 1,000
technical texts, which formed the basis of the West Point library (Manning, 2003). Ecole
Polytechnique was established in 1794 as a civilian engineering school but was converted
by Napoleon to a French military engineering school in 1804 (Ecole Polytechnique,
2010). Unlike the United States with a shortage of West Point trained officers, there was
no shortage of officers in France who were trained at the Ecole Polytechnique or one of
the other French military schools. So the school Thayer studied was well advanced
beyond West Point as both an engineer college and a military school.
Some of the changes Thayer made upon assuming the duties of West Point
Superintendent in 1817 were the establishment of classes small enough to allow daily
recitation by each cadet with the intent to provide practical experience, a focus on
subjects which orient the cadet to be a technically trained military engineer, a
requirement of daily grades and resectioning based on those grades, and the institution of
rank ordering by academic standing and year group (Manning, 2003).
Thayer further “regularized the entire cadet schedule” (Manning, 2003, p. 116)
which helped translate West Point’s culture to the military school culture of the future.
He insisted on “high standards of appearance, weekly attendance at chapel, and a strict
enforcement of rules against lying, stealing, and other irregular or immoral practices”
(Manning, 2003, p. 116). The cadets were organized into two cadet companies by height,
well equipped with muskets, well drilled, and led by cadet officers. They were marched
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to and from the mess hall in formation and were dismissed in front o f the North and
South Barracks (Latrobe, 1887).
Thayer is widely credited with the start of the honor code at West Point, which
actually became a written code in 1932. What Thayer did was engrain in the corps of
cadets the following:
A code of ethical behavior set forth as the ideal of the commissioned officer
corps. Central to the ethical system was the idea that an officer’s word was his
bond. The penalty for failure to meet this standard, was for the officer [cadet] to
be immediately cashiered and disgraced. (Sorley, 2009, p. 17)
The combination of his approach to academics and cadet discipline became known as the
Thayer Method (Manning, 2003).
The Superintendent at Culver Military Academy summed up Thayer’s
contribution by stating that Colonel Thayer “is perhaps more than any other man
responsible for that blending of military, intellectual and moral training that has enabled
the graduates o f West Point to achieve distinction in civil no less than in military
pursuits” (Gignilliat, 1916, p. 9). Thayer actually did more in that he refined the
organizational culture o f the military school concept and perfected a model for the
country’s military schools. According to Manning (2003), where Partridge had failed,
Thayer had succeeded for three reasons. First, he was building on the predecessors who
established the initial facilities, curriculum, and policies. Second, he had complete
support of three presidential administrations: Madison, Monroe, and Adams. Finally, he
possessed the organizational skills to enlist the support of a competent faculty who could
have taught elsewhere if they desired.
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Thayer’s support of the faculty, however, may not have always been the best for
the institution. The Commandant of Cadets was Captain John Bliss, considered the best
drill instructor in the army. Unfortunately, he had a temper which resulted in his assault
of a cadet. Five cadet leaders presented their objections to Thayer in the form of a
petition of over a hundred cadets and were reprimanded by Thayer. When the five
returned with a new petition representing 189 cadets despite the superintendent’s
warning, they were dismissed. The ring leaders were court martialed and their dismissal
was upheld by President Monroe. Although Captain Bliss departed the academy in
January, 1819, the grievances of the cadets who remembered Bliss as “harsh and
tyrannical” were never redressed (Latrobe, 1887, p. 10).
Thayer and West Point did not escape criticism during his time as superintendent.
Chief critic was Partridge, as part of his quest for regional academies. Among others was
Congressman Newton Cannon of Tennessee whose resolution in 1820 called for the
abolishment of West Point. Congress rejected that proposal but again in 1830 the famous
Congressman Davy Crockett accused West Point of being exclusively for the privileged,
educating the sons of the rich and neglecting the poor (Webb, 1958). The state legislature
of Kentucky in 1833 called for West Point’s abolishment (Webb, 1958).
Despite the criticism, the academy grew in reputation. Its graduates proved to be
competent soldiers with outstanding educations provided by the school. In the midst of a
poor showing by the army at large in the War of 1812, the West Pointers were a bright
spot. No West Point-engineered fortress fell to the enemy. Ten o f the 47 West Point
graduates serving among 3,495 officers in the army were killed. But the West Pointers
accounted for 10% of the promotions for bravery or exceptional service (brevet
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promotions). By 1823 the reputation of West Point had grown so that there were 1,000
applications for the limited openings. Outstanding professors such as Dennis Hart Mahan
and Edward H. Courtenay brought the academies at the school to new academic heights
(Cowley, 2002).
The student body’s small size of 250 is deceptive and must be placed into
historical perspective of the early 19th century. The nine most influential colleges in the
1800s included Harvard, with an enrollment of 200, Princeton 150, Dartmouth 140, and
University o f Pennsylvania 150 (Manning, 2003). West Point in 1819 was the only
engineering school in the country until Norwich University doors opened in 1820, and in
1824 Rennsselaer School, a nonmilitary institution, became the third. After 1833, more
civilian institutions o f higher learning began offering civil engineering courses of study
(Manning, 2003).
But Thayer, like Partridge, had growing conflicts with President Andrew Jackson.
President Jackson referred to Thayer as a tyrant and overturned a series of the
superintendent’s disciplinary decisions. The last of Jackson’s actions against Thayer’s
wishes involved the dismissal of Cadet Ariel Norris. Norris had a long record of
reprimands, courts-martial that included a previously overturned dismissal. When
Jackson reversed his second dismissal, after 26 years as superintendent, Thayer resigned
(Cowley, 2002).
Thayer, unlike Partridge, was focused inward on West Point. His demands on the
academic institution of West Point established it not only as the country’s first
engineering school but the best of his time. His leadership and application of the school
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standards he saw in France helped create the model military school culture for military
schools to emulate for the next two centuries.
Thayer did not accomplish this influence with an effort to expand the military
school concept outside of West Point but did so through the reputation of the school and
its alumni. West Point alumni were very involved in the establishment o f other U.S.
military schools. This included American Classical and Military Lyceum, opened in 1826
and whose first superintendent and founder was Augustus L. Roumford, Class of 1817.
The American Classical and Military Lyceum opened in 1826 in the building formerly
used by a Catholic seminary in Germantown, Pennsylvania. Roumford had been a teacher
at the seminary and uniformed his cadets in gray uniforms and white trousers in the
summer. The cadets wore caps with a seven-inch crown adorned with a yellow cockade
and eagle and conducted daily drill and morning and evening parades (“Obituary of
Colonel,” 1878).
The American Classical and Military Lyceum’s cadet corps contained 150 young
men and boys, many of whom were from the South. They marched to Saint Luke’s
Episcopal Church for religious services. Among the cadets were at least two from Mexico
and others from Cuba. General George Meade, Union commander at Gettysburg, was
prepared for West Point at the school as was Confederate General Beauregard. Roumford
taught mathematics and languages and employed at least six other professors including
future Confederate General Quitman, and Colonel Kober, a Prussian who taught German.
The school operated for 10 years, closing in 1836 (Houtchkin, 1889; Germantown
Independent Gazette, August 2,1878).
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After the founding of Rounford’s school, there were at least 17 other military
schools documented to have been opened with West Point founders or under West Point
alumni leadership. Among them was the Huntsville Military, Scientific, and Classical
School, which Bradley S.A. Lowe, Class of 1814, founded in 1831 in Huntsville,
Alabama. The Aiken Classical and Military Academy opened in South Carolina in 1842
with Alfred Herbert, Class of 1835, as the principal (Cullum, 1891). Georgia Military
Academy in Greenville opened in 1847 with William F. Disbrow, Class of 1843
(nongraduate), as principal.
That same year the Maryland Military Institute (Military Academy) in Oxford
was founded by Tench Tilghman, West Point Class of 1832 (Winemann, 2003). The
school’s first superintendent was John H. Allen, also of the Class of 1832. John Allen
would depart after 10 years and founded his own school in Chillicothe, the Ohio Military
Academy, which opened in 1857 (Cullum, 1879). Saint Thomas Hall in Holly Springs,
Mississippi, transitioned to Saint Thomas Hall Military Academy in 1849 under the
leadership of Claudius W. Sears, Class of 1841, as president. The Mississippi Military
Institute was founded in 1848 by a man who claimed to be a West Point graduate, but
Colonel Goldsborough’s claim has not been confirmed. The Alabama Scientific and
Military Institute, Tuskegee, founded in 1846, was under Amoldus Brumby, Class of
1846, who in 1851 would become the first superintendent of Georgia Military Institute,
Marion (Winneman, 2007).
Kentucky Military Institute, in Farmdale, was founded in 1846 by Colonel Robert
T. P. Allen, Class of 1834, and he later transitioned the Bastrop Academy in Bastrop,
Texas, to Bastrop Military Institute as their first superintendent in 1857. Other military
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schools founded under West Point alumni included the Western Military Institute,
Georgetown, Kentucky, founded in 1847 by Colonel Thornton Johnson, West Point Class
of 1822 (nongraduate) (Winneman, 2007). He was followed in 1851 by Bushrod Rust
Johnson, Class of 1840, who lead that institution until the Civil War (Warner, 2006).
Caleb Goldsmith Forshey, a nongraduate of West Point’s Class of 1838, established
Texas Military Institute in San Antonio, Texas, in 1854 (Olson, 2011). D. H. Hill, Class
of 1842, was the first superintendent of Hillsborro Military Academy, Hillsborro, North
Carolina, opened in 1860. Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy,
Alexandria, opened in 1860, and its first president would become one of West Point’s
most famous alumni, General William Tecumseh Sherman, Class of 1840.
The most influential alumni in the expansion of the military school format in the
United States were the first superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute and, to a
lesser degree, the initial leadership of the South Carolina Military Academy, which is
referred to as the Citadel, its designation officially starting in 1910. The Virginia Military
Institute’s first president was a West Pointer, Colonel Francis H. Smith, Class of 1835.
The Citadel’s first two presidents directed the school for nine years and were both West
Pointers. Captain William F. Graham, Class of 1838, died of tuberculosis in office as
president and was followed by Major Richard W. Colcock, Class of 1826 (Citadel, 2010).
The United States Military Academy under the leadership of Thayer perfected the
Thayer method and much of what would become the common organizational culture of
military schools for the next 200 years. The alumni of the academy founded, transitioned,
or initially directed 20 o f the early military academies, including Alden Partridge at
Norwich. Additionally, two other military schools, Virginia Military Institute and the
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Citadel, would influence the expansion of the military school concept extensively in the
southern United States in the years preceding the Civil War.
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Chapter 5: Francis Smith, Virginia Military Institute
Between 1843 and 1854, 91 military schools operated in the United States: 52
(57%) in states that later became the Confederacy and 28 in the Union States, with 11
associated with states considered Border States during the approaching Civil War. In the
seven years just prior to the Civil War, southern military school expansion was dramatic.
Between 1854 and the beginning of the Civil War, the number of military schools in
operation had expanded by 49% with 137 military schools operating. Ninety-eight (71%)
of those schools were in what would become Confederate States. This increase and
regional shift was directly related to the establishment of two southern military
institutions and the superintendent of one of them.
The creation of a state-supported military school in Virginia had been discussed in
that state prior to 1835. That year, an article published by Lexington, Virginia, lawyer
John Preston stated that the idea of an institute of a military character was not new and
had become a popular idea since the establishment of the arsenal in Lexington, which
was guarded by undisciplined state soldiers that had been involved in a murder.
The reputation of West Point was a subject o f the Lexington Gazette only three
weeks prior to John Preston’s comments. In January, 1836, a petition of 94 Lexington
citizens called for the arsenal to be the responsibility of a new military school. This action
progressed through the state legislature until the Governor appointed a Board of Visitors
with directions to establish a military school in Lexington. The Board included the State
Engineer, Colonel Claudius Crozet, a Frenchmen, graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique,
who served under Napoleon prior to coming to the United States in 1816 and worked at
West Point as a professor of mathematics under Alden Partridge (Couper, 1939; Baker,
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1958). At his suggestion “the regulations of the West Point Academy were made
substantially the code of laws for the government of the institution” (Smith, 1912, pp.
54-55).
But Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was not to be a clone of West Point. West
Point was to serve as a model, but the education was “not to fit its graduates for a single
profession . . . but to prepare young men for the varied work of civil life” (Couper, 1939,
p. 33). This required the education at VMI to have a “diminished intensity” but a
“comprehensiveness enlarged” (Smith, 1912, p. 23). VMI was the nation’s first state
military college and, like Partridge’s Norwich, looked at an education beyond the
engineering focus of West Point to the needs of the state and its militia.
The first superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute was Francis Smith, West
Point Class of 1833. He had been at West Point the last four years of Colonel Sylvanus
Thayer’s reign as superintendent. Smith’s feelings about Sylvanus Thayer were revealed
in his address to the West Point alumni in 1879 when he spoke at the annual reunion.
Smith described Thayer as “a noble specimen o f West Point character” (Smith, 1879, p.
7) and alluded to his encounters with him before and after graduation. Smith served in the
1st Artillery Regiment and then returned to West Point as a professor of moral and
political philosophy before resigning from the army in 1836 and becoming an educator at
Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia, where he taught mathematics (Wineman, 2006).
Smith took charge of the institute’s initial 28 cadets and led the institution for 50
years, 1839-1889. Smith built a college based on many of Thayer’s West Point academic
fundamentals that included much of the science and mathematics core curriculum. But
Smith added liberal arts as he desired that VMI provide for a “thoroughness of education”
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that would give VMI a distinct character and provide for the production of good teachers
with the command of English and “sound mathematical minds” (Wineman, 2006, p. 4546).
Through his connections, the superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute
recruited a pool of military educators to expand his philosophy o f education. Initially
these educators were, like him, West Point graduates, but as Virginia Military Institute
produced graduates, they became his source for teacher and administrator
recommendations. In the first 15 years of VMI existence, 54% of its graduates became
teachers, giving Smith many opportunities to expand his philosophy as well as VMI’s
reputation (Green, 2008).
Colonel Francis Smith’s correspondence while superintendent reflects an interest
in helping both West Pointer alumni and VMI graduates with advice and employment
referrals. West Pointers who requested his advice and assistance included Colonel Robert
T. P. Allen at Kentucky Military Institute, who requested VMI’s regulations. Major
Richard W. Colcock, who took over the Citadel after the untimely death of its first
superintendent, visited VMI and sought out Smith’s advice on a variety o f subjects.
Amoldus Brumby sought his advice as he took over Georgia Military Institute. Colonel
Tench Tilghman sought Smith’s advice on a variety of issues and requested the VMI
regulations for his Maryland Military Academy. And Major William Tecumseh Sherman
at the Louisiana Seminary o f Learning and Military Academy also turned to Smith for
guidance. Smith used these relationships and those with nonmilitary educators to help the
alumni of both West Point and VMI with employment (Wineman, 2006).
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Like West Point, many VMI alumni actually started military schools of their own
based on their educational experiences. But the list of pre-Civil War military schools with
founders or initial leadership from VMI was even larger than from West Point, as the
Virginia school’s alumni were more prepared to go into educational careers.
A total of 26 military schools were established or created by VMI alumni prior to
the firing on Fort Sumter on April 12,1861. John B. Strange, Class of 1842, transitioned
Norfolk Academy in Virginia to the military format in 1843 as the assistant principal and
then as principal in 1847 (Brown, 1993). He later started Albemarle Military Institute,
Charlottesville, Virginia, in 1856. James L. Bryan, Class of 1843, was the founder of
Petersburg Classical and Military Academy in Virginia opened in 1848 (Wineman,
2006). After the war, he established Cambridge Military Academy in Maryland.
Abingdon Military Academy in Virginia had a series of VMI men as principals starting
with B. F. Ficklin in 1849. John Henry Pitts, Class of 1844, transitioned the Rumford
Academy in Virginia to the Rumford Military Academy in 1849. Thomas Benton, Class
o f 1850, was co-principal at the Arkansas Military Institute when it opened in 1850.
Valentine Saunders, Class of 1842, chose the 1853-1854 time frame to open his Baton
Rouge Military Institute in Louisiana which closed shortly thereafter due to a yellow
fever epidemic (Wineman, 2006). James J. Phillips, Class of 1853, established the
Chuckatuck Military Academy in Chuckatuck, Virginia, in 1854. Titus V. Williams,
Class o f 1859, established the Jeffersonville Military Academy in Tazewell County,
Virginia (Wineman, 2006). Charles E. Lightfoot, Class of 1854, was key in organizing
the Culpeper Military Institute in Virginia in 1857; John W. Lewis, Class of 1859, helped
transition St. John’s College, Arkansas, in 1859 as commandant. Thomas Harris, Class of
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1851, helped transition Elizabeth City Academy in North Carolina to military in 1851.
Charles Derby, Class of 1848, was first superintendent of West Alabama Military
Institute in i851 (Walker, 1875). William Elisha Arnold, Class of 1853, was the first
superintendent of Lafayette Military Institute in Missouri in 1859.
Lynchburg Military College in Virginia was established in 1855, and Captain
James E. Blankenship, Class of 1852, was among the faculty as mathematics professor
and a member of the military department, as may have been other VMI alumni. He would
go on to help convert Randolph-Macon College in Virginia to a military format after the
Civil War began. Also on the faculty with Captain Blankenship at Lynchburg Military
College was James Thomas Murfee, VMI Class of 1853, who taught natural sciences. He
is an excellent example of how far and long VMI’s influence in the military school
movement went. Prior to coming to Lynchburg, he taught at Madison College in
Pennsylvania. Madison was not a military school, but they required uniforms for drill and
had a demerit system (Hadden, 1913; Gates, 1905). During the Civil War he served as
commandant for the University of Alabama, and after the war he converted Howard
College to a military school as its president, and later founded Marion Military Institute.
The Virginia Military Institute alumni contributed to an explosion of military
schools in the South. Edward J. Magruder, Class of 1855, ran the Rome Military
Academy from 1855 until the start of the war ini 861 (Battey, 1922). Valentine M.
Johnson, Class of 1860, went to West Florida Seminary as Commandant of Cadets
shortly before the war. He was joined there by James Cross, Class of 1856, who became
the professor of mathematics and tactics. Cross had been principal of Winchester Military
School in Virginia which was established in 1856, during its early years. (Virginia
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Military Institute Archives Online Historical Rosters, 2010). William Keiter, Class of
1859, started Shelbyville Military Academy in Tennessee in 1860. Frederick Bass, Class
of 1851, as first professor o f military tactics and later as president of Marshall College in
Texas, transitioned the school to military around 1858. James W. Keeble, Class of 1857,
was professor of tactics and principal of Sharon College in Mississippi when it
transitioned to military in 1860. James W. Hairston, Class of 1858, founded Hairston
School in Mississippi in 1859. James H. Waddell, Class of 1855, was the first
commandant in 1860 for the Cappahoosie Military Academy in Virginia. James V. Hall,
Class of 1852, established the Craddockville Military Academy, in Accomack County,
Virginia, around 1853.
Joseph H. Hebard and Edward C. Edmonds, both of the Class of 1858, were hired
at the Hampton Academy in Virginia as it transitioned to the Hampton Military Academy
in the late 1850s (Brown, 1997). Edwards left shortly thereafter to help found Danville
Military Academy (Institute) in Danville, Virginia in 1859 (Walker, 1875). William
Mahone, Class of 1847, and Thomas R. Thorston, Class of 1852, were both employed at
the Rappahannock Academy and helped transform it to the Rappahannock Academy and
Military Institute in Virginia.
Once the war began, many private, male, nonmilitary schools and colleges saw
enrollment drop dramatically. In 1860, one of these colleges in Virginia was RandolphMacon College, was at the “climax of its antebellum prosperity” (Irby, 1899, p. 151). By
August 1861, so many students had departed the college to enlist in the Confederate
Army that the leadership “sought to reinvent the school as a military academy” (Davis &
Robertson, 2009, p. 242). The Board of Trustees of the Methodist college initially
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appointed Rev. Major William H. Wheelwright, VMI Class of 1845, as professor of
military tactics in August 1861. The following February, the board completed the military
reorganization o f the college with the president, Rev. William A. Smith, named colonel
and commandant of cadets and another VMI man, Major J. E. Blankenship, Class of
1852, named professor o f mathematics and military science. “A regular uniform was
prescribed, drills were observed daily, and other things of a similar character were
enjoined, all looking towards preparation o f the student for the duties that awaited him in
defense o f his country” (Irby, 1899, p. 155).
After the war, Randolph-Macon would reopen as a nonmilitary college and thrive.
But years later, reaching back to those few years of military operation, the school’s two
affiliated academies, Randolph-Macon Academy in Front Royal and Randolph-Macon
Academy in Bedford, would convert to military prep schools in 1910 and 1920,
respectively.
The contributions of Francis Smith and the Virginia Military Institute alumni
prior to the Civil War to the expansion of the military school concept explained the
popularity of the military school in the southern United States, but it does not tell the
whole story. In South Carolina, Governor George McDuffie proposed the creation of a
state military school combining “military instruction with the usual subjects taught in
state schools in 1836” (Buckley, 2004, p. 2). Military schools by this time were becoming
familiar, as about 100 South Carolina men had attended Norwich and seven served in the
state legislature (Kraus, 1978).
In 1842, South Carolina Governor John P. Richardson established two schools,
one at Columbia and the other in Charleston. The schools were under one Board of
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Governors and the cadets would, like VMI, take the duties of guarding the arsenals at
each location. In March, 1843, 20 cadets reported to the Citadel Academy in Charleston
and 14 to the Arsenal Academy in Columbia. The two schools were known collectively
as the South Carolina Military Academy (The Citadel). After 1845, only cadets in their
initial year at the academy were housed at the Arsenal in Columbia (Buckley, 2004).
Between opening in 1842 and the start of the Civil War in 1861, the Citadel had four
superintendents. Captain William F. Graham only served one year prior to his death; he
was replaced by Major Richard W. Colcock, who served as superintendent until 1852. He
was replaced by a Citadel faculty member, Major Francis W. Capers, who served until
1859 and was replaced by Citadel graduate, Major Peter F. Stevens, Class of 1849
(Citadel, 2010). Unlike Francis Smith at VMI, whatever part the four Citadel
superintendents played in the establishment of additional military schools prior to the
Civil War was largely lost to history when the Citadel was destroyed by Union forces in
1865. But a number o f military schools created by the school’s alumni have been
identified. The Citadel alumni, like Virginia Military Institute, were much more likely to
go into the education field than the alumni of West Point, with 27.7% following that
profession (Green, 2008).
Nine military schools are known to have been established by Citadel alumni, but
others are likely to have had Citadel graduates as founders or key faculty. In Alabama,
Gibson Hill was assisted by N. W. Armstrong, Class of 1851, in establishing the Southern
Military Academy in Fredonia in 1851. In North Carolina, Wilmington Military
Academy was opened in 1856 by James D. Radcliffe, and Hillsbourgh Military Academy
was founded by Charles Tew (University of North Carolina, 2010). Bowden Collegiate
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Institute was started in 1856 by John Richardson in Georgia. Florence Wesleyan
University in Alabama transitioned to LaGrange Military Academy in 1858 under James
W. Robertson, Class of 1850, as the superintendent (Wythe, 1907), and the Brandon State
Military School in Mississippi was founded by Pierre S. Layton in 1860.
In South Carolina, Citadel graduates established Aiken Classical and Military
Academy in 1856 with C. W. McCrary and T. H. Mangum, both of the Class of 1856, as
principals. Around that same time, Anderson Military Academy was established with
Joseph Manning Adams, Class of 1856, as principal. But by far, the most successful of
the Citadel-inspired schools was King’s Mountain Military School. It was founded by
Michael Jenkins, Class of 1854, in January 1855. Its military and academic programs
were so well thought of that the school’s graduates were permitted entrance into the
Citadel as sophomores (Thomas, 1893). The school opened with just 12 cadets, ages 1116, but by the end o f the first year, had expanded to 60. The curriculum spanned five
years and included mathematics, history, chemistry, languages, literature, astronomy,
geology, physiology, and philosophy. By 1861, cadets numbered 140. At the onset of the
Civil War, the school closed but reopened in 1866 and operated until 1886 (West, 2011).
Between 1831 and 1843, 39 military schools operated in the United States.
Regionally the division between the North and South was relatively equal, with the South
having 17 schools and the North 19 schools. In the six years prior to the Civil War, the
number of military schools in operation had climbed to 138, and regional orientation
shifted to the South. The explanation for both the growth and regional shift has been
largely attributed to a southern cultural orientation to militarism, and preparation for war.
The sectionalism which led to southern concerns for military preparedness grew out of
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divergent economic interests o f the northern industrial base and the southern cotton based
wealth and slave supported economy.
The two largest issues dividing the North and South grew from questions of
slavery and economic policies that favored the North. Both issues were questions of
state’s rights under the constitution with slavery issues that went back to at least 1784,
when Thomas Jefferson proposed to Congress the prohibition o f slavery in all western
expansions. The subject o f the expansion of slavery would divide the states; the North
opposed to the western expansion of slavery and the South supported expansion. This
division of opinion was for a time addressed by the Missouri Compromise in 1820, but by
1848, with the expansion of United States’ territory the crises reemerged as additional
states was admitted into the Union as “slave” or “free” states. In addition to the political
issues associated with slavery, the moral issue grew as the abolitionist movement in the
North grained more political influence. (Simkins, 1969).
In addition to opposing views on slavery, the nation was divided by economic
interests and associated tariffs. As early as 1828 with the enactment of tariffs designed to
favor the manufacturing northern states, South Carolina led a crusade which became
known as the Nullification Crisis. The resulting compromise, which lowered tariffs,
enforced a southern attitude towards the importance of state’s rights and their place in
trade and slavery issues. (Olsen, 2006). These issues grew to support the need for military
preparedness in the South having “lived in a crisis atmosphere ... menaced through
encirclement by a power containing elements unfriendly to its interests, elements that
were growing strong enough to capture the [national] government” (Woodward, 2008, p.
62).

56

Other contributing factors according to Mohr (2011) that encouraged to the
military school expansion in the South were southern parental concern for discipline,
character development, training sound citizens and a means to provide an affordable
education to less advantaged white males. The establishment of Virginia Military
Institute and the Citadel in 1839 and 1841 helped meet those needs. Those schools were
not established out of fear from northern encirclement.
Clearly two factors that strongly influenced the expansion of military schools in
the South were Francis Smith and the Virginia Military Alumni and, to a lesser degree,
the alumni of The Citadel. Thirty of the southern schools were established by alumni of
those two schools. Many other schools likely employed the teachers from the two
schools, and others were founded on the concepts demonstrated by the two institutions.
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C hapter 6: The Civil W ar
There were four major impacts on military schools in the United States as a result
of the Civil War. During the war and immediately following, many military schools in
the South were forced to close and most did not reopen. Outside the South, the Civil War
played a role in influencing northern states to transition to or establish new military
schools. Military schools also participated as units in active military service and even
fought as combat units. Finally, the postwar occupation of the South also limited military
school activities for several years.
Between 1855 and 1860, there were at least 85 military schools operating in the
South. Documentation shows that only 22-26% of these schools reopened or continued
operation after the war. In 1860, the year prior to the Civil War, the Union States had
only 32 military schools. By the end of the war in 1865, the number of military schools in
the Union States had increased by 40%, with 15 newly established military schools.
Southern M ilitary Faculty and Cadets Depart to be Soldiers
Many of the smaller southern military schools closed when key faculty left to join
Confederate military forces. Chuckatuck Military Academy in Virginia is a good
example, when President James J. Phillips left his school to recruit the Chuckatuck Light
Artillery for Confederate service. For another small military school, it was a combination
of the loss of their founder and enlistment of cadets that closed Shelbyville Military
Academy in Tennessee. The school’s founder, Captain William H. Keiter, VMI Class of
1859, departed for military service in May of 1861. It appears his school’s leadership was
taken over by Alexander McKinnery Rafter who, “within two months of the beginning of
the war enlisted with all the pupils” (Miller, 1901, p. 529). Rafter and his cadets may
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have been members of the Tennessee Belmont Artillery Battery and witnessed the death
of Captain Keiter. In 1862, Keiter was ordered to fire what he believed to be a defective
artillery piece. Against his better judgment, he followed orders and the resulting
explosion killed him (Walker, 1875).
Nathan B. Webster, Norwich Class of 1839, left the Virginia Literary, Scientific
and Military Academy for very different reasons. He closed his school and departed for
Canada, likely for two reasons. Portsmouth, Virginia, was under Union occupation,
making conduct of a military school nearly impossible, and he had conflicting loyalties,
having worked in Virginia for 22 years but being bom in New Hampshire and educated at
Norwich University (Johnson & Brown, 1904).
Kentucky Military Institute is an example of one of the larger state military
schools that closed. “When the Civil War broke out every Cadet and almost every faculty
member joined one side or the other, forcing the school to close” (Stevens, 1991, p. 44).
The North Carolina Military Institute in Charlotte closed in 1861, as the 1st North
Carolina Infantry Regiment enlisted the faculty as the regiment’s staff officers, and the
cadets were permitted to join with their parent’s permission (Clark, 1901). The Arkansas
Military Institute formed the basis of Company I, 3rd Arkansas Infantry. The school’s
permanent closure was sealed by Union troops in 1864, when they burned the school
buildings. In Arkansas, St. John’s College cadets formed Company A (Capital Guard),
6th Arkansas Infantry. Their legacy helped inspire the reopening of the school after the
war (Brown, 2009). Bowden Collegiate and Military Institute/College in Georgia closed
as a military school when seven graduates and a large number of cadets formed a 130man unit, Company B, Cobb’s Legion, under the leadership of the college president as
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the captain (Eastern Digital Resources, 2011). Other colleges closed as cadets organized
Confederate units, including Lynchburg Military College, where faculty and cadets
formed Company E, 11th Virginia Infantry (Troiani, 2002). La Grange Military College
th

and Academy closed in 1862, as it helped man the 35 Alabama Infantry Regiment, with
their superintendent as colonel, a professor serving as lieutenant colonel, their
commandant as major, the cadet adjutant as regimental adjutant, and cadets manning the
majority of B Company, with representation in other companies as well (Wyeth, 1907).
King’s Mountain Military Academy closed when the founders became the
commander and adjutant of the 5th South Carolina Infantry Regiment. Company I (Jasper
Light Infantry) of the regiment was largely comprised of the academy’s graduates and
graduating seniors (West, 2011). The school reopened after the close of the Civil War and
remained open until 1886.
The Franklin Military Institute of Duplin County North Carolina formed
Company E, 20th North Carolina Infantry, in 1861, with the school principal, Claudius B.
Denson, elected to serve as their captain (Wynstra, 2010). Denson was a graduate of
Virginia Literary, Scientific and Military Academy and employed as his co-principal
Richard W. Millard, who was an associate of Nathan B. Webster, founder of the Virginia
school. Besides cadet enlistments impacting military school enrollment, those schools not
under state control faced the Confederate Conscription Act that provided compulsory
military service for all white males 18 to 35 years of age (Baker, 1989).
Symbolic o f the fate of most southern military schools, the University High
School and Military Academy of Athens, Georgia, surrendered to Union forces in 1865.
For southern military schools, the Civil War and the northern occupation was a major
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setback. Northern occupation, with its prohibition against the issue of drill weapons and
an environment of suspicion, slowed any military school recovery in the South.
Drill Masters and Cadets in Combat
O f the southern military schools that remained open, at least 10 set aside their
academic function for a period of time and conducted military operations in support of
the Confederacy. Virginia Military Institute became the most famous of these schools for
its charge during the Battle of New Market. The cadets of The Citadel, University of
Alabama, Georgia Military Institute, and West Florida Seminary, along with midshipmen
of the Confederate Naval Academy, all engaged in combat. Several military schools
including the North Carolina Military Institute, the Hillsboro Military Academy in North
Carolina, Texas’ Bastrop Military Institute, Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military
Academy, and others helped drill recruits in preparation for military service.
Additionally, La Grange Military College and Academy initially sent one cadet company
commander to help train the 16th and 27th Alabama Infantry regiments, the latter unit
Cadet Captain John Smith Napier would join after graduation and become its adjutant
(Wyeth, 1907).
The Hillsboro Military Academy numbered 130 cadets in 1861 when a large
number o f newly elected Confederate officers of North Carolinian Volunteer Regiments
came to Hillsboro to ask for help. According to Cadet Captain William Cain, a company
commander of the academy, “it was certainly a novel sight to see the little cadets from
ages 13 years and older trampling his squad of grown and sometimes grizzled men over
the parade ground” (Clark, 1901, p. 638). These new officers having no military
experience took the drill instruction of their young instructors very seriously. In
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hindsight, Cadet Cain saw the Hillsboro contribution as bringing order out o f chaos by
fonning regiments with inexperienced soldiers. In fact, three months of instruction with
the aid of the young cadets helped produce “well drilled and disciplined” units. (Clark,
1901, p. 638). It also resulted in the vast majority of cadets enlisting in the regiments they
helped train.
The Citadel. The cadets from the Citadel were called upon numerous times
during the Civil War for service in combat and to serve as drill masters for new
Confederate Army recruits, as guards for storage facilities and prisoners of war, to help
man fortification in the Charleston area, and in combat. In January 1861, prior to the
bombardment o f Fort Sumter that started the Civil War, a detachment of 50 Citadel
cadets manned four 20-pounder siege guns and fired on the Star of the West, an unarmed
steamer carrying reinforcements to Fort Sumter. O f the three shells fired from their
position on Morris Island, two missed and one struck the ship, turning the vessel around
and back to New York (Baker, 1989). Many consider this action, rather than the April
bombardment o f Fort Sumter, the beginning of the Civil War.
Apart from Union naval bombardment of Charleston, the cadet’s next combat
came in December o f 1864. The Citadel cadet battalion, comprised of both freshman
from the Arsenal and upperclassmen from the Citadel, were called to active service again
to fight alongside regular Confederate troops at Tuliffinny Creek. The cadets proved
themselves, as one veteran solider stated “them youngsters’ll fight like hell” (Baker,
1989, p. 145) and were compared to General Hood’s Texans. This was despite going into
combat with the look of “Dandy-Jim looking kids,” (Baker, 1989, p. 145) unfortunately,
at the cost of eight casualties including one killed. The Citadel cadets ended their
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participation in the war on active duty by defending the fortifications of Charleston then
retreated with Confederate forces before the city fell. In April 1865, the governor of
South Carolina furloughed the upperclassmen cadets of the Citadel, and in May, the
freshman cadets of the Arsenal. During the period of active service, seven additional
cadets died from disease. But the last bloodshed was after the official furlough; on May
9,1865, Cadet McKenzie Parker, in a skirmish with union troops, was killed near
Anderson County (Baker, 1989). The school was burned by Union troops and would not
reopen until 1882.
University of Alabama. Early in the war, University of Alabama cadets were
called out of the classrooms periodically to drill newly formed Alabama regiments and to
serve as wagon guards for supply trains. Like many southern schools, the University of
Alabama cadets and faculty left to enlist at such a rate that in 1862, there were no
graduates (Center, 1990). No cadets were called up under the Confederate Conscription
Act because the school’s cadets were considered exceptions as a state-supported
institution, and the school actually grew, with new cadets joining the University of
Alabama’s ranks. But on at least two occasions the cadets were called on for combat
operations.
In July 1864, 54 cadets, as part of a composite force called the Lockhart Battalion,
were traveling by train from Montgomery to counter a Union Army Calvary advance on
Auburn. The battalion detrained at Chehaw Station and began fighting from behind a rail
fence. They advanced to the better protection of a ravine against Rousseau’s Union
Calvary which was armed with the superior Spencer Carbine. Two University of
Alabama Cadets were among the 80 Confederate casualties. Both sides claimed victory—
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the Confederates because they advanced and secured Auburn, and the Union because
they had suffered only 11-13 casualties (Conrad, 1997).
The final military operation for the cadets of University of Alabama started on the
night of April 3,1865, with a force of 1,500 Union cavalrymen approaching
Montgomery. In the late hours the university president ordered, “Beat the long roll! The
Yankees are in town!” (Center, 1990, p. 34). With that, the roll of cadet drums aroused
the cadets from their barracks, and there were two brief engagements with Union
cavalrymen resulting in three wounded cadets as well as their commandant, John H.
Murfee, VMI Class of 1853.
As the cadets waited for dawn and the coming battle against an overwhelming
Union force, the decision was made by the president of the university to abandon
Montgomery and the university’s buildings. The Cadets marched out of town and
entrenched themselves on high ground. The next day Union troops burned the university
to the ground. The Cadets marched to Marion where a shortage of food led the
commandant to place the cadets on leave to reassemble in 30 days. But four days later
General Lee surrendered, and this led to the end of the war (Center, 1990). The university
would not reopen until 1871, and it did so without a corps of cadets.
West Florida Seminary. West Florida Seminary was another southern military
school whose cadets were called for combat operations late in the war. When the war
began, the school had 250 cadets, but by 1865, enrollment was down to only 58 students
(Conrad, 1997). The cadets were called out for the Battle of Olustee, but were relegated
to guard Union prisoners, a duty they had performed on several other occasions (Cox,
2007). In March of 1865, three regiments of 1,500 Union troops landed by sea at
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Apalachee Bay and marched north. The small corps of cadets of the West Florida
Seminary, numbering only 34-37 cadets, was called to active duty. Twenty-five Cadets
traveled by train south to Newport. In Newport, they joined the 5th Florida Cavalry
Battalion by running under fire to the trench line across the Saint Marks River (Coles &
Graetz, 1989).
The next day, as Union forces marched north, the cadets moved with the 5th
Florida to Nature Bridge to counter the threatened river crossing there. At the location
where the Saint Marks River went underground forming a land bridge, the Confederate
troops and cadets entrenched and repulsed the Union assaults (Coles & Graetz, 1989).
The Union troops tried eight times to cross at Natural Bridge and suffered 21 killed, 89
wounded, and 38 captured. The Union troops then withdrew and embarked by sea the
next morning. The Confederate force lost four men and 22 were wounded. Cadet Tom
Frazier was among the Confederate dead when he fell off the train early in the
deployment (Cox, 2007). During the war, the West Florida Seminary was known as the
Florida Military Collegiate Institute. It would reopen after the war as a nonmilitary school
and, through several name changes, ultimately become Florida State University.
Georgia Military Institute. Georgia Military Institute was tasked early in the war
by the governor o f Georgia to train newly arrived soldiers at Camp McDonald. The
Confederate Conscription Act initially threatened to close the school but, through the
Governor’s protests, the policy changed and by 1863 the school was similar in size to its
prewar enrollment. In 1863, the Cadets were called upon to guard a rail bridge during
Colonel Abel Streight’s Union Cavalry raid. In May of the next year, the cadets were
assembled and moved by train to Resaca, where the cadets were attached to Major
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General William Walker’s division and played a role in repulsing a Union assault. There
were no cadet casualties. They were on active duty for just a few days then returned to
their classrooms in Marietta (Yates, 1968).
By June, the situation for the Confederacy in Georgia had worsened and the
cadets were called upon again and moved by train to West Point, Georgia. After
encampment for about six weeks, they joined forces near Atlanta and participated in
action at Turner’s Ferry by defending that crossing on July 4th and 8th. No casualties were
suffered during this period, although they came under cannon fire as they marched to
Atlanta where they took up defensive positions. Life for the cadets in the trenches was
both difficult and life threatening. The Battle for Atlanta cost the Georgia Military
Institute five battle casualties, including one killed and six cadets who eventually died of
disease. After almost two months away from their studies, the corps of cadets was moved
to Milledgeville on August 20,1864, and camped on the capitol square, attempting to
resume academic work (Yates, 1968).
For all practical purposes, the Georgia Military Institute was reestablished on the
capitol square and the cadets remained there until mid-November. The cadets were there
when Union troops burned their building in Marietta on November 13. Soon after, the
cadets departed their temporary campus in Montgomery and found themselves back in
combat defending the Oconee River railroad bridge. On November 23 and 25, the cadets
fought against several assaults until in the early hours of November 26, they were flanked
by Union forces and withdrew under cover of darkness. During the fighting, three cadets
were wounded and one was killed (Yates, 1968).
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Between November 28 and December 20, the cadets defended various positions in
defense o f Savannah including Oliver’s Station, Ogeechee Station, and the Oconee
Bridge. As the rear guard of the Confederate evacuation of Savannah, the cadets suffered
two wounded and one killed among their ranks. The corps of cadets was back in
Milledgeville when the Confederates surrendered at Appomattox. In their final days as
cadets and in the final days of the Georgia Military Institute, cadets functioned as police
in Atlanta. On May 20, the cadets were paroled and the Institute was disbanded. Eight of
their comrades died in southern service, three of which were killed in combat. Six others
carried the wounds of war home including a missing arm and another who lost an eye
(Yates, 1968).
Virginia Military Institute. Cadets at the Virginia Military Institute did not fire
the first shots of the war, as the Citadel can claim, but they were involved in major events
leading up to the Civil War. In 1859,64 cadets escorted the governor of Virginia and
provided guards for the public execution of John Brown. In the early days of the Civil
War, VMI was called upon to drill assembling Confederate forces. VMI’s cadets were the
first to be lost in combat. When Union forces started to advance on Manassas in July,
1861 the emergency redeployment o f Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s Brigade and the
18 Virginia Infantry Regiment resulted in cadets being attached for training purposes
and accompanying the units they were training. On the fields of the Battle of Bull Run,
three cadets were killed and two were wounded. These were the first southern cadets to
fall in combat, but far from the last from the Institute (Conrad, 1997).
In May 1862, a year later, the Institute was called to active service with Stonewall
Jackson, this time not as individual cadets but the corps of cadets as a unit. During the
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Battle of McDowell, they were not committed to combat but remained in the field for
more than two weeks. After the battle, they collected the wounded from both sides and
buried the dead. The final five days of their active service were spent marching back to
Lexington in the rain. One cadet would later die of an illness caught during his service
that rainy May day (Conrad, 1997).
From late April through July 1863, cadets were working as drillmasters at Camp
Lee. In August 1863, the cadets of Virginia Military Institute were tasked with hunting
deserters and deployed to counter a Union cavalry raid. Fifty cadets mounted on horses
were sent southwest of Lexington searching for deserters; a force of two cadet companies
was sent seven miles northwest to defend against a suspected Union raid. The success of
the deserter hunt is unknown and the Union raid never materialized. In November, 225
cadets marched to Clifton Forge to help the Confederate Cavalry under leadership of
General John Imboden repel another Union cavalry raid. Before the cadets could reach
Covington, Imboden forced the Northern troops to retreat, and the cadets marched back
to Lexington. On December 17, the cadets were marched out of Lexington in response to
a cavalry raid, only to return on December 20 and march out again the next day. In both
cases, the cadets fought against bad winter weather and encountered no Union troops
(Conrad, 1997).
On May 11,1864, the corps of cadets of Virginia Military Institute marched into
events which would make their deeds the center piece o f military school lore and
southern tradition. Upon arrival at New Market, Confederate Commander General
Breckinridge welcomed them with “Young Gentlemen, I hope there will be no occasion
to use you, but if there is, I trust you will do your duty” (Conrad, 1997, p. 93). The cadet
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battalion became the reserve force for Colonel Wharton, the brigade commander and a
VMI graduate. Unfortunately, Colonel Wharton did not formally brief Colonel Ship, the
Virginia Military Institute Commandant, on the situation and, as the cadets marched
down the hill into an area of relative safety, Union cannon fire caused four casualties
(Conrad, 1997).
Initially, the Virginia Military Institute functioned as an infantry reserve behind
the Confederate line. They numbered 226 cadets and faculty with three cadets being left
behind ill. An additional 32 cadets manned two cannons placed along the Confederate
artillery line. As the battle was entering a critical stage, General Breckinridge, in an
agonizing decision ordered, “Put the boys in and may God forgive me for that order”
(Davies, 1983, p. 122).
With that order, the Cadet Battalion went into the gap between the 51st Virginia
Infantry Regiment and the 62nd Virginia Infantry Mounted Regiment, the latter fighting
as dismounted infantry. Both units had already suffered heavily, and the right four
companies of the 51st Virginia had faltered under withering fire. Just the initial movement
into the line cost the cadets at least six casualties. The cadets endured heavy enemy fire
and a faint-hearted attack against the Confederate line by three Union regiments. As the
Union attack faltered, a Union artillery battery behind started preparing the horses to
withdraw their cannons from the field (Davies, 1983).
Shortly thereafter the Confederate counter attack started first to the left of the
corps of cadets with the simultaneous commands of Captain Wise, acting commandant,
and Captain Preston, one o f the tactical officers. The cadets joined in charging the Union
artillery battery. The following was described by journalist beyond them:
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The cadets from VMI moved forward in the charge upon the enemy’s battery.
Their step was as steady as the tread o f veteran soldiers. They never faltered, but
went into the harvest of death as though they were accustomed to such bloody
work. (Davies, 1983, p. 136)
The cadets advanced across an open muddy field, as cadets lost their footwear and
ran forward barefoot. Across the field, which became known as the field of lost shoes, the
cadets’ “lines well formed and continued to advance toward the battery” (Davies, 1983,
pp. 138-139) up to the crest of the hill. On the right of the enemy battery, the Union 1st
West Virginia Infantry retreated in disorder. The artillerymen of the 30th New York
Artillery Battery retreated to the rear under fire from the cadets, leaving one 12-pounder
cannon as the cadets swept the position.
In the meantime, the cadets manning the Institute’s artillery on the right of the
Confederate line were ordered to prepare double-shot caster fire as the Union Cavalry
was forming to attack there. The Union horsemen advanced; the Confederate artillery,
with the Cadets firing their cannon, caused confusion and broke up their charge. As the
Union commander ordered a withdrawal, the 22nd Virginia Infantry attacked under the
command of Colonel George S. Patton, Virginia Military Institute graduate, and ensured
the Union movement to the rear was a rout (Davis, 1983).1
The battle ended in Confederate victory with the Virginia Military Institute Corps
of Cadets suffering 10 killed and 47 wounded (Davis, 1983). After the battle, the
Confederate Secretary o f War ordered the corps of cadets to Richmond. In route they
stopped in Charlottesville and crossed paths with men of the “Stonewall Brigade,” the
most heralded unit of the Confederate Army. The Cadets were flattered because the
1 Colonel Patton was the great grandfather of General George Patton who would attend VMI a
year before transferring to West Point and gaining fame as a World War II commander.
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hardened combat veterans had already heard of the Cadets of Virginia Military Institute
at New Market. Their actions became part of the southern tradition and a testimony of
military school devotion to duty. In Richmond, the corps of cadets was reviewed by
Confederate President Jefferson Davis, West Point Class of 1828, and was thanked by the
Confederate Congress and issued a new battle flag and Enfield Rifles (Conrad, 1997).
Ironically on June 12,1864, at the capture of the Lexington and VMI by Union troops,
Gillespie W. Henry, VMI Class of 1862, the adjutant of the 14th West Virginia Infantry,
attempted unsuccessfully to convince the Union commander that it was not to bum the
school (Virginia Military Institute Archives Online Historical Rosters, 2011).
Confederate Naval Academy. The Union States had two national academies, the
United States Military Academy at West Point and the United States Naval Academy. In
1861, at the beginning of the war, the Confederacy had no national military schools. The
Confederate Naval Academy’s service in the Civil War began with its opening in
Richmond in July 1863. Midshipmen numbering about 60 were aboard the CSS Patrick
Henry and moved to the location of Confederate fortifications on Drewry’s Bluff,
guarding Richmond on the James River. The midshipmen studied aboard and helped man
the cannon emplacements when needed.
But the first combat was seen by the eight academy midshipmen detached to
augment a Confederate naval raid in Bern, North Carolina. On the evening of February 2,
1864,40 Confederate sailors and marines, including eight midshipmen of the
Confederate Naval Academy, deployed into the dark water of the Nause River in two
launches and headed towards Union Navy forces believed to be downstream. In the
darkness, they came upon the USS Underwriter, a Union gunboat with 89 crewmen and
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four cannons. Boarding the vessel under fire, the Confederates fought armed with pistols,
rifles, and sabers. After a brief intense action, five Confederate sailors and marines were
killed, including Midshipman Saunders, who was killed with a saber wound to the head.
Sixteen others were wounded, including another midshipman. The Union ship was
captured with nine Union sailors killed, including the captain of the ship; 46 Union
sailors were wounded and captured. The Union vessel was burned and the Confederates
with their captives returned to Confederate lines (Campbell, 1998).
The Naval Academy aboard the CSS Patrick Henry docked at Drewry’s Bluff
became endangered by the advance of Union General Butler’s troops in May of 1864.
With the advance of Union troops, midshipmen were assigned temporary duties manning
the cannon at Drewry’s Bluff, with 19 midshipmen on the crews of the ships of the James
River Squadron, others assigned to an artillery battery north of Richmond, and several
sent to ships and raiding parties in North Carolina. The fighting did not reach Drewry’s
Bluff, but the squadron was engaged in limited action on June 20, with shelling on union
gunboats in Trent’s Reach on the James River (Campbell, 1998). During this time,
Lieutenant Hall led a group of midshipmen in several skirmishes with Union
sharpshooters near Howlett House and Drewry’s Bluff (Scharf, 1887). By the end of July,
most of the midshipmen had returned to duty at the academy.
In the latter part of 1864, the academy functioned as normally as possible with the
“rumblings o f war” heard daily. Midshipmen were often called from class to man the
fortifications, participating in long-range artillery duels, some lasting for three days. At
other times, details of midshipmen went downstream to lay mines and anchor spar
torpedoes. In October, the CSS Patrick Henry moved upstream and the 60 midshipmen
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and 10 officers manned trenches guarding a pontoon bridge across the James River at
Wilton Farm. Shortly after their return to Drewry Bluff, the winter closed in with three to
six inches of snow a common sight. Living conditions aboard ship and in winter huts
deteriorated causing many midshipmen to fall ill (Campbell, 1998).
In March 1865, the midshipmen and the CSS Patrick Henry moved upstream
closer to Richmond. They docked at Rocketts Landing, and the midshipmen lived in a
tobacco warehouse. On April 2,1865, the academy received orders to “have the Corps of
Midshipmen with proper officers at the Danville depot today at 6pm” (Conrad, 2003, p.
87). Shortly after arrival and drawing equipment, they learned that Richmond was to be
evacuated and the midshipmen and their officers were to guard the train containing
Confederate archives, the treasury, as well as President Jefferson Davis and his wife. The
trains departed that evening with the midshipmen fully armed and with three days rations.
Between that time and April 13, the Confederate government was escorted by train
through Virginia, North Carolina, and on to Chester, South Carolina. At Chester the
treasury was moved by wagon train with gold in boxes and silver in kegs, eventually
arriving in Augusta, Georgia, despite Union cavalry patrols and the chaos in a defeated
South. (Scharf, 1887).
By May 2,1865, Robert E. Lee had surrendered, Present Lincoln had been
assassinated, and General Johnston had surrendered to Sherman. On that day, the
Secretary of Treasury relieved the Naval Academy of responsibility for the gold and
silver and ordered the academy disbanded. The midshipmen received written orders
detaching them “from the Naval School and leave is granted to visit [their] home. You
will report to the Secretary of the Navy as possible” (Scharf, 1887, p. 778).
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Never surrendered and never paroled, the unit disbanded after executing its final
mission. President Jefferson Davis traveled a different route, arrived in Augusta, and
learned that the midshipmen were no longer his guard. He told Captain Parker, “I have no
fault with you, but I regret Mr. Mallory [Secretary of Treasury] gave you that order”
(Scharf, 1887, pp. 778-779).
N orthern military schools. Prior to the first major battle of the Civil War at
Manassas, Virginia, the midshipmen of the United States Naval Academy found
themselves defending their institute from potential attack. Baltimore had rioted at the
arrival of Union troops in April 1861, and Annapolis became both the point of
embarkation for reinforcements and a target of potential Confederate attack. Cannons
were placed at the front gate and the Midshipmen Battalion was repeatedly called out to
defend the installation (Sweetman, 1995). Because of the unstable situation, the Academy
moved its operation to Newport, Rhode Island, until 1865. In 1863, another riot, this time
in New York City, brought the cadets of West Point to take arms and increase their guard
as rumors of violence spread to the academy. Although some accounts say the cadets
were deployed to the streets of New York, the enlisted soldiers at the academy were not
the cadets.
Like the military schools of the Confederacy, Norwich University was heavily
engaged in the conflict by supporting the Vermont mobilization of drillmasters with
various units including the 3rd Vermont Infantry Regiment. The cadets also drilled
students at Dartmouth University and Bowdoin College. The Dartmouth students and
Norwich cadets eventually manned B Troop, 7th Rhode Island Cavalry. At Bowdoin
College training was observed by Professor Lawrence Chamberlain, a graduate of
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Whitting's Military and Classical School in Maine. Chamberlain would later rise to
general officer, receive the Medal of Honor for action at Little Round Top at Gettysburg,
and become Governor of Maine (Poirier, 1999).
The Norwich cadets were also sent to Camp Rendezvous and helped prepare the
4*, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th Vermont Infantry Regiments and 1st
Light Artillery Battery. Camp Rendezvous was in Brattleboro where the Burnside
Military School was located. The school principal, Colonel Charles A. Miles, and his
cadets drilled officers o f the 2nd Vermont Infantry at the beginning of the war (Poirier,
1999; Cabot, 1922). The Highland Military Academy of Worcester, Massachusetts, had
cadets function as drill masters in “neighboring towns” as the war began as well (Wilson,
1892). The Peekskill Military Academy cadets in New York drilled newly formed units
and marched with them to the war (Augustowski, 2001).
Norwich University was far from the battlefields of the South, but on October 19,
1864, southern raiders entered the town of St. Albans, Vermont, from Canada. The 21
raiders were led by Confederate Lieutenant Bennett Young. Young had been captured
earlier in the war, escaped to Canada, and returned to the South where he was assigned to
organize a company with other escaped prisoners from Canada and “create havoc along
the border” (Hamilton, 2005, p. 48). The raiders robbed St. Albans Bank, Franklin
County Bank, and the First National Bank of at least $208,000. The raiders incurred one
wounded; one town person was killed and a visitor to the town wounded (Hamilton,
2005).
Vermont’s militia had long since mobilized and left to fight on the southern
battlefield. As “the only source of organized defense was the corps of cadets” (Ellis,
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1911, p. 418), the school was alerted by telegram of a potential similar “invasion” of
Newport, Vermont. General Alonso Jackson, the Norwich superintendent, gathered the
cadets by drum beat for roll call. The force might have been larger from Norwich, but
like their southern military school counterparts the ranks of the cadets had been depleted
by cadets departing the school as volunteers to fight with various units in the war. At the
formation of the small corps, the cadets were instructed to step one pace forward should
they wish to volunteer for active service in Newport. The result was a “complete forward
movement in response” (Ellis, 1911, p. 418). The school sent a telegram to Vermont’s
governor offering the services of the Cadet Corps. The governor asked what they could
bring and the Corps responded, “Springfield muskets and two six pound field guns as to
what arms they could bring to the fight; the state ordered the cadets to leave for Newport
on the first train with artillery” (Ellis, 1911, p. 418).
Prior to commandeering a train, the order was amended to proceed without
artillery. The force assembled included two faculty members including General Jackson,
a Lieutenant of Cavalry, an alumni veteran, two local volunteers, and 47 Cadets for a
total of 52 men. The force arrived in Newport to find the town’s people had organized a
company o f citizens. The Cadets marched on the wharf and received a streamer at the
ready should the boat contain southern raiders. No raiders materialized and after spending
the night in Newport, the Cadets marched eight miles to the Canadian border (Ellis,
1911).
An unarmed group crossed the Canadian border to find the Canadians ready to
help. According to Portus Baxter, Norwich Class of 1825, who was present, the cadets
had to uphold the honor of Vermont and calmed the anxiety of its citizens. The Corps
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returned to Norwich never having heard a shot in anger. (Ellis, 1911). O f the 21 raiders,
the Canadian Militia captured 14 and $75,000 was recovered (Hamilton, 2009).
Alumni Contributions to the W ar Efforts
The contributions of military schools to the efforts of Confederate operations have
been addressed holistically by Bruce Allardice. But no attempt has been made to look at
the military education of Union forces beyond works focused at West Point and Norwich
University. This may be because, as Cunliffe (1973) pointed out, military schools are
regarded as a southern idea and viewed as having no significance to the North.
M ilitary schools’ contribution to the southern effort. Allardice’s (1997) study
of southern military schools in the Civil War provided an estimate of 12,000 alumni of
military schools serving with the Confederate military forces. This figure was based on
his estimate of 96 schools operating in the South between 1827 and 1860. This included
Western Military Institute, which operated in Kentucky and Tennessee, and provided
more than 1,000 officers to include two generals, 37 colonels and lieutenant colonels, and
18 majors. Virginia Military Institute contributed 1,796 officers including 20 generals, 92
colonels, 64 lieutenant colonels, and 107 majors. Georgia Military Institute had 500
alumni in gray to include two generals and 36 field-grade officers (colonels, lieutenant
colonels, and majors). LaGrange Military Academy in Alabama provided 176 alumni.
Hillsboro Military Academy in North Carolina provided at least 250 to include two
lieutenant colonels, one major, and two captains (Clark, 1901).
The Citadel’s total contribution has never been documented. The school had 209
graduates in the Confederate forces to include four generals and 48 field officers. But a
total o f 1,699 had attended the school by war’s end and the majority served the
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Confederate cause. Kentucky Military Institute had 3,049 cadets serve in the Civil War
(Allardice, 1997). That school’s alumni served in both blue and gray and their service has
never been completely documented. Other southern military schools’ contributions of
Confederate generals include two from Jefferson College in Mississippi, one from
Georgia Military Institute, one from Raleigh Military Academy in North Carolina, one
from Saint Thomas Hall in Mississippi, and one from Western Military Academy in
Tennessee.
Additionally, Allardice (1997) found that at least six military schools outside
West Point in the Union States contributed small numbers to the Southern cause. These
schools were Kenyon College in Ohio, Mount Pleasant Military Academy in New York,
Russell Military Academy in Connecticut, Mount Vemon Military Academy in New
York, Norwich University in Vermont, and Starr’s Military Institute in New York.
Green (2008) estimated that 11,000 alumni of southern military schools were
prepared to serve in the Confederate military. These estimates were based in part on the
identification o f 94 military schools in the South and North that had played a part in the
education of southerners prior to the Civil War. In addition to Green’s estimates, West
Point contributed 661 men of which 156 became Confederate generals. The United States
Naval Academy provided 95 officers; the American Classical and Military Lyceum in
Pennsylvania likely sent several; and 22 additional alumni from Norwich University, for
a total o f 56, served in the Confederate military (Poirier, 1999; Cowley & Guinzburg,
2002). Building on the work of Allardice and Green with an additional 26 military
schools in the South, as well as West Point, the United States Naval Academy and other
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northern schools almost 1,700 additional alumni are added for a total of 13,700 men from
military schools serving for the Southern cause.
This contribution greatly increased the effectiveness of the Confederate war
machine. Examples include the collective contribution of military school alumni to the
population of Confederate staff officers, critical for planning and administration of the
army. More than 15% were military school alumni, with the most from Virginia Military
Institute, followed by West Point, the Citadel, and Georgia Military Institute (Krick,
2003). The representation within the field-grade officer ranks are another indicator of the
military schools impact on Confederate leadership. In the Army of Northern Virginia,
285 of 1,965, or 14.5%, of the field-grade officers were products of military schools.
These included 156 from Virginia Military Institute, 73 West Pointers, 37 from the
Citadel, 14 from Georgia Military Institute, four from the Naval Academy, and one from
La Grange Military Academy. This does not include the “qualified junior officers and
noncommissioned officers” that military schools provided (McMurry, 1989, p. 99).
M ilitary schools contributions to the N orthern w ar effort. Very little has been
written about contributions of military schools to the Union efforts apart from West Point
and Norwich University. This is despite the fact that there were 54 military schools
functioning between 1802 and 1860 in Union states. Additionally, there were 15 military
schools established, or schools transitioned to a military format, during the Civil War in
Union States.
Cunliffe (1973) addresses the question of the lack o f literature on military schools
in the North. First, the popularity of military schools in the South has been assumed to be
equally as strong after the Civil War as before. Secondly, Cunliffe asserts the following:
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Military academies have come to be regarded as a feature of the South, or rather
of the idea of the South. They have hence been regarded as not-Northem, and
have no significance attached to them. The men at VMI have been highly visible
in the eyes o f posterity; those in cadet gray at Mount Pleasant, New York or
Highland Military Academy in Worcester, Massachusetts or Hamden,
Connecticut have been well-nigh invisible, (p. 353)
The biggest difference between Confederate and Union military schools was that
the Union States never adopted state sponsorship. The Confederacy had a series of
schools such as Virginia Military Institute, the Citadel, Georgia Military Academy, and
others that were supported with state funds, either wholly or partially, and had cadets
attending as “State Cadets” with paid tuition. The Union states saw the federal
government as fulfilling the needs of military training. Despite this, Norwich University,
a private military college providing 705 alumni to the Union war effort, was far from
alone (Poirier, 1999). The alumni of the two federal military academies provided the
Union about 1,336 men, with 936 from West Point and 400 from the United States Naval
Academy (Cowley & Guinzburg, 2002). West Point provided at least 228 generals of the
583 general officers of the Union Army (Warner, 1992). Norwich contributions included
at least 12 generals, 27 colonels, 24 lieutenant colonels, and 15 majors.
Other military schools in the Union States included Russell Military Academy,
which numbered 130 to 160 cadets and contributed 100 officers and likely an additional
50 enlisted soldiers. Highland Military Academy in Massachusetts contributed at least 50
alumni including one lieutenant colonel, one major, three captains, and a lieutenant. The
school had 84 cadets in 1862, and likely operated with slightly fewer numbers prior to
hostilities. After the school converted to a military format in 1856 and prior to 1863, an
estimated number of 150 cadets were matriculated.
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Mount Pleasant Military Academy in New York operated as a military school
starting in 1845, and its cadet enrollment is estimated to have been 75 a year. Their
contribution to the military manpower o f Union forces was close to 425. Churchill
Military Academy in New York was another well-respected military school. Both
General Robert E. Lee and Union General William Sherman’s letters reflected a high
opinion of this institution. Established in 1841, this school likely contributed 525 Union
officers and soldiers, among them was Brigadier General John B. McIntosh. Another
school of significant size was the American Classical and Military Lyceum in
Philadelphia with an enrollment as high as 150. The school only operated from 1828 to
1835 and counted General George Meade, Commander at Gettysburg, among its
contributions to the Union war effort.
With General Meade at Gettysburg was Joshua Chamberlain, Colonel of the 20th
Maine Infantry at Little Round Top. Chamberlain’s association with Bowden College is
well known, as is his post-war governorship of the State of Maine. Less known is that he
attended Whiting's Military and Classical School, which had operated under a West Point
graduate from 1841 to 1847 in Maine. Another alumnus of this school was General James
G. Blunt. Collins (2005) believes Blunt’s attendance could account for his battlefield
success. “He could well have been one of the few from Kansas who had any military
education when the war broke out. At the very least, Blunt knew the basics of drill,
military formations and disciplined marching” (p. 16). Prior to 1893, Kansas had no
military schools.
Other schools with smaller cadet enrollments included Alexandria Institute with
30; Jarvis Military Academy in Connecticut, 33; Everest Military Academy in
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Connecticut with 65; Starr’s Military Institute in New York with 37; Delaware Military
Academy, 83; Peekskill Military Academy in New York with 85; and based on post-war
enrollment figures, Yonkers Collegiate and Military Institute in New York with 40
(Weston Historical Society, 2011; Blake, 1888; Moll, 1954). In all, there were 49 military
schools functioning in the northern states, three in the midwest, and one in the west.
Joining these military schools would be men from the border states’ military schools, and
the South’s military schools that supported the Union military. Examples of the latter
include 13 Virginia Military Institute alumni who served with the Union Army (Miller,
1996). Kentucky Military Institute’s contribution to Union military manpower has not
been determined, but at least two Union generals were alumni (Warner, 1992). The
resulting 4,800 military school alumni provided the Union with a much smaller cadre for
their military forces; it was significant and too often forgotten.
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Chapter 7: The United States Naval Academy and Maritime Academies
The first steps which led to the establishment of the United States Naval
Academy, took place during the final years of congressional consideration for the
establishment of a national military academy. In 1800, two years prior to the
establishment of the United States Military Academy at West Point, Alexander Hamilton
recommended that Secretary of War James McHenry include a provision for a School of
the Navy in future national military academy plans. But as previously noted, the academy
at West Point focused on the needs of the Engineer and Artillery Corps of the Army, and
no naval component was included in the building plan (Marshall, 1862).
Despite this, in 1808, the Superintendent of West Point, General Jonathan
Williams, recommended expansion of the school to include teaching “nautical astronomy,
geography and navigation” (Marshall, 1862, p. 14). His intention was for West Point to
serve both the needs of the Army as well as the Navy. This did not come to pass,
although according to Marshall’s (1862) History o f the United States Naval Academy,
during the War of 1812 “many of the cadets of the Military Academy were commissioned
as midshipmen in the Navy” (p. 14).
Much o f the long, slow progress towards establishing a national naval academy
may have come from the traditions of the British naval midshipmen and the lack o f a
naval academy on the part of the allied French. The American Navy faced the British
Navy in the Revolution, which was officered by men who were often schooled aboard
ship as midshipmen. These young men prepared themselves for examination in their sixth
year of service in seamanship and navigation in order to advance to the grade of mate.
Although the Portsmouth Naval Academy (renamed the Royal Naval College in 1806)
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was established in 1729 in England, only a portion of the British midshipmen studied its
two-year curriculum before going to sea. Many midshipmen learned their skills while
serving aboard ship and were mentored and taught by officers and crew. The allied
French Navy did not establish their naval schools at Brest and Toulon until 1810 (Soley,
1880).
Prior to 1811, there were no military schools with a naval orientation in the
United States. The first evidence of a movement in that direction came with the
establishment of nautical subject courses. In 1798, Stephen Decatur’s family hired Talbot
Hamilton to tutor him in navigation prior to his appointment as a midshipman
(MacKenzie, 1846). Decatur went on to become the Navy’s youngest captain and hero of
the Barbary Wars. Similarly, James Lawrence, a famous naval hero remembered for his
dying declaration, “Don’t give up the ship” in the War of 1812, was schooled in 1796, by
either Samuel Webster or John Griscom (also spelled Griscomb) in navigation and naval
tactics prior to his appointment (Benjamin, 1900; Prowell, 1886). In 1798, Philadelphia
merchant and ship owner, John Coulter, sent his apprentice, Uriah Levy, to school for
navigation and seamanship. He attended school for seven to nine months between 1807
and 1808. This school was most likely run by Talbot Hamilton in the Lower Dublin area
of Philadelphia. Talbot Hamilton was identified as Scottish or English, and a former
officer o f the British Navy. Uriah Levy rose to become a Commodore in the United
States Navy, the first Jewish officer, and was credited with ending the practice of
flogging (American Jewish Historical Society, 2004). There is no documentation that
these schools operated by Hamilton, Webster, or Griscom functioned as military schools
with a uniformed student body.
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Navigating toward a United States Naval Academy
Around the same time, the United States Navy Secretary, Robert Smith, ordered
Navy Presbyterian Chaplain Robert Thompson to organize a course at Washington Navy
Yard. The school was voluntary and addressed mathematics and navigation from 1802 to
1804 (Leeman, 2010). During this period, an event far from Washington spurred the
desire to establish officer education. On October 31,1803, the USS Philadelphia and its
307-man crew were captured by Barbary pirates (January, 2009). While in captivity in
Tripoli, the U.S. midshipmen studied in preparation for qualifying exams (Leeman,
2010).

The Washington Naval Yard course ended in 1804, with Chaplain Thompson’s
departure for sea duty. Upon his return in 1806, the course resumed, and in 1808
Chaplain Thompson traveled to New York and Norfolk to continue teaching. Beginning
in 1811, an “informal academy” began operation at the Washington Navy Yard and had
midshipmen assigned to the school. This was the first military school in the United States
with a documented naval orientation, and mathematics, navigation, and astronomy were
taught to midshipmen. One of the midshipmen was Josiah Tattnall who later rose to
captain in the Confederate Navy (Naval Historical Center, 2001). Due to the onset o f the
War of 1812, the Washington Navy Yard was closed. A wartime course was conducted
on Lake Ontario in New York for midshipmen and junior officers.
In 1813, a congressional act authorized the Navy to employ naval schoolmasters
(Marshall, 1862). This act likely influenced Admiral William Bainbridge to establish
what has been referred to as the first naval school in December 1815 at the Boston Navy
Yard (Winsor, 1881). “His classroom was ship board; which was hands on training, and
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the students excelled or they were requested to leave” (Williams, 2010, p. 332).
Bainbridge was said to have been an excellent teacher and the Secretary of the Navy
hoped he would impact the Navy’s need for promising officers. It is unclear how long
instruction continued, but by June 1815, Bainbridge and the crew of the Independence
were well focused on the problems of Algiers (Williams, 2010).
The authorization of schoolmasters for the Navy helped open additional naval
schools in New York as early as 1827 and in Norfolk, Virginia, in 1828. The naval school
in New York received assigned midshipmen until 1844. Between 1841 and 1844, they
were aboard the USS North Carolina. One of those midshipmen, Stephen B. Luce, would
play a key role in the expansion of the military school format to a merchant fleet focus
(Speelman, 2001). The Norfolk Naval School received midshipmen until as late as 1837.
Beyond the United States Navy, another naval military school was operating
between 1828 and 1831 on the Brig Clio, near Nantucket, Massachusetts. The school was
a product of a financial investment by British Admiral Sir Isaac Coffin and was intended
to serve his former nation and American members of the Coffin family. Coffin was bom
in Boston in 1759 and rose to admiral in the British Navy. His personal instruction for the
school leaves little doubt that it was structured to be conducted as a naval military school
(Amory, 1886). The school was administered first by Lieutenant Alexander B. Pinkham
who was on loan from the United States Navy. The school transitioned to shore and a
nonmilitary format in 1831 due to the costs associated with supporting the ship’s
operation. Before the school went to shore, it did visit Nova Scotia on cruise (Uhl, 1983).
The establishment of a central and more permanent naval academy was
championed by a series of Secretaries of the Navy, Williams Jones in 1814, Samuel
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Southard in 1824, and A. P. Upshur in 1841. Southard’s efforts were supported by
President John Quincy Adams in 1827. But it was not until 1838 that a significant step
towards a permanent naval academy was gained with the opening of the Philadelphia
Naval Asylum and Academy. Apparently Philadelphia was suggested by Paul Hamilton,
Secretary of the Navy, some 28 years prior. Initially the school had an enrollment of 22 to
34 midshipmen, a curriculum of one year, and was conducted in a wing of what was a
home for aged sailors. With the ascension of Professor William Chauvenet as head of
instruction at the school, the course of study was extended to two years, with the content
and quality of the course improving through the additions of maritime law lectures,
navigation, ordnance, and gunnery (Benjamin, 1900).
The next major event in the voyage towards the establishment of the United States
Naval Academy occurred far from a Philadelphia classroom or the United States
Congress. It occurred at sea on the USS Somers, a brig-of-war vessel sailing from the
West Indies to New York. Among the crew was Midshipman Philip Spencer who had not
benefited from the education at the Philadelphia Naval Asylum and Academy. Spencer
had a checkered academic career that included failing grades from Geneva College and
Union College. At Union College, he established their chapter of the Chi Psi Fraternity.
The young Spencer was the son of the Secretary of War, who convinced his son after a
stay on a whaler ship that he should become a gentleman by way of becoming a
midshipman in the Navy (Filbert & Kaufman, 1998).
Spencer’s career as a midshipman was worse than his academic endeavors and
would end with his execution at sea. The young man served aboard several other ships
and had a record of drunkenness. He had a fascination with piracy and apparently made a
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list of potential conspirators to take over the ship. The captain and officers believed he
was the ringleader of a potential mutiny to take over the ship and kill the officers, despite
“evidence ...to this effect, was at best, slim” (Filbert & Kaufman, 1998, p. 9). But he and
two seamen were hanged at sea on December 1,1842, resulting in a naval leadership and
public reaction that became another catalyst for professionalization of naval officer corps
through the establishment of a naval academy (Filbert & Kaufman, 1998).
In 1844 the Navy had 22 professors: 14 at sea, two in Boston, one in New York,
two in Norfolk, three in Philadelphia, and three on special service. George Bancroft
became Secretary o f the Navy in 1845 and concluded that this arrangement of education
was “one o f scattering schools, diffusing responsibility, and barren of good results”
(Halstead, 1899, p. 101). Secretary Bancroft requested that the Board of Examiners, who
reviewed midshipmen for qualification for promotion, assist “in maturing a more efficient
system of instruction for the young naval officers” (Halstead, 1899, p. 101).
As early as 1826, the Maryland House of Delegates had lobbied Congress for a
naval school in Annapolis. In October 1845, their long-term desire came to pass as Fort
Severn was transferred to the Department of the Navy. Secretary Bancroft received the
recommendation from a committee of naval commanders that Annapolis was a suitable
location for a naval school. Accordingly, an academic staff was organized to include
Commander Franklin Buchanan as superintendent, Lieutenant James H. Ward as
executive officer and instructor o f gunnery and steam, six other instructors including
Professor William Chauvenet, and two others from the Philadelphia Naval Asylum and
Academy (Halstead, 1899).
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Despite the midshipmen tradition and naval focus, the school was not without the
influence of the military schools that were flourishing in the United States at this time. A.
P. Upshur, the secretary of the navy, in his desire for a naval academy, made no attempt
to hide his envy of “the advantages which the Army has derived from the Academy at
West P o in t... proof that a similar institution for the Navy would produce like results”
(Southern Literary Messenger, 1850, p. 521). Lieutenant James H. Ward served as the
executive officer for two years of the newly formed Naval Academy in a duty that would
later be called Commandant of Midshipmen (Halstead, 1899; Benjamin, 1900).
Lieutenant Ward was a graduate of Norwich University, class of 1823, and his influence
would remain for years through the use of his The Manual o f Naval Tactics as well as his
lectures on naval ordnance and gunnery (Ellis, 1911).
Another influential faculty member was Professor Henry Hays Lockwood. He
came from the Philadelphia Naval Asylum and Academy as a professor of natural
philosophy and astronomy. He was an 1836 graduate of the United States Military
Academy at West Point and a former artillery officer. His service at the United States
Naval Academy spanned from 1847-1861 and 1865-1871 (Johnson & Brown, 1904).
Much to the dislike of 50 midshipmen, the academy opened on October 10,1845, with
the addition of drill and cannon crew practice to the nautical curriculum (Benjamin,
1900).
The United States Naval Academy and its alumni would also influence the
expansion of the military school concept. The first expansion was the wartime
establishment of the Confederate Naval Academy. In 1862 the Confederate Congress
authorized the existing United States law addressing the Navy to apply to the southern
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states. The Confederate Secretary of the Navy recommended a Naval Academy in
February 1862. The academy was organized by William Harwar Parker to mirror the
United States Naval Academy. Lieutenant Parker was an 1848 Naval Academy graduate
and had served as a professor of mathematics, professor of navigation and astronomy,
and instructor of seamanship and naval tactics from 1853-1857. He was appointed
superintendent and served as such until the end of the Civil War. His commandant of
midshipmen was Lieutenant Wilburn B. Hall who was the Naval Academy’s top graduate
in 1859. The school began operation in July 1863, aboard the CSS Patrick Henry while it
was anchored at the Richmond, Virginia waterfront, although the official opening of the
Academy was on October 10,1863, when it docked at Drewry’s Bluff on the James
River. During the operation of the school, 124 midshipmen from 14 states were assigned
to the academy. Enrollment usually numbered about 60, and their ages ranged from 14 to
17 years (Campbell, 1998). The wartime operations of the school, until the school was
disbanded on May 2,1865, were addressed in Chapter VI.
The United States Naval Academy’s reputation, along with their alumni,
influenced the format and creation of 29 colleges, junior colleges, and preparatory
military schools to include several that have stood the test o f time and continue to operate
successfully today. The accounting below provides their dates of operation as military
schools with * signifying a transition rather than opening or closing. These schools with a
naval theme are listed in Table 2.
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Table 2
Military Schools with a Naval Theme
Dates of
Operation

School

Location

1863-1865

Confederate Naval Academy

Virginia

1880-1891

Maryland Military and Naval Academy

Maryland

1888-1995

Northwestern Military and Naval Academy

Wisconsin

1905-1912

Lakeside Classical Institute

Texas

1910-present

Army and Navy Academy

California

1913-1920

Florida Military and Naval Academy

Florida

1914

Riverside Military Academy (Riverside Military

Georgia

and Naval Academy)
1915-1916

Silver Lake Military and Naval Academy

New York

1916-1940s

Talbor Academy

Massachusetts

1917

Army and Navy Academy

California

1919-1924

Carolina Naval-Military Academy

North Carolina

1920-1941

Carson Military and Naval Institute

Michigan

1932-1994

Admiral Farragut Academy

New Jersey

1933-1977

Elsimore Naval and Military School

California

1935-1939

New Jersey Naval Academy

New Jersey

1935-1937

Stonehurst Military & Naval Academy

California

1937-1953

Puget Sound Naval Academy (Hill Naval

Washington

Academy),
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1936-1953

Admiral Billard Academy, Florida

Connecticut

1939-1953

Florida Naval Academy Junior College

Florida

1941-present;

Leonard Hall Junior Naval Academy

Maryland

1943-1953

Hudson River Naval Academy

New York

1945-present

Admiral Farragut Academy

Florida

1963-1976

Sanford Naval Academy

Florida

1963-present

Texas Marine Military Academy

Texas

1981-present

Marine Academy of Science & Technology

New Jersey

2003-present

Delaware Military Academy

Delaware

2005-present

Admiral Hyman George Rickover Naval Academy

Illinois

2006-present

Marine Math Science Academy

Illinois

2011-present

New Orleans Military Maritime Academy

Louisiana

Stephen B. Luce and the Maritime Military Academy Movement
Stephen B. Luce, United States Naval Academy, Class of 1848, would eventually
become the Father o f the Maritime Military Academy Movement through his writing,
lobbying, and leadership. He was bom in 1827 in Albany, New York. At the age o f six,
he and his family moved to Washington, DC, where his father was employed as a clerk
for the Treasury Department. Based on family tradition, at the age of 14, Stephen and his
father visited Zachary Taylor at the White House and secured an appointment for Stephen
as a midshipman in the United States Navy (Hattendorf, 1997).
His first assignment was at the U.S. Naval School, New York, aboard the USS
North Carolina. The USS North Carolina served as a Navy school from 1841-1844 and
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Midshipman Luce spent his first six months as a midshipman aboard. For the next six
years he was at sea, first with the Frigate USS Congress and then with the USS Columbus.
After nearly six years at sea he returned to join the second class at the United States
Naval Academy (Hattendorf, 1997).
From April 1848 to August 1849, Midshipmen Luce attended classes and studied
for his qualifying exam to become a “passed midshipmen.” Unfortunately for him, his
pride in his service and the new United States Naval Academy cost him dearly. The
Secretary of the Navy authorized the Naval Academy to have its midshipmen participate
in the inauguration events of President Zachary Taylor. For reasons unknown, the
superintendent of the Naval Academy at the time, Captain Upshur, did not approve of the
action. The midshipmen’s reaction was “ringing bells, blowing loudly on horns and
discharging guns” and in general, demonstrating their displeasure in a very unmilitary
manner (Inkster, 1965, p. 175). The resulting punishment pushed Midshipmen Luce back
72 places on the promotion list and delayed his promotion from passed midshipmen to
lieutenant by six years (Hattendorf, 1997). This was an unexpected end to the academy
experience by a man who should have been considered the Father of the Maritime
Academy movement.
After his graduation in 1849, Luce went to sea again aboard the USS Vandalia.
Serving as a passed midshipman, he spent his off-duty hours in the pursuit of a selftaught liberal education. His journal reveals that among the texts he read were Milton’s
Paradise Lost, Dickens’ Old Curiosity Shop, Shakespeare, Grote’s History o f Greece, the
Bible and Bible scholars, William Falconer, the Sailor Poet, Lord Byron, Theodor
Mommsen, and James Fenimore Cooper. The USS Vandalia assignment was followed by
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another duty that increased his professional knowledge. He served aboard several survey
ships on the Atlantic Coast and then on the USS Jamestown, which included a voyage to
the Central American coast. As a result of the assignment, he gained extensive additional
exposure to astronomy, oceanography, cartography, and hydrography during his latter sea
assignment (Hattendorf, 1997).
The depth and girth of his academic and nautical experience made him the perfect
individual to return to the Naval Academy even though he left under less than stellar
circumstances. From 1860 to 1861, he served as assistant commandant, followed by head
of the seamanship department beginning in 1863, and commandant o f midshipmen from
1865 until 1869. During that time he revised Lieutenant Parker’s book, (superintendent,
Confederate Naval Academy) Instruction fo r Naval Artillery, but more importantly, he
authored Seamanship, which was a practical guide for the nautical skills. With the end of
the Civil War, Luce shifted his focus from the Naval Academy to the professionalization
of the Navy and the Merchant Marines. He is best known for his efforts with thel873
establishment of the United States Naval Institute and the Institute’s publication,
Proceeding. Luce is also credited with the establishment of the United States Navy War
College in 1885 (Speelman, 2001).
With regard to the Merchant Marine, Luce should also have been considered the
most influential figure in the Maritime Military Academy movement. His shifting of
attention beyond the Navy was incumbent on three events: the Newfoundland collision of
1854, the Mississippi River sinking of 1865, and the Georgia Hurricane sinking o f 1866.
The first was the nautical disaster of September 27, 1854, when the luxury vessel Arctic
and the French ship Vesta collided off the coast of Newfoundland, resulting in the loss of
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322 lives (Baehre, 1999). The collision was a point discussed by the Baltimore Board of
Trade in February 1855. This event, like the execution of Midshipman Spencer, inspired
the creation of a school to prepare young men to be better able seamen. The school was
outside the federal government’s purview in the city of Baltimore (Runyun, 1987).
In 1856, the Board purchased the USS Ontario, a retired U.S. Navy vessel, to be
their school ship. On September 14,1857, classes started with just eight students.
Uniforms were designated with a blue cap, roundabout, and trousers for winter and white
for summer” (DeBow, 1859, p. 41). Students were selected to perform officer of the day
duties; reading, writing, grammar, geography, algebra, geometry, navigation, and seaman
duties were all part of instruction (DeBow, 1859). Enrollment grew to 139 students in
1858, and to 243 by 1860. Unfortunately, by 1865 daily attendance dropped to just five
students and the school closed. The decline appears to have been the result of the Civil
War’s effect on Baltimore, changing from a “commercial to an industrial city” (Runyun,
1987, p. 246).
This school was a foreshadowing of future events that would be prompted by the
influence of Stephen B. Luce. The same year as the closure of the Baltimore School Ship,
the Riverboat Sultana on the Mississippi River sank. The cause was a boiler explosion
that took 1,500 lives, many of whom were recently freed Union prisoners o f war on the
way to Illinois after the Battle of Vicksburg (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).
The following year, in 1866, the steamer Evening Star sank after encountering a
hurricane off the coast of Georgia. The resulting melee between passenger and crew cost
230 lives (Speelman, 2001). In 1874, Luce probably alluded to this very incident when he
wrote that
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the increasing number of marine disasters, the demoralization, becoming so
general on board our merchant vessels . . . all indicate that we can no longer
disregard with impunity the examples of other maritime countries in providing
technical education for those employed in mercantile service” (Luce, 1874, p. 34).
The same year as the Evening Star disaster ini 866, Luce wrote his article,
Nautical Schools, in the Army and Navy Journal. His work described the advantages of a
system of maritime education as established by Great Britain. In 1869, the Congressional
appointment of the Select Committee, which generated the Lynch Report, pointed out that
the British shipmaster must “pass a rather rigid examination before a board of examiners .
.. receive a certification from them . . . [and] for any misconduct or incompetency as
master, this certificate maybe suspended or taken from him” (U.S. Congress, 1870, p.
220). The national concern for the decline of the United States maritime capability was
reported in Congressional hearings and the publications of the Lynch Report, Causes o f
the Reduction o f American Tonnage and Decline o f Navigation Interests in 1870, and in
the Nimmo Report, Report to the Secretary o f the Treasury: Practical Workings o f our
Relations o f Maritime Reciprocity in 1871. Both reports identified Britain as the principal
competitor to United States maritime interests. The Lynch Report said that the American
sea captain was a combination of merchant and seaman, whereas the British counterpart
was a professional seaman who was certified and held to a higher level of competence by
a certification, examination, and strict enforcement of standards (U.S. Congress, 1870).
The Nimmo Report placed the focus on the need for “upbuilding o f our merchant marine .
.. [in order] to protect it against British competition” (Nimmo, 1871, p. 220).
While events continued to illustrate the maritime unpreparedness, the Revenue
Cutter Service, had a minimal formal training program for its officers. In 1808, Captain
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Hopley Yeaton added four young men to his Cutter New Hampshire, “so he could train
them as seamen, navigators and pilots” (King, 1996, p. 154). Captain Alexander V.
Fraser, between 1848 and 1849, ran an 11-month school for untrained politically
appointed officers aboard his ship as duties allowed (King, 1996; Burhoe, 2010). In 1848
and 1849, Captain Alexander V. Fraser ran his Cutter Lawrence like a training ship. He
identified “incompetent junior officers” who could not handle the heavy storms and
required them to study and take examinations in surveying, law, seamanship, and
navigation (King, 1996).
In 1869, the Revenue Cutter Service got its wake-up call for officer education
when a commission was appointed to examine abuses in the officer commissioning
system and discharged 39 officers as disqualified (Nicholls, 1896). At the time, there
were only 200 commissioned officers, and almost 20% of the service’s officers were
considered unfit. A report to Congress, dated May 26,1870, noted that during the Civil
War, officers of questionable character and professional competence had been
commissioned. The report fell short of creating an academy, but regulations were
reformed to require physical and professional examinations (King, 1996). The Chief of
Revenue Marine Division, Department of the Treasury, Sumner I. Kimball, who had
oversight o f the Revenue Cutter Service, further reformed the prerequisites for officers.
With the support of Chief of Instruction, George W. Moore, Superintendent of
Construction, James H. Merryman, and Captain John Henrigues, Kimball influenced
Congress to approve a school of officer instruction resulting in congressional approval in
1876 (King, 1996).
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The Revenue Cutter School of Instruction opened in 1876 with eight cadets in
New Bedford, Massachusetts, serving aboard the Cutter Dobbins. Captain John
Henrigues served as the captain, superintendent, and principal instructor. He was assisted
by two civilian instructors: Edwin Emery, a graduate of Bowdoin College was wounded
in the Civil War, where he served as a soldier, color sergeant, and lieutenant in the 17th
Maine Infantry. Emery was the main academic instructor, having taught school and
served as principal (Ross, 1886). Charles E. Emery, who held an honorary Ph.D. from
University o f New York, was a consultant to the Revenue Service, designer of many of
their cutters’ engines, and guest lecturer for engineering instruction. He was a Civil War
veteran, having served first as a soldier and later in the Union Navy as an assistant
engineer, where he saw action with the Union blockade (American Institute of Mining
Engineers, 1890).
The first class of eight cadets reported to the training ship, the Cutter Dobbins,
and sailed out of Baltimore in October, arriving at their new station, New Bedford,
Massachusetts in 1876. The academy would close from 1890 to 1894 when the
government decided the United States Naval Academy could provide services for officers
o f the Cutter Service. After four years, the school reopened at New Bedford and operated
until 1900 when the academy’s second training ship, the Cutter Chase, docked at Arundel
Cove, Maryland. In 1910, the school moved permanently to New London, Connecticut
and in 1915 was renamed the United States Coast Guard Academy (Burhoe, 2011).
Amid the increasing concerns of the United States, Luce published his article, The
Manning o f our Navy and Mercantile Marine, in 1874. Voicing the need for the
education of naval officers and the philosophy of the means to that end, he said the model
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naval officer should be highly cultured and carefully trained. The training he described,
in keeping with his experience at the Naval Academy, was in step with the military
school movement of the United States as addressing the “whole man, the body, the mind
and the heart” (Speelman, 2001, p. 23).
His article condemned the failure of Congress to include a maritime component to
the Morrill Land Grant Act, stating that the legislative halls had “not a single
representative voice . . . in behalf of the Navy” (Luce, 1874, p. 28). Luce praised the
legislatures of New York and Massachusetts for their passage of acts in support of
maritime education. By this time, Luce was fully involved with the New York efforts to
establish a maritime educational facility.
In April, the New York legislators passed An act to authorize the Board o f
Education fo r the City and County o f New York to establish a nautical school. By
August, the committee of the Board of Education charged with that task asked Luce to
draft a bill for the United States Congress in support of their efforts. Luce’s efforts
became House Bill 1347, sponsored by Congressmen Henry L. Dawes and Benjamin F.
Butler, both o f Massachusetts (Speelman, 2001). The draft called for a wide range of
actions to include a system of certification of competency for masters and mates, service
requirements for maritime school graduates, a national school certification and
inspection, and the loan o f naval ships and officers for instructional purposes to state
schools (Luce, 1874). Unfortunately, the bill was watered down and passed with only an
authorization for the Navy to loan ships and officers. Among those Luce had lobbied for
further action were Secretary of the Navy George M. Robeson; Charles Sumner
(Republican, Massachusetts); Zachariah Chandler (Republican, Michigan); William A.
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Wheeler (Republican, New York); Benjamin F. Butler (Republican, Massachusetts);
Boards of Commerce and Education in eastern seaports; and the President of the General
Boards of U.S. Trade (Speelman, 2001).
Although the legislation that passed called for schools in New York, Boston,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and San Francisco, a systematic education system for
maritime officers was not put into effect. Only New York carried through with actions to
establish a maritime state academy. Luce was deeply involved in the establishment of
several maritime military colleges, four of which still exist. The New York Merchant
Marine Academy was established in 1874. Luce’s The Young Seaman’s Manual was
published in 1875, becoming one of its principal texts. Luce would assist in the selection,
outfitting, and coordination of the Academy’s delivery of the school’s first training
vessel, the St. Mary. He further influenced the curriculum through his book by stressing
lifesaving skills and drills and through his association with the school’s first
superintendent, Commander Robert L. Phythain, a graduate of the Naval Academy who
had worked with Luce in the 1860s at the academy (Speelman, 2001).
As the New York Merchant Marine Academy grew, Luce took command of the
USS Minnesota. This ship, along with the USS Saratoga, USS Pensacola, USS
Monongahela, USS Supply, and USS Juniata, all became training ships for boys as young
as 15 years. From 1875 through 1877, the number of enrollees grew from 260 to 479, of
which 258 boys were passed to the ranks of the regular enlisted Navy. This helped Luce
and the Navy with concerns about the large number of foreign-bom sailors; boys entering
the Maritime Academy were required to be American bom (Dickinson, 1884; Secretary
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of the Navy, 1877). The short duration and scope of the program made it more of a
seagoing transition training course than a military school, mimicking Annapolis.
With direct help from Luce, the New York Nautical School became the model for
those maritime academies that would follow during the next 67 years. The administration
of the school recognized their potential and stated in their 1876 Annual Report that
“should this experiment be successful, the cities of Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore and
San Francisco will, no doubt, follow the example of New York, and establish schools of
their own” (Speelman, 2001, p. 34). Unfortunately, San Francisco, which obtained the
training ship USS Jamestown in 1876, repeated the mistakes in Massachusetts, rather than
emulating the New York Nautical School approach. In 1860, the Massachusetts State
Reform School opened the Rigger Rockall (later renamed Massachusetts) in Boston, and
in 1867, the Rigger George M. Barnard, in New Bedford, to operate as floating reform
schools. The goal of the school was to teach the maritime trade to minors who had
committed petty crimes. The system failed in 1872 due to the cost and lack of graduates
(Speelman, 2001). Likewise, the Board of Education in San Francisco diverted from their
original plan prepared by Lieutenant Commander Henry Glass, United States Naval
Academy, Class of 1863. The initial class of students included male inmates of the
Industrial School, a juvenile reform program (Report of the Commissioner of Education,
1878).
Commander Glass, the ship’s superintendent and captain, was immediately
hampered by his new recruits and his ship gained “the appearance of a reformatory which
deterred many parents from applying for the benefits . . . because of contaminating
influences exerted by these wayward boys” (Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco,
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1892, p. 34). Glass’s conduct and management was attacked amid student applications
for discharge from the school. In February 1879, the ship was returned to the Navy,
ending the San Francisco experiment and fittingly returned its students to the San
Francisco Industrial School (Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco, 1892). The ship’s
captain, Henry Glass, went back to the fleet and had a distinguished career, retiring in
1903 as an admiral (Stewart, 2009).
It took another 10 years before the Pennsylvania Nautical School was established
in 1889. The school rightfully adopted New York’s model and experience (Speelman,
2001). This also set the pattern of future maritime academies as post-secondary, twoyear, and later four-year college institutions. The Pennsylvania Nautical School president
was Charles Lawrence, who had a long association with the merchant-marine industry
rather than the Navy. He started as a sail maker before the Civil War and served in the
Union Navy using his civilian skills. After the war, he became involved in politics and
served on the Board of School Directors for Philadelphia Commons, was a member of the
Vessel Owners and Captains’ Association, and was master of the Philadelphia port. In his
latter role, he lobbied for the establishment of the school (Speelman, 2001). He was
assisted by Commander Francis M. Green, United States Navy, who served as a training
ship captain from 1889 to 1893 (Brown, 1900).
Both the New York and Pennsylvania schools relied on the traditional sail ship to
provide a platform for the schools, with the New York Nautical School having the USS
St. Mary, and the Pennsylvania Nautical School receiving support from the USS
Saratoga. The seagoing classrooms from New York between 1877 and 1888 traveled to
Lisbon, Portugal, Cadiz, Gibraltar, Tangiers, Cherbourg, Southampton in Britain, and
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Queenstown, Ireland. The Pennsylvania school traveled to Europe, South America, and
the West Indies as well (Speelman, 2001).
In 1891, the momentum of the merchant marine education was regenerated
because o f two events: the passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1891, which provided
subsidies for American-owned and built vessels officered by Americans; and the
establishment of the Massachusetts Nautical Training School. This school elevated the
Merchant Marine Academy movement to a new level. Where the New York and
Pennsylvania schools remained loyal to the sail ship as the vehicle for educating future
officers, the Massachusetts school adopted a more modem, less traditional curriculum,
educational philosophy, and training vessel, the bark-rigged steam gunboat Enterprise
(Speelman, 2001).
The school’s first superintendent not only had a naval background, he had also
been a merchant marine. Commander John F. Merry was a Merchant Marine first officer
in 1862, when he was appointed an ensign in the Union Navy. He was a wounded veteran
of the Civil War and served on a Navy ship with duties in the China Sea, Mediterranean,
and Arctic Ocean, as well as the Great Lakes, prior to taking charge of the school. He
remained at the school until December 1895 and later rose to the rank of admiral (Cutter,
1908).
With more modem vessels than the other two nautical schools, the Massachusetts
Nautical Training School successfully blended academic and engineering courses with
the seamanship curriculum. The other schools would follow suit as they, too, adopted
vessels that were more modem. The Pennsylvania Nautical School acquired the USS
Adams, a wooden bark-rigged steam gunboat. The New York Nautical School acquired
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the USS Newport, a bark-rigged steam gunboat they used between 1907 and 1908. It was
at this time that both the states of Washington and California contacted the New York
Nautical School with interest in establishing their own programs (Speelman, 2001).
As interest grew in the Pacific states, the state of Pennsylvania closed their school
in 1913, despite the loud protests of the alumni. A few years later, the dire need for a
strong merchant marine program was demonstrated during World War I and would result
in a third wave of nautical military schools. The Washington State Nautical School
opened in 1917, the Pennsylvania State Nautical School was reestablished in 1919, and
12 years later in 1929, the California State Nautical School opened.
Upon reestablishment of the Pennsylvania State Nautical School, its operation
was placed directly under the state rather than Philadelphia authorities. The school was
firmly reestablished in the military school format with school regulations stating the
following:
[Student conduct will be] governed, as far as practicable, by the United States
Naval Regulations and customs . . . . Formations shall be by classes and will be
conducted in a military manner. . . . The rules for military etiquette on board ship
are founded on custom and tradition, and their strict observance forms an
important factor in the maintenance of discipline. (Speelman, 2001, pp. 118-119)
The Washington State Nautical School was patterned after the military schools of
New York and Massachusetts, with a strict military conduct, two-year curriculum, and
the training ship Vicksburg. However, what appeared to have been a successful model
was closed in 1920 (Speelman, 2001). The justification for closure is not well
documented, but the cost of ship operation was an issue with state legislatures.
According to the congressional testimony o f the superintendent o f the New York Nautical
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School in 1921, the Washington Nautical School did not have the record o f graduate
success needed to continue operating the program (U.S. Congress, 1922).
The opening of the California State Nautical School in 1929, provided another
step in the modernization of the Maritime Military Academy movement. The California
School applied a different approach to its curriculum than the other schools. The school
conducted classes and housed cadets ashore, with the first class of 56 cadets taking
residence in barracks on a 50-acre compound at an old coaling station in California City
(Tiburon) in March 1931. But because of lack of state funding, by the time the first class
had graduated, the cadets were back on ship for both classes and housing. For the next 11
years, the school would be threatened with termination due to funding shortfalls, and
cadets remained in the “Iron Mother,” as they called their home on the training ship
California. It was not until 1943 that the school and the cadets resumed shore academic
activities and occupied barracks at a new location, Morrow Cove (Peterson, 2004).
The curriculum at the California State Nautical School was expanded to three
years. This allowed the academics to be broadened to address subjects such as
meteorology, communications, ship construction, cargo handling, ship medicine, physics,
and electrical engineering (Speelman, 2001). The extension of the curriculum would
become part o f the next wave of improvement in the expanding maritime academy
movement.
The next maritime academy may have opened in Virginia if not for congressional
opposition. In 1935, the State of Virginia proposed that a maritime academy be
established and receive federal funds. Schuyler O. Bland helped kill the idea due to what
he felt was the absurdity of its association with a “school up in the mountains” (De la
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Pedraja Toman, 1994, p. 582). Congressman Bland from Virginia was a William and
Mary graduate and was very influential in maritime affairs (De la Pedraja Toman, 1994).
He saw little connection between maritime education and the military colleges of
Virginia Tech or VMI nestled in the mountains of Virginia hundreds of miles from the
ocean.
Going back as far as 1895, there had been suggestions for the establishment of a
national maritime academy on par with West Point and Annapolis. Several publications
voiced this opinion in 1913, as did a member of Pennsylvania Nautical School’s board of
directors, Joseph C. Gabriel (Speelman, 2001). The 20th century saw a new champion
emerge for the development of another movement towards a national maritime school.
The maritime academy movement’s momentum would increased with the advent of
World War II and result in a national academy.
Between 1929 and 1934, Richard R. McNulty, Massachusetts Nautical School
class of 1919, wrote articles in the Marine Journal, Naval Institute Proceedings, and the
Nautical Gazette endorsing merchant marine officer training. His concept, unlike those of
Stephen B. Luce’s, depicted a national academy located at New London, Connecticut,
replacing not only the state maritime academies, but also sending the Coast Guard cadets
to the Naval Academy. McNulty’s proposals made him several enemies in the maritime
academies, the Coast Guard, and the International Seamen Union. The state maritime
academies did not like the idea of their schools being closed in favor of a federal
institution, and the Coast Guard had no desire for their academy to be absorbed into the
Navy’s. McNulty also was a supporter of existing maritime curriculum, with education
primarily ashore augmented by training at sea. The union protested this concept, which
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would devalue their members’ experience. Their position was that “the only acceptable
training for merchant marine personnel was experience at sea” (Cruikshank & Kline,
2008).
At the National Conference on Merchant Marine in 1930, McNulty found some
allies. The chair of the Committee on the Training of Officer Personnel, Admiral
Hutchinson Cone, sent out questionnaires to leaders of government, commerce, shipping
labor, and education, and 6,500 were returned. These responses indorsed his proposal
three to one to replace the state maritime academies with a national academy. In a 1932
article in Naval Institute Proceedings, McNulty gained another ally, superintendent of the
New York Maritime Academy, Captain James H. Tomb (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).
Amid McNulty’s series of articles, the liner SS Moro Castle sank in 1934, due to
crew negligence when a fire was not brought under control. Adding to the tragedy,
members o f the crew filled the lifeboats and 134 died including 91 passengers. Only
months later, the SS Mohawk collided with the Norwegian freighter Talisman with more
loss of life and accusations of crew incompetence. But in this case, the captain and all but
one of his crew went down with the ship (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).
The Merchant Marine Act, passed by Congress in 1936, included two significant
elements that would take the country a step closer to establishing a national merchant
marine academy. The first was introduced by the Director o f the Shipping Board, J. C.
Peacock, to “establish a Merchant Marine Academy for the training of citizens of the
U.S. as officers for service on vessels . . . of the United States” (Cruikshank & Kline,
2008, p. 46). The second significant element was the establishment o f the Maritime
Commission.
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The Commission’s personnel division, under the leadership of Rear Admiral
Telfair Knight, took on the task of establishing a Merchant Marine Academy. Knight
added Richard R. McNulty to his staff. The first concrete step in founding the United
States Merchant Marine Academy was the establishment of the Merchant Marine Cadet
Corps by order of the Maritime Commission in 1938 (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008). The
sequence of accepting the cadets before having a facility for a military school was rather
strange. As a result, the program for the cadets was not a maritime military school at all
but a reflection of the pre-1838 idea of midshipmen receiving their education at sea at the
hands of a ship master. The requirement for merchant vessels to carry cadets based on
tonnage was a two-edged sword. It provided training opportunities but also brought
unwanted employees on board.
McNulty took time during this period of development to uncover the problems
associated with the shipmaster’s disinterest in providing a true training opportunity, and
he discovered cases of downright abuse of cadets by shipmasters and crew. In one case,
union members assaulted an unwelcome cadet on the SS Laura without reprimand of the
perpetrators. On some ships, cadets were isolated and union crew refused to work
alongside them. There were sufficient examples of failure on the sea that McNulty
pushed ahead with the shore establishment of the academy (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).
In October 1939, the Maritime Commission defined a four-year course for cadets
and directed that shore educational facilities be established in New York, New Orleans,
and San Francisco. The three maritime military schools became institutions looking for a
home. Harold V. Nemey, Massachusetts Nautical School Class of 1925, and the
California Nautical School facilitated the San Francisco Maritime Military School’s first
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home in the fall of 1939 aboard the California Nautical School’s training ship, the SS
California State. The California Nautical School was the first of the maritime academies
to establish shore facilities. Six months later, they moved to the Navy barracks ship, SS
Delta King, and a few months later, the SS Delta Queen. Finally, in January 1942, the
school relocated on 20 acres in San Mateo Point, north of San Francisco (Cruikshank &
Kline, 2008).
The New Orleans and New York schools had more success. Although the New
Orleans District had no maritime academy to help them, they set up classes in the spring
of 1940, at the Biloxi, Mississippi Coast Guard Station. In February 1941, the New
Orleans District’s cadets moved into the Algiers Navy Yard (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).
Sixty years later, in 2011, this became the location of the public charter secondary school,
the New Orleans Military Maritime Academy. Unfortunately, by November 1941 the
New Orleans District Maritime School was forced to leave again. Quick action by
McNulty placed them aboard a 120-foot houseboat, North Star, which by chance sought
safety from a storm in Pass Christian (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).
Pass Christian, Mississippi, was no stranger to military schools. The Mississippi
Military Academy operated in that location from 1852 to 1861, the Mississippi Military
Institute moved there from Aberdeen, Mississippi, in 1876, and functioned there until
1887. The cadets of the North Star moored their boat beside the Hotel Inn by the Sea to
avoid a storm and learned the hotel was for sale. It was not long until the spacious hotel
provided an excellent location for the school (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).
The New York District Maritime School had the fewest problems, as their first
shore facility was initially located at the New York Maritime Academy. They were
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welcomed by Admiral Tome, the New York superintendent and longtime supporter of the
national maritime academy concept. The New York contingent was split due to growth,
with one group moving into quarters at the Admiral Billard Academy in New London,
Connecticut (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008). The Admiral Billard Academy was a nautical
military school that had opened in 1936 and would operate as a secondary school until
1953, with a focus on preparing young men for entrance into the Coast Guard Academy.
Nutley was actively searching for a place to consolidate the New York District
facilities and depart the dual-location operation. In early December, 1941 the Walter P.
Chrysler estate on Kings Point went up for sale. This estate was the model for East Egg in
F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby. In the last week of January 1942, the cadets of
the United States Merchant Marine Academy housed at Fort Schuyler along side of the
cadets of the New York Nautical School rowed in “monomoys” (long wooden rowboats)
to their new home at Kings Point. When the facility was dedicated in September 1943,
Admiral Tomb, US Naval Academy Class of 1899, was the first superintendent and in
formation were 2,500 cadets organized into three battalions and 18 companies
(Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).
Admiral Tomb was a beloved figure at both the Merchant Marine Academy and at
New York Nautical School where he had been superintendent since 1927. He served the
United States Merchant Marine Academy long enough to see the academies establish
strong foundations; in retirement, he continued to worked on behalf of the schools. Tomb
was followed by Captain Giles Stedman, known as the “Clark Gable of the Seas” for his
multiple daring sea rescues of stricken vessels. Although he was not the product of a
nautical military school, he served in the Navy twice and captained some of the nation’s
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most prestigious ships including the SS America, flagship of the U.S. Lines (Cruikshank
& Kline, 2008).
Among these men, the four initial pillars of the academy were established: the
Kings Point Campus, the Naval Reserve status of midshipmen, the sea-going requirement
for graduation, and the regimental system. The latter was in large part Stedman’s
accomplishment while he served under Admiral Tomb as commandant of cadets.
Stedman was a tough disciplinarian and by August 1942, under his guidance, cadets took
the responsibilities of cadet officers and petty officers; the military school established a
demerit system; and 24- hour watch stations were established (Cruikshank & Kline,
2008).
Weeks prior to the initial occupation of Kings Point, the maritime curriculum
changed to meet the demands of the war. The four-year curriculum gave way to a
program of 12 weeks’ basic instruction at any one of the three locations—Kings Point,
Pass Christian, or San Mateo P oint- followed by six months on a merchant vessel, and
then 36 months at Kings Point. This schedule of three years, 10 months, remained until
1943, when it was modified to six months of basic instruction at any of the three
locations, six months aboard ship, and 24 months at Kings Point. The strength of the
Cadet Corps, including those serving aboard ship, was 7,000 in 1944, but was down to
4,391 by July 1945 (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).
In 1945, the academy superintendent Giles Stedman decided to return to his sea
career and turn over the superintendent’s position to Rear Admiral Richard McNulty,
who would be known as the Father of the United States Merchant Marine Academy. For
such a well-deserved title, his two-year term had an “abrupt and ugly” end reminiscent of
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the Alden Partridge end at West Point. According to Cruikshank and Kline (2008),
McNulty was a visionary, intelligent advocate who avoided the limelight and political
demands of the superintendent position. He was a shy man who had even missed the
1943 dedication at Kings Point, likely to avoid the praise that would have been given to
him. McNulty’s lack of assertiveness resulted in Admiral Telfair Knight removing him
from the academy to a much lesser staff position after just two years. Knight was the man
who had encouraged him to take the position and called him the “guiding force” behind
the academy’s establishment.
The United States Merchant Marine Academy would end the satellite facilities
one by one with the last to close, Pass Christian in 1950. McNulty remained a bitter man
and did not set foot on Kings Point for 22 years, until 1976 when the Alumni Association
named him “Father o f the Academy.” Four years later, McNulty died knowing his
contributions were celebrated and appreciated (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008). After World
War II, the enrollment of the academy ranged from 650 to 1,050. In 2010 there were 964
cadets enrolled.
While the United States Merchant Marine Academy was firming up their
establishment, a sister institution was on its last leg. In 1940, the Pennsylvania Nautical
School’s administration came under the auspices of the United States Merchant Marine
Commission. As a result, the school was renamed the Pennsylvania Maritime Academy,
and in 1942 the faculty and cadets transferred to the United States Merchant Marine
Academy at Kings Point. Pennsylvania resumed administration that September, when the
training ship Seneca (renaming it Keystone State) was returned for state use. Facilities
were open at Morrisville, Pennsylvania, to provide shore support. Like the United States
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Merchant Marine Academy, the school was oriented to two tracks: deck cadets and
engineering cadets (Independence Seaport Museum, 2006).
After the war, plans were made to increase the curriculum from two years to three
years and to include two cruises. Unfortunately, the state budget review came to the
legislature’s attention at the same time as allegations of poor management. Further
hurting the school were inaccurate reports from the New York Times claiming “mutinous
behavior” during a cruise. The school had already been closed twice in its history. The
fact that the mutinous behavior claim was proven false after an investigation (New York
Times, 1946, December 25) did not prevent the removal of funding and closure of the
program in June 1947. The United States Merchant Marine Academy “welcomed all
cadets who wanted to transfer and received a major infusion of faculty talent”
(Cruikshank & Kline, 2008, p. 120).
On October 9,1941, just two months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the
entry of the United States into World War II, the state of Maine opened the Maine
Maritime Academy with an initial 28 Cadets and an 18-month curriculum. By 1945, at
the war’s end, 384 men had graduated and served at sea. After the war, the curriculum
was expanded to three years and then four years (Maine Maritime Academy, 2011). In
2010, enrollment was 932 cadets.
The most recent maritime academy was established in 1962, 88 years after the
founding of the first, the New York Maritime Academy. Efforts to start a maritime
academy in Texas started in 1920, when the Assistant Secretary of State of Texas made
three different attempts to get a bill passed in the state legislature to establish a Texas
Nautical School. All of these attempts failed (Speelman, 2001). In the 1950s, Rear
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Admiral Sherman Wetmore was researching the possibility of establishing a maritime
academy in Galveston when he discovered a bill that was passed in 1931 establishing a
charter for a nautical school but no action had taken place. In 1959, the charter came back
to life and the state legislature authorized some minimal funding to support it (Dawson,
2011 ).

The Texas Maritime Academy was initially part of an expansion of Texas A&M,
and the Texas Maritime Academy cadets came directly from the corps of cadets of Texas
A&M. In 1962, the corps of cadets at Texas A&M assigned 27 cadets destined as the
cadre o f the Maritime Academy to Company I, 3rd Brigade, a cadet company with
leadership oriented toward the United States Marine Corps. The Marine Company was a
idea of the maritime academy’s future superintendent who wanted the best-trained and
motivated cadets for his school. The superintendent, Captain Bennett M. Dodson, had a
long association with the maritime academy movement, having been the commanding
officer of the United States Merchant Maritime Academy’s Pass Christian cadet training
facility. After that, Dodson became the superintendent of the Pennsylvania Maritime
Academy and, following the closure of PMA, became the executive officer at the
California Maritime Academy (Curley, 2005).
The 20 sophomore cadets in the Texas A&M uniform and a small faculty moved
to the Galveston campus in 1963. There they were joined by 35 freshmen and the small
organization became the corps o f midshipmen of the Texas Maritime Academy (Curley,
2005).The academy maintained a close tie to Texas A&M and its Corps at College
Station for many years. The maritime institution grew to become Texas A&M at
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Galveston, and the Texas Merchant Marine Academy, functioned as the Texas A&M at
Galveston’s corps of cadets. There were 300 midshipmen in 2010.
In Texas, the maritime academy movement met and blended well with the
military origins of Texas A&M. Texas A&M University formation was heavily
influenced by Virginia Military Institute graduates. These graduates had been schooled
by Francis Smith, who had studied with Sylvanus Thayer at West Point. West Point is an
institution closely associated with Alden Partridge. The 1969 opening o f the Great Lakes
Maritime Academy in Michigan as a civilian institution did not sway the remaining
maritime academies from the Stephen B. Luce model of a maritime academy based on a
military school format.
The maritime academies had created a historical pattern of close association and
cooperation. Examples in the 1940s include the New York Maritime Academy’s housing
of the United States Maritime Academy and the integration of cadets and faculty of
Pennsylvania Maritime Academy into the United States Merchant Marine Academy when
the former school closed. That pattern continued with the Texas Maritime Academy’s
first two cruises being conducted aboard the Empire State IV, New York Merchant
Marine Academy’s training vessel, and the State of Maine II, Maine Maritime
Academy’s vessel (Curley, 2011).
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Chapter 8: The Lost Cause and General Expansion of an Educational Format
The tradition of military schools has most frequently been attributed to the
Southern United States. The image of the Virginia Military Institute and The South
Carolina Military Academy (The Citadel), as well as the cadets’ participation in combat
in the Civil War, contributed to that impression. The attraction of military education in
the South has been attributed to military tradition, defense of slavery, and the appeal of
the post-Civil War’s Lost Cause interpretation in southern culture and education.
Between the end of the Civil War and 1898, there was a shift in the origins of the
establishment of military schools. Up until the beginning of the Civil War in 1861, a total
of 311 military schools had been established, with Partridge and Norwich alumni
associated with the establishment of at least 23, West Point Alumni 22, Francis Smith
efforts and the alumni of the Virginia Military Institute 27, and the Citadel alumni six.
With an alumnus from Virginia Literary, Scientific and Military Academy who
established the Franklin Military Institute in Kentucky, a total of 78 military schools
established through 1861 are documented to have been established by alumni of military
schools. This does not account in any way for the many teachers from military schools
that staffed the newly established military schools and helped pattern them after the
school traditions they knew. By the Civil War, Partridge, Thayer, and Smith had created
institutions that served as models for educational institutions, and were a source of
teachers particularly at the secondary level, in both the North and South. In VMI’s initial
15 years, 54% of its graduates became teachers, and Norwich University listed 74 of its
alumni as military school teachers prior to the Class of 1910 (Green, 2008; Ellis, 1911).

116

Indications are that many of West Point’s and the Citadel’s alumni also went into
education. These were likely military school movement multipliers as well.
Up until the Civil War, the military format in education was significantly
influenced by men who had experience with the military in an educational format.
Starting after the Civil War and up to the 20th century, that pattern shifted. Men whose
military experience was not in an educational setting but in the ranks of the Confederate
and Union Armies became founders of many schools. The military school format was
further embraced by men with no military background as both a successful business and
educational vehicle.
Former Confederate soldiers and educators in the South were influenced toward
the military school format through the positive image of the Civil War military service
and the heroic image o f southern Confederate leadership. Also associated with the Lost
Cause was the manner in which the South enacted the Morrill Land Grant Acts of 1862
and 1890. This created multiple college-level military schools exclusively in the South.
Finally, the various religious institutions had begun to adopt the military school format as
early as 1832 and integrate it into their particular denomination’s educational goals. A
modest 15 denominationally associated military schools were established prior to the
Civil War. By 1898, the denominational contribution to the military school movement
had reached 77 schools, and 142 military schools associated with religious denominations
had been established by 2011.

117

Tfce Lost Cause
Centric to the Lost Cause was the “firm connection in the minds of southerners
between the martial virtues (courage, patriotism, selflessness and loyalty) and moral
rectitude” (Andrews, 2001, p. 47). A symbol of those virtues is embodied on Stone
Mountain outside Atlanta Georgia. The rock face mountain contains the largest bas-relief
sculpture in the world. Depicted on a surface of 12,000 square meters are three mounted
heroes of the Confederate lost cause: General Robert E. Lee, General Thomas
“Stonewall’ Jackson and the Confederate President Jeff Davis.
These men particularly and many other Confederate military figures to a lesser
extent were connected to Southern military schools. General Lee was educated at West
Point, and had served as that school’s superintendent. General Stonewall Jackson
likewise had been educated at West Point and served on the faculty at Virginia Military
Institute. Finally, the Confederate President was also a West Point graduate. These men
particularly Lee and Jackson were sainted in the South as the perfection of southern
manhood.
James Morrison (2004) described growing up in Virginia amid the influences of
the Lost Cause as contributing to his decision to attend the Virginia Military Institute:
Still subtle influences may have been at work, even though I was unconscious of
them. My grandmothers, both o f whom I adored, were daughters of Company I,
3rd Virginia Cavalry. To them, the courage and virtue of the soldiers who served
in the Army o f Northern Virginia were without parallel in human history, a
conviction fully shared by my Great-Grandmother Morrison, the widow of a
member of Company A, 12th Virginia Infantry. These ladies, along with parents,
teachers, and other older people, instilled in me the belief that the aged
Confederate veterans who occasionally could be seen tottering along the streets of
Petersburg deserved special attention and respect, (p. 3)
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Likewise, Harry Temple and his brother from Petersburg were bound for the
corps of cadets at Virginia Tech. Harry spoke of his childhood memories of walking the
Petersburg Battlefield with a former Confederate battery commander in his gray overcoat
recounting the memory of the bloody battle. He was well versed on the part his ancestors’
played in Virginia and North Carolina regiments in the Civil War, and one of their
muskets hung from the wall as a constant reminder.
In Virginia Tech’s second year, 1873, the literary society adopted the name of the
Lee Literary Society. In doing so they stated
We can only endeavor to emulate him [Robert E. Lee]. He was far too above us
for us to hope to be like him, but if our aspirations are high and noble, we can
accomplish much. Although we may not leave behind us the record which others
have done, if we have endeavored to maintain the spotless reputation borne by our
beloved leader, we shall have been worthy of the name Lee” (Temple, 1996, p.
66).
The Richmond dedications of the Jackson Monument in 1875, Lee Monument in
1887, and the Soldier and Sailors Monument in 1894 all reflected the central place that
the Lost Cause, especially of General Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, had for the
South and its military schools. The 1875 event drew 40,000 people at Capital Square and
the parade and ceremony included both VMI and Virginia Tech’s corps of cadets along
with Confederate veterans. The 1887 and 1894 events were attended by both the Corps of
Cadets of VMI and Virginia Tech having traveled by train from their Virginia campuses
in the mountains. The 1894 event had an estimated 100,000 people in attendance and a
representation of 10 cadets and several officers from The Citadel (Temple, 1996).
Southern educators were said to have embraced the “traits of manly bearing,
courage, loyalty, patriotism and morally correct behavior” encouraged by the military
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school format (Andrew, 2001, p. 2). Between the end of the Civil War and 1897, 108
military schools were established in the South. These joined the 39 southern schools that
reopened in a military school format after the war. Their cadets dressed in gray often
served in annual parades and monument dedications as echoes of a valiant past.
The Lost Cause resulted in a union of religious and military virtues. Preachers
commonly used the southern military leaders like Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson
as examples of Christian virtue (Andrew, 2001). The military school movement and
school ethos blended perfectly with the moral goals of the Lost Cause. These schools
demanded moral behavior, lived by codes of obedience, and maintained their cadets as
much as possible in an environment free from alcohol, the immoral distraction of the
period. This is not to mention the strong religious character of many nonsectarian military
schools in the requirement of church attendance.
Civilian educators who saw schools’ transition to military format in the South
included Edwin P. Cater, an Oglethorpe University graduate, who in 1881 oversaw the
transformation of East Florida Seminary to a military school. The college later evolved
into University of Florida after 22 years as a military college. C. H. McKeen, a
Washington and Lee College graduate, founded Elmington Military and Classical School
in Virginia in 1872. Archibald Campbell, a Hampden-Sidney graduate, founded
Wytheville Military Academy in Virginia in 1881.
But perhaps the best example of an educator of the Lost Cause influencing the
establishment of southern military schools did not actually found one himself. James
DeRuyter Blackwell, graduate of Randolph-Macon College and Dickinson College,
joined the faculty of Bethel Academy in Virginia. Blackwell was a Confederate veteran
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and poet who had among his poetic works The Dead Drummer Boy, Our Native Land,
and Forget not the Dead (Blackwell, 1879). He convinced the founder of the academy,
Major Albert G. Smith, a hero of Pickett’s Charge and postwar graduate of University of
Virginia, to transition to a military format in 1869, and the school operated as such until it
closed in 1911 (Toler, 1996).
Morrill Land Grant Act
Justin Smith Morrill, a congressional representative from Vermont from 1855—
1867 and senator from 1867-1898, authored the Morrill Land Grant Act which became
law in 1862 (U.S. Congress, 2011). Despite the fact that Morrill lived in Stafford, just 19
miles from Norwich, a relationship between him and Alden Partridge has never really
been documented. In fact, Morrill was a Wig and Partridge a Democrat, so the two would
not have been political allies. But between 1862 and 1863, Morrill was a member of the
Board of Trustees of Norwich University (Ellis, 1911). Having been a short distance from
Norwich University and becoming a member o f the board of that military institution so
quickly after passage of the act, suggests there must have been influence there with
Partridge’s citizen-solider concept and the idea of military academies supporting the state
militias.
The Morrill Act’s goal was to help fund the establishment of colleges under the
oversight of the state legislatures, which would address the need for practical education
of the industrial classes in agriculture and engineering. The importance of the act for this
study was that it specified the teaching of military tactics (National Association o f State
Universities and Land Grant Colleges, 2008). The act did not dictate the manner in which
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military tactics would be incorporated into the colleges, so different states and regions
approached this in very different ways.
By 1890, 39 states had used federal funding under the Morrill Land Grant Act of
1862 (Webb, 1958). The act influenced the establishment or transition of 11 military
colleges, of which four were still in operation as military schools in 2011. Between 1872
and 1914, two military colleges became associated with the Land Grant Act, six military
colleges were established, and eight others converted to military while associated with
the act. With the exception of two schools transitioned in the 20th century in the Western
United States, all these schools were in the South. No college in the northern United
States became a military school under the Morrill Land Grant Act, although military
training was an element of most Land Grant Colleges to varying degrees.
In 1872, the first three military schools under the Morrill Land Grant Act were the
Virginia Agriculture and Mechanical College, Agricultural and Mechanical College of
Alabama, and Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute in Virginia. Hampton Institute
was established in 1868, brought under the Morrill Act in 1870, and transitioned to
military format around 1872. This African American, American Indian college, known
today as Hampton University, will be further addressed later. Texas Agricultural and
Mechanical College followed four years later in 1876 and would become Texas A&M.
The Virginia Agricultural and Mechanical College, which became better known
as Virginia Tech, and Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College, now Texas A&M,
have maintained their military school status to this day. The stories of Virginia Tech and
Texas A&M describe the changes and influences required of Morrill Land Grant Act
military schools to have survived the many social changes over time. Established in 1872
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and 1876 respectively, both were located in rural areas, and their leadership involved
former Confederate officers and VMI graduates.
Virginia Tech’s military program almost ended a few years after the
establishment of the college. The president was Charles Landon Carter Minor, a
University of Virginia graduate, who had served as a Confederate staff officer in the Civil
War. The professor o f engineering and commandant of cadets was Brigadier General
James H. Lane, VMI Class of 1854, a University of Virginia graduate who had served on
the faculties of two military schools prior to the war, Armstrong Military and Classical
Academy in Virginia and Hillsborro Military Academy in North Carolina.
Very different educational philosophies collided on March 23,1877. The
president led a faction o f the faculty that desired a classical civilian college and General
Lane naturally desired a military college. A faculty meeting fistfight resulted in both
being charged with disturbing the peace. The incident was widely reported in the state
newspapers and as a result, Minor left Virginia Tech. The Board of Visitors issued a
statement strongly supporting the military character of the school (Temple, 1996).
General Lane left the following year and took a teaching position at Auburn University.
His establishment of the corps’s high standards endeared him as the Father o f the
Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets. However, General Lane’s altercation with Charles Minor
would serve as a foreshadowing of future conflicts between the military and a future
college president.
Both Virginia Tech and Texas A&M would, at the end of their first 25 years,
enter periods under very popular presidents who fully supported both the military nature
of the schools and evolution of the institutions toward expanded educational
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opportunities. The first of the popular figures at Virginia Tech was John M. McBryde,
who was president from 1891-1907 and considered the Father of Virginia Tech. He was
a graduate and former president of University of South Carolina, a lawyer, and longtime
professor of agriculture. Although he did not have experience with a military school, he
had left the University of Virginia and fought in the Civil War as a soldier with the 1st
South Carolina Infantry until struck by typhus (Temple, 1996).
The second president in the building o f the military college was Julian Burruss,
Virginia Tech Class of 1894, who as a cadet had been the commander of the college’s
elite artillery battery. After graduation, he taught at Speers-Lanford Military Institute,
Searcy Female Institute, and was principal of a public school. His postgraduate work
included a master’s degree from Columbia and a Ph.D. from University of Chicago,
magna cum laude. Prior to starting a 26-year term (1919-1945) as president of Virginia
Tech, he had been president at a college that became James Madison University (Temple,
1998). He successfully integrated women as civilian students on campus. He reduced the
mandatory participation in the corps of cadets to two years while at the same time
endorsing the higher discipline, which helped build higher discipline and higher esprit de
corps among the cadets. He is also credited with increasing the quality of the faculty and
expanding the academic opportunities and reputation of the college.
Texas A&M had similar figures, among them Lawrence Sullivan (Sul) Ross
served as president from 1891 until his death in 1897. Ross’s resume was impressive as
the leader of a military school, despite not being a military school graduate. He was a
graduate of Florence Wesleyan in Alabama, lead Indian scouts, served as a captain in the
2nd United States Cavalry, and served in the famous Texas Rangers in the pre-Civil War
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period. During the Civil War, he went from private to colonel with the 6th Texas Infantry
Regiment, was credited with 135 engagements. He is credited with the capture of 30
Union regimental colors. After the war, he was elected to the Texas Legislature and
served two terms as Governor (Adams, 2001).
The second Texas A&M leader o f note was Dr. William B. Bizzell, Baylor
University graduate, and former president of the college that later became Texas
Women’s University. He did not have a military background, but his contributions from
1914 to 1925 were significant with improved scholastics, expanded religious and athletic
activities, improved facilities, and a moral and cooperative tone (Adams, 2001).
These men at Virginia Tech and Texas A&M set the stage for cadet corps, which
by World War II numbered over 9,000. A significant difference between the two colleges
was the manner in which change came to their campuses as they evolved. Texas A&M
transitioned to a volunteer corps of cadets in 1963 with a popular and pro-military
president, James Rudder, Texas A&M, Class of 1932. Rudder, a former major general
and World War II hero of D-Day, was a beloved figure by the alumni and cadets. In its
volunteer status, the corps of cadets has thrived through the years and numbered 2,177
cadets in their ranks in 2011. This is as much a reflection on the history of the campus as
it is of the very conservative nature of the student body.
On the other hand, President T. Marshall Hahn at Virginia Tech was distrusted
and openly disliked by many of the alumni, and likely by the corps of cadets, in his drive
for the greater Virginia Tech. His goal was for the military to be reduced to the ROTC
program seen at most universities. The reaction of the Virginia Tech alumni stopped him
from achieving this goal but not from changing the Cadet Corps to a voluntary option
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starting in 1964. The tone and style of leadership of these two universities as they
evolved militarily were very different.
Friendlier administrations would follow at Virginia Tech. First, in 1975 the
alumni of the Regimental Band formed the Highty-Tighties Incorporated, under Charles
Comelison, Class of 1967, and in 1992 established the Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets
Alumni Association under Henry Dekker, Class of 1944, to insure the preservation of the
corps. After many years of low cadet enrollment, these two alumni organizations joined
with two successive commandants, Major General Stan Musser and Major General Jerry
Allen, to provide a constant, outstanding military leadership through focused leadership
training programs. These efforts were backed by a growing endowment devoted to the
corps, which helped grow the cadet corps to 949 cadets in 2011, the largest since 1968.
The Agricultural and Mechanical College of Alabama was established in 1856 as
the East Alabama Male College in Auburn. Upon its inclusion in the Morrill Act, it
clanged its name and transitioned to a military school in 1872. It is now better known as
Auburn University, a title not officially adopted until 1960. The school maintained its
military character for 34 years until 1906. According to the 1901 catalog, the military
system provided “good order, promptness and regularity in performance of academic
duties” (Andrew, 2001, p. 43). In 1890, 203 of the 234 students were members of the
corps o f cadets. The cadets were uniformed in cadet gray and equipped with 150
Springfield rifles and two three-inch cannons. Although the corps was reported to have
good discipline, this college did not have barracks and cadets lived off campus (Heyl,
1890). The lack o f barracks space weakened cadet discipline and adoption of military
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requirements and may have been a factor in the end of military school requirements in
1906.
In 1874, the Louisiana State University Agricultural & Mechanical College,
formerly known as Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy, was brought
under the Morrill Act. The school was established as a military college in 1860 with
Colonel W. T. Sherman, West Point Class of 1840 and future Union general, as its
president and Francis Smith, Virginia Military Institute Class of 1856, as commandant
and professor of chemistry and mineralogy. The enrollment initially numbered 59 cadets
and quickly grew to 80. Sherman departed the campus prior to the outbreak of the Civil
War when the state authorities of Louisiana sent confiscated federal property to the
academy. The Louisiana State Militia captured the federal arsenal at Baton Rouge and
sent captured federal-govemment property for the college’s use. The war helped close the
school in 1863, but it reopened after the war in 1865. By 1869, the enrollment had
climbed to 133 cadets when a fire caused the college’s relocation from Alexandria to
Baton Rouge. Louisiana, facing a budget crisis, cut funding to support tuition for “State
Cadets” in 1873. As a result, the administration had to furlough those who could not pay
full tuition and the enrollment dropped to 35 cadets (Ruffin, Jackson, & Hebert, 2006).
The demise o f the military system was a combination of low enrollment and a merger.
Four years later the school merged with the nonmilitary Louisiana State A&M College
and the military school was no more.
Another Morrill Land Grant Act college that ended its military status because of a
merger with a nonmilitary school was Florida Agricultural College. This college was
established in 1884 and transitioned to a military school in 1887. The college was
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coeducational with 81 male cadets in 1892. It was said the cadets and faculty had an
exceptional spirit of support for the military program. But in 1905, that came to an end
when the Florida legislature organized the University o f Florida through the merging of
the college with the nonmilitary Petersburg Normal and Industrial School, the East
Florida Seminary, which had ended its military school aspect in 1903, and the South
Florida Military College.
Georgia was the home of three military schools, all established under the Morrill
Land Grant Act and considered branches of the University of Georgia. The first was
North Georgia Agricultural College (North Georgia College), established as a civilian
coed institution and opened in January 1873. From the very early years, military training
was conducted but the college remained organized as a civilian institution. The initial
faculty included B. Palmer Gaillard as professor of mathematics and military tactics and
civil engineering. Enrollment in the initial years was about 95 males and 35 females. The
training was so enthusiastically received that the male students petitioned the college
president to allow students to wear uniforms. In 1876, the War Department issued the
school rifles and equipment to support this training and in 1877 detailed an officer
(Kraus, 1978).2
The first three years of the school’s catalogs reflect a desire for a uniformed male
student body and a Virginia Military Institute graduate became president in 1877. The
military school concept was abandoned in 1877 but with retention of military training for
male students. (North Georgia Agricultural College, 1873-1880).

2 Part of the 1866 Morrill Land Grant Act was the detailing o f active-duty army officers to Land
Grant Colleges
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In 1904, David C. Barrow, a University of Georgia graduate, became the new
college president. He had nothing in his background that would lead one to believe he
would convert the school to a full-military format for its male students. The new
commandant in 1905 was Captain E. J. Williams who was described as “one of the most
valuable officers that the institution has ever had” (Georgia Department of Education,
1906, p. 20). It appears that he designed a plan to provide officers for the Georgia
National Guard and was the guiding influence in the school’s conversion. The school
now required a system of discipline “military in nature” (North Georgia Agricultural
college, 1905, p. 10) where “cadets [wore] uniforms at all times during the school term”
(North Georgia Agricultural College, p. 48).
The work of Captain Williams received high praise from the Board of Trustees in
1908 upon his reassignment and the Board stated that the “life of a student at this
institution [North Georgia Agricultural College] very closely resembles the life of a cadet
at the U.S. Military Academy” (Kraus, 1978, p. 283). Unfortunately, the challenges of
cadet discipline became an issue from at least 1913-1921 and as a result, in 1923,
Professor Marion D. DuBose rose to the office of president of the college. The Princeton
University graduate acted quickly to end “rigid military discipline.” By 1925, the alumni
and the student body had mobilized against the president over their displeasure with the
new change o f direction for the college. First, an alumni resolution condemned the
president, and second, a student petition was made to the Board of Trustees to change the
president. DuBoise resigned despite a vote of confidence from the board, expressing his
sentiments:
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The citizens of Dahlonega desire a strict military college here. I do not approve of
strict military training in an institution of college rank. Under conditions as they
now exist, I do not feel that I care to remain at the head of this college. (Kraus,
1978, p. 294)
The next year, North Georgia College resumed its military college character and has
retained it since, with a corps of cadets of over 700 in 2011.
The South Georgia Military and Agricultural College in Thomasville was
established in 1878, a few years after North Georgia College. Officially, this school, as
well as North Georgia, was a branch of the University of Georgia. Enrollment in 1885
was 85 students (Appleton, 1886). The school had a military character from the outset
but, like North Georgia, was coeducational. Unlike North Georgia, South Georgia was
considered a preparatory school for the University of Georgia, enabling entrance as a
college freshman or sophomore there (Jones, 1889). The small military school operated
until at least 1911, but was likely overshadowed by the success of North Georgia.
The final of the three Georgia land grant military schools, Middle Georgia
Military & Agriculture College, opened in Milledgeville in 1880. Until 1893, the school
was another feeder school for the University of Georgia. Cadets wore gray wool uniforms
and female civilian students were dressed in blue or white dresses as prescribed by the
college. Among the influences of the early college was the second commandant, Richard
Tyler Crawford, a Citadel graduate, and Confederate General D. H. Hill, West Point,
Class o f 1841, who was president from 1886-1889. Barracks were not provided for
cadets until 1884 (Simpson, 2008). Enrollment in 1885 was an impressive 407 cadets
(Mayes, 1899). In 1900, the school was renamed Georgia Military College, and in 1931,
a military junior college was added. In 1934, the school became all male and remained as
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such till 1969 (Simpson, 2008). By 2010, the college had evolved with a coeducational
military junior college of approximately 250 cadets and a military program of

2th

graders numbering 500.
The Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College opened in 1880 with former
Confederate General Thomas D. Lee, West Point Class of 1854, as president. The
school’s initial regulations were taken from Alabama Military Institute. General Lee was
associated with the college, which became known as Mississippi State University, for 19
years as president and another nine years as a member of the board. The disciplinary
concept at the outset of the college was to “furnish the machinery of discipline” (Kraus,
1978, p. 90).
The school from the outset appeared to have addressed the military program not
as a character or leadership-development tool, but as a means to discipline the
challenging student body. Reflecting on the 1902-1903 school year, the second president
of the college, John C. Hardy, voiced concern about the school gaining a reputation of a
place to send “bad boys” and went as far as to say “if the state wants a reformatory . . . it
must build one” (Kraus, 1978, p. 95). In the first ten years of the college, the average
enrollment was 314 students, with 1,832 students having attended, only 104 graduated
(Mayes, 1899). Up until 1908, the percentage of returning students was never more than
45% (Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1909). The military system was
not fully supported by barracks space, with only 660 of 847 cadets housed in 1899
(Mayes, 1899). The dismal record of academic success there suggests a low level of cadet
esprit de corps and bonding with the institution and their military organization. This is
further reflected in the general state of discipline over the college’s first 20 years.
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Kraus (1978) emphasized that the military system at the college was inconsistent,
with the military department frequently undermined by the faculty. The military
department set policies, such as uniform regulations and attendance to formations, while
members of the faculty were empowered and active in giving exemptions to individual
cadets. This resulted in a situation described in 1912 as “a lack of co-operation between
the Heads of the Departments and the Commandant’s office [resulting in] great abuse of
privilege during the year” (p. 98). The type of privilege abuses included authorizing
civilian clothing, class absences, and shirking of military duties.
To complete the picture of the military setting of the college in its first 20 years, a
single set of uniforms was required of cadets and expected by policy to be worn at all
times on campus. With labor and lab activities required of agriculture cadets the single
uniform provided adversely impacted military discipline and uniform standards (Kraus,
1978). The new President J. C. Hardy refused to embrace the strict uniform regulations
and the faculty and president had a series of confrontations (Ballard, 2008). With a
questionable quality o f cadets and a discipline system weakened by faculty interference,
grave indications of a lack of traditional military school culture were reflected by acts
very contrary to military school ethos. “The average cadet does not as a general rule,
have that high sense of duty and justice to make a military system of control successful”
(Kraus, 1978, p. 98). Reflective of this were the common practices of lying, theft, and
even vandalism. Related to the latter was a telling comment in the 1899 annual report that
described the damage from four fires on campus. “In the previous years the college had
not a single fire involving any loss. This alone would indicate that the burning was
incendiary” (Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1899, p. 232).
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The beginning of the end of Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College as a
military school occurred in 1912, when the senior class presented their demands
associated with the college vice president’s order restricting conversations with the few
female students in the school. The petition was presented at chapel and followed by the
senior class walking out on the new president, George R. Hightower (Ballard, 2008).
Hightower expelled 61 seniors for the walk out and 35 others for misconduct on an
athletic trip to Birmingham. Some expelled cadets refused to leave campus and a collegewide strike resulted, with only 325 of 808 students attending class.
Although the dismissals broke the back of the senior revolt and the student strike,
the lax military system, for the most part, continued to decay. In 1920, the War
Department ended the school’s classification as a military college. Ten years later the
student newspaper summed up the feeling of the end of the military environment at the
college in part saying that the students were finally “granted the privileges of gentlemen.
.. a n d . . . the right to govern themselves” (Kraus, 1978, p. 108). Considering all the
school’s problems with cadet quality, barracks space, discipline, and uniforms, it is
surprising the military school aspect of the college lasted for 30 years. But the principal
problem was that the military school ethos was never embraced. Honor, duty, and
leadership were not aims of the system; the military was simply a method chosen to
control young male farmers. The college went on to evolve into Mississippi State
University.
Clemson Agriculture College, which officially became Clemson University in
1964, was established as a military college as part of the Morrill Land Grant Act, opening
in 1893 in South Carolina. The school was patterned after the Mississippi Agricultural
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and Mechanical College founded 13 years prior, but its military system aim was far
greater than just to discipline students. The all-male college cadets lived in barracks,
except for a small number of “day cadets” from local families who were required to
reside in the barracks at least six months of either freshman or sophomore year. By 1915,
the military spirit at Clemson had “developed and nurtured to the best possible extent”
(Kraus, 1978, p. 62). Although Kraus (1978) questioned the discipline of the corps at
Clemson based on the antics of their senior privates, historically this is common with
other military schools, including Virginia Military Institute and Virginia Tech. At the
college level, there are many examples of those cadets not promoted beyond cadet private
banding together in a fraternal group and trying their best to enjoy their senior year to the
maximum extent possible.
The college catalog of 1924-25 stated the purpose of the military system:
“Clemson is operated as a military school not for the purpose of making soldiers, but in
order that students may learn important life lessons” (Krause, 1978, p. 65). In the 1930s,
the cadets were uniformed in West Point style gray, with senior officers in riding boots
and Sam Brown Belts. The corps numbered 2,359 in 1940 and peaked in 1942 at 2,364 in
the first year o f United States involvement in World War II. Clemson military men
became well known for their quality of officer in World War II, especially as cavalry and
armored officers.
But World War II was actually the catalyst o f the end of Clemson as a military
school. After World War II, returned veterans and new-student veterans of the conflict
changed the makeup of the student body. By 1949, the corps was back to 1,740, but it
was only 55% of the student body. According to Kraus (1978), the school dropped its
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standards of corps discipline to reflect more of the life of a country gentleman or military
fraternity and abandoned the pursuit of life lessons. Despite an enrollment of 1,583 cadets
in 1954, the college felt that the changes underway, such as the enrollment of women that
year, meant departure from the past, and in September 1954, the corps of cadets became
voluntary. In 1955, a college-sponsored management study called for “the college to
undergo normal expansion without being hampered by the military program” (Krause,
1978, p. 72). The college opened in September 1955 without the military school
requirements. Unlike the reaction of the alumni and cadets of North Georgia College in
the 1920s and Virginia Tech in the 1970-1990s, the change did not result in a major
backlash.
Two Land Grant colleges ended their adoption of the military school requirements
after a short period. One was due to the efforts of the students and the other to the actions
of a new president. North Carolina College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts was
established in 1889 and transitioned to a military format in 1894. Between that year and
1906, cadets wore gray uniforms, marched to chapel and meals, drilled three hours per
week, and conducted periodic field training. But the military system appears to have
never been completely embraced by the students. “The senior class of 1906 conducted a
strike in the fall o f 1905 when the president revoked senior privileges. Petitions followed
to adjust all matters pertaining to discipline and liberties” (J. Baker, personal
communication, December 16,2010). The results of these actions united the trustees with
the students to endorse military training but “not allow the college to become a military
school like Clemson Agricultural College. Nor would they permit the administration to
enforce outmoded military codes” (Reagan, 1987, p. 47).
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The University of Tennessee’s history goes back as far as 1794, when it was
founded as Blount College. In 1875, after being designated a Land Grant college in 1869,
the school adopted a military format. The cadets were organized into a regiment,
uniformed, required to hold drills and parades, and assigned a commandant. According to
Dennis (2001):
The school offered dashing uniforms and taste of confederate military glory to
young southerners bred on the lore of Beauregard and Lee . . . . paramilitarization
o f the campus suggests much about the grip of the lost cause on southern culture
in practical terms, military discipline was an effective method for controlling
adolescents ill prepared for university studies, (p. 94)
Charles Dabney, who became President of University of Tennessee in 1887,was a
Hampden-Sydney graduate, as well as alumni of the University of Virginia and a college
in Gottingen, Germany. Dabney was no stranger to the question of military school
adoption to secure funding under the Morrill Land Grant Act. He had been a strong
faculty supporter in Walter Barnard Hill’s fight as president of University o f North
Carolina to keep it from becoming another Land Grant military college. Hill’s view was
that the Morrill Land Grant was intended to create a balanced approach to liberal arts and
industrial training, and not meant to establish military colleges. Dabney backed that point
of view with the example of General Robert E. Lee’s post-war leadership at Washington
College. He took on the military school structure as being “inconsistent with true
university life and work” (Dennis, 2001, p. 94). His elimination of the military aspect was
like other Land Grant military colleges but unlike the reaction to change at North
Georgia, Texas A&M, and Virginia Tech. An alumni observer noted “we have come to a
turning point. . . where it [University of Tennessee] has outgrown the . . . barracks
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system o f a military academy and we must either give room for expansion or congestion
will result” (Dennis, 2001, p. 94).
Eight of the 12 Land Grant military colleges’ military requirements ended in six
ways. Two were by means of changes in college leadership, one through the change from
traditional military male enrolled student body, two from a lack o f instructional support
in order to maintain the military ethos, one through the desires of the cadets, one from
consolidation or reorganization with nonmilitary colleges, and one may have simply been
overshadowed by a more successful military college. Of the remaining four, three
continued as military colleges and one evolved into a military junior college.
Grand Army of the Republic
But the historical image of the South as the principal home of the military school
calls for a closer examination when faced with the fact that New York state has had 78
military schools in its history and California has had 90. The period between the close of
the Civil War and 1898 saw the military school format not only continue to expand in the
northern United States but also spread west. During this period, 51 schools were
established or transitioned to military format in the North, 33 in the Midwest, and eight
schools in the western United States.
The Grand Army o f the Republic is a generic term for the Union Army as well as
the Union veteran’s organization of the post-Civil War era. It was symbolized by the May
1865 parade, where the Union armies of the East and West conducted their victory parade
down Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, DC. The number of Union army veterans
numbered close to 1.8 million. Like the Lost Cause of the South, former soldiers in blue

137

and their legacy impacted the military school movement in the North, Midwest, and
Western states.
An example o f an educator who returned from military service and incorporated
the military into his educational philosophy was Charles Jefferson Wright. Colonel
Wright was a Holbart College graduate who served in the 16th New Hampshire Infantry.
He was wounded at both Fort Fisher and at the siege of Petersburg and ended the war as a
brevet colonel. In 1869, he was first the principal at New York’s Peekskill Military
Academy, which had been a military school since 1857. When he took charge of that
school there were only seven cadets enrolled (Simberg, 1902). He turned the school
around and charted a course that enabled it to operate until 1968. In 1887, Wright left the
school after 18 years and founded New York Military Academy with 78 boarding cadets.
Enrollment in 1980 was 516 cadets and the school was still functioning with over 100
cadets in 2011 (Rogal, 2009).
In 1894, Wright left New York Military Academy and took over as president of
Matawan Military Academy in New Jersey. This was another well-established military
school, having been founded in 1836 and transitioned to a military format in 1857. An
article in Printer’s Ink, an advertiser’s journal, in 1902 described Wright as a man who
could take a school near ruin and resurrect it. “Colonel Wright has been identified with
several military schools since he left the service at the close of the Civil War, and has
more than once used advertising as a stimulant for run-down establishments” (Simberg,
1902, p. 14).
Colonel Wright had a financial interest in Cayuga Lake Military Academy in New
York (Rogal, 2009). He was listed as the point of contact for that school from 1891 to
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1896. Churchill Military Academy, founded in 1843, was another school that would fall
under the Wright influence. It changed names to St. John’s School in 1869 when Rev J.
Beckinridge Gibson took over the school. Reverend Beckinridge died in 1899 and
enrollment waned quickly. Colonel Wright remodeled the school and advertised from
Boston to San Francisco (Simberg, 1902). St. John’s School continued operation until
1948.
In 1900, Wright founded the New Jersey Military Academy in Freehold. It
appears he maintained a close association with the Matawan Military Academy, as he
died in Matawan in 1910 (Hobart College, 1911). Prior to his death, Colonel Wright
founded two military schools and was associated with the leadership of three others.
New York Military Academy remains his legacy.
Captain Joseph S. Rogers enlisted as a private in the 2nd Maine Infantry and
participated in the initial battles of the Civil War, including First Bull Run and the
Peninsula Campaign, and received a head wound at Second Manassas, which took him
out of service (All Biographies, 2011). He returned home to recover, completed his
education at Bucksport Seminary in Bangor, and reenlisted as an officer with the 3 1st
Maine Infantry (Starbuck, 1966). Rogers fought in the final battles of the war, including
Petersburg and Appomattox. He received a brevet promotion from captain to major for
bravery. In 1877, having stayed in uniform with the regular army after the war, he
resigned to found Michigan Military Academy (All Biographies, 2011).
Another example of a returning veteran was Peter De Graff, who was first a
principal at several schools before 1868, when he established the DeGraff s Military and
Collegiate Institute. DeGraff had been at the Canadaigua Academy of New York before
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the war as a teacher for four years and principal from 1857-1861. Enlisting in 1861 in the
33rd New York Infantry Regiment, he fought at the Battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg,
and Chancellorsville before mustering out of the army and returning to education (Kirk,
1883).
The DeGraff s Military and Collegiate Institute started with 25 cadets, and in
three years the cadet corps numbered 280 (University of the State of New York, 1887).
The school’s stated goal was “to prepare boys to become healthy, intelligent Christian
men” (Drew, 1870, p. 282). Cadets wore uniforms patterned after West Point cadets and
took academics that were considered “correct preparation for college” (Drew, 1870, p.
282). Other veterans included Wilbur F. Miles, a Binghamton Commercial College
graduate, who returned to Deposit, New York, after recovery from wounds while serving
with the 13th New York Heavy Artillery to take charge of the Deposit Military Academy
(Inter-State Publishing Company, 1882).
Northern Educators
In part, returning Union veterans explains the expanding popularity of military
schools outside the southern United States, but the popularity was much wider. The
School Journal was a northern-oriented education periodical (New York, Chicago,
Boston), which in 1903 described the educational setting for the post-Civil War military
school well:
An increasing number of secondary schools are adopting the military system as a
medium for supplying in the education of boys that training which cannot be
derived from books alone. The important question is, of course, whether or not the
soldier’s discipline is an effective means to the desired end. Observation shows
the military system, when properly used, fulfills better than any other mode of
school discipline, the condition of being to character what study is to mind and
exercise to physique. (Little, 1903, p. 204)
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This helps explain the adoption of the military school concept by those outside the
ranks o f veterans. Good examples of this include Henry Harrison Culver, who in 1894,
founded Culver Military Academy in Indiana. His background was largely in the
stovepipe business, and he was the son of an Ohio farmer. The school stemmed from his
desire to provide quality education for young men, and perhaps the school’s format was
inspired by a brother’s feeling for his brother, Litellus Culver, who was killed in the Civil
War (Roeder, 2004). Henry Culver, as a young man of 15 in 1855, started working with
his other brother, Wallace, in St. Louis and remained in that city until 1881. A prominent
educator and military school in St Louis could have been a factor which influenced Henry
Culver’s future establishment of a military school.
St. Louis had a very influential educator during this period, Edward Wyman.
Wyman had conducted Wyman's English and Classical High School, a military school,
from 1843 until 1853. At his second school, City University, which opened in 1861, he
organized its cadet enrollment of over 600 into three full companies, known for their
uniform appearance and skill at drill under arms. Supported by the school’s drum and fife
corps, they marched behind the school colors emblazoned with Palma non sine Pulverre,
meaning victory not without toil, instead of the United States flag, since many of the
young men were attached by birth or sentiment to the southern cause. The school gained
much attention not only on parade, but also when Wyman’s loyalty to the Union was
questioned. In a gesture of loyalty to their superintendent, all the cadets including those
with southern leanings unanimously concurred to parade behind the United States colors,
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which afterwards was explained as their “loyalty to and love of Professor Wyman” (Hyde
& Conrad, 1899, p. 2258).
Another example of a noted northern educator was Professor Orvon Graff Brown,
a graduate of Mount Union College, University of Cincinnati, and University of Denver.
He founded Miami Military Institute of Ohio in 1894. His philosophy matched the
emerging military school culture as he sought to shape the diverse talents of his cadets in
a challenging moral, physical, mental, and social school structure (Rogal, 2009). Brown’s
background gives few clues to his selection of a military format. His childhood near
Gettysburg Battlefield, or his familiarity with the four military schools operating in Ohio
at the time, could have been factors which led him to found his school in a military style.
There were two military schools in Cincinnati at the time, the Ohio Military Academy,
founded in 1832, and the Ohio Military Academy, founded in 1833.
Two other northern educators who adopted the military school format were
Stephen G. Wentworth and John Michael Birch. Wentworth was bom in Massachusetts
and home schooled. He was a businessperson in Virginia for six years then moved to
Missouri, where he was a public administrator in Lafayette, and president of Farmers and
later Morrison-Wentworth Banks in Lexington. Upon the death of his son, William, he
opened Wentworth Military Academy as a memorial to him (Stevens, 1915). Neither
Stephen Wentworth’s education nor occupation gave clues to the reasons for the military
nature of his school. Lexington was the site of two Civil War battles. In the graduation
address of 1899 at Wentworth, it was stated “Wentworth is a boy’s school and therefore a
military school. A boy’s school without the military would be as preposterous as a
military school without boys in it” (Little, 1903, p. 204). John Michael Birch, graduate of
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Washington and Jefferson College in Pennsylvania, was headmaster at the Linsly School
in West Virginia from 1874 to 1881,1889 to 1890, and 1910 to 1911. In the interims, he
was superintendent of public schools in Wheeling, West Virginia, and a diplomat in
Japan. He converted the Linsly School to military format in 1887 and enrolled about 114
cadets through the 1890s. Although the school dropped its military school format due to
Board of Trustee action in 1907 over alumni protests, the military format was returned
when Birch took the school’s leadership again in 1910 (Schramm, 2003). The school
continued as a military school until 1979.
One of the most dramatic and least known expansions of the military school
format came about through the leadership of Enoch Henry Currier. Currier suffered an
injury as a young man causing loss of sight in one eye and health problems, which
delayed his education. He became a professor at the New York Institute for the Deaf
because of early interests in deaf education through his interactions with Dr. Harvey P.
Peet. Currier taught all grades at the institute over a 20-year period and was credited with
the 1884 invention o f the duplex conical hearing tube. Considered an authority on the
subject of defective hearing, he was selected as the principal of the institution in 1883
(Harrison, 1900).
Shortly thereafter, he transitioned the school to become the only deaf military
school in history. The deaf cadets were initially organized into three, then four
companies, and a cadet band. Male faculty wore army uniforms and Currier functioned
militarily as the school’s colonel, the military tactics instructor as the school’s major, and
cadets as company officers. The corps were dressed in West Point-style uniforms and
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marched to class and meals (Dobyns, 1908). The cadet’s silent drill was heralded from
New York to Virginia.
Currier explained this concept:
[The intentions were not] to make soldiers of the boys. That is a matter of
secondary importance. We do not even teach them marksmanship. The military
drill was introduced because of its gymnastic value and in order to inculcate into
the boys the lesson of discipline . . . . They are proud of their proficiency and
compliments they have received from army experts. (“Mutes,” 1900)
Currie felt the first step in education was obedience and self-control. For that
purpose he felt nothing was as effective as a military environment. A further benefit was
the military’s part in “character building, the basic principle of all true education, [which]
is most advanced when obedience to authority is most implicit” (The Volta Review,
1911, p. 201). The school continued its military format with its cadets until 1952.
Adoption of the Military School Format by Religious Denominations
O f the approximately 834 military schools that have operated in The United States
from 1802-2011, at least 142, or 17%, have been affiliated with various Christian
denominations including the Catholic (48), Episcopal (46), Presbyterian (24), Baptist (9),
Methodist (6), and other denominations (9). The association between religion and
military school culture goes back to the first two military schools. Under the leadership of
Thayer, West Point required weekly church attendance of cadets and “enforcement [of]
rules against lying, stealing and other irregular or immoral practices” (Manning, 2003, p.
116).
Norwich University was established with a chaplain on the faculty and, from its
earliest days, cadets were required to attend church services on Sundays and encouraged
to read the Bible during their leisure hours afterward (Ellis, 1911). The Citadel enforced
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church attendance on Sunday from its first year (Thomas, 1893). Through the personal
involvement of Francis Smith and local clergy at Virginia Military Institute, religious
training became an important feature for cadets (Smith, 1912).
Kraus (1976) reflects on the similarities in military colleges or schools and
church-related colleges, with both having a “strong commitment to purpose, values and to
tradition” (p. 438). He viewed the military-college culture as expressing the messages of
the church college in a modified form. As an example, he cited the Virginia Military
Institute’s 1974 planning document, which explained cadet life in terms of “conviction
that the development of honor, integrity, a mature sense of values, responsibility, selfrespect and physical wellbeing are essential to the development of man’s ability” (p.
439). Norwich University’s Annual Report of 1976 states “the corps is the
instrumentality by which a Norwich education develops honor, patriotism, self discipline,
respect for constituted authority, character and leadership” (p. 439).
In 1896 Reverend Allan L. Burleson, the first headmaster of West Texas Military
Academy (later Texas Military Institute), summarized his view on military schools in his
speech in San Antonio on education day. “Military training in the American schools is a
great moral agency for good which tends to give us better sons, better neighbors, better
citizens” (Burleson, 1896). More than 100 years later in 2002, the president of Randolph
-Macon Academy summarized the church military school:
The Church. . . does a masterful job o f blending three cultures: military, religion
and academic. In all areas, including school literature and chapel services no
student would ever have to wonder, ‘Is this a church-related school? In ministry
of teaching, the environment reflects the United Methodist Church values. This is
a military school, but sees the military as a part of the methodology of enforcing
support, and discipline, and to give children structure. (Rogal, 2009, p. 27)
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Episcopal Church. The Episcopal Church embraced the military format to the
greatest extent by far with a total of 46 schools being established as military schools,
transitioned or established by Episcopal clergy. In addition to these, other military
schools characterized as nondenominational have found they were best supported by the
tradition of Episcopal chaplains such as Valley Forge Military Academy and Culver
Military Academy. In 1901, the Episcopal Almanac and Parochial List included 59
schools for boys. O f the 59 schools, 18 were military schools, reflecting almost 31% of
the boys’ schools (Whittaker, 1901).
The first Episcopal-affiliated school to adopt a military format was that founded
by Reverend Charles William Everest. Reverend Everest was the minister of both the
Grace Church in Hamden and St. John’s in North Haven, Connecticut (Episcopal Church
Diocese of Connecticut, 1847). In 1843, he established a school in Centerville, New
Haven County, and completed its seminary building on Main Street in May 1844. The
rectory school’s enrollment grew quickly from nine cadets the first year, to 21 at the end
of five years, and 65 by 1853 (Blake, 1888).
Gray West Point-style uniforms were adopted from the early days of the school,
and later Major James Quinn and Colonel John Arnold acted as military instructors
(Blake, 1888). The cadets were armed with lances rather than rifles and were organized
as a military company with a cadet captain, lieutenants, sergeants, and corporals. Drill
was conducted two to three times weekly and Reverend Everest said he was “surprised to
see how much can be done in so short a time by systematic work, and this too not to
interfere with the school duties, but aid them” (Smyth, 1856, p. 149). Because of the
military trappings, the school was often called Everest Military Academy. For several
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years after Reverend Everest’s death in 1877, the school operated as the Atlantic Military
Institute (Stieger, 1878).
Prior to the Civil War, the Episcopal Church established seven other military
schools with two Yale graduates and a West Pointer as founders: Burlington Military
(Academy) College, Burlington, New York (1846); St. John's Classical and Military
School, South Carolina (1856); De Veaux School, Niagara Falls, New York (1857);
Starrs Military Institute, New York (later know as Port Chester Commercial, Collegiate,
& Military Institute) (1854); Vermont Episcopal Institute, Burlington (1854); and St.
Thomas Hall Military Academy, Mississippi (1844).
In addition, two Episcopal schools converted to a military format during this
period. St. Timothy Hall Military Academy, Catonsville Maryland (also known as
Catonsville Military Institute) was established in 1845 and transitioned to military in
1854, and Highland Military Academy, Worcester, Massachusetts, was established in
1856 and transitioned about a year later. At a time when there was an explosion of
military schools in the south, the Episcopal Church was founding them primarily in the
northern states. This would continue with two additional military schools established or
transitioning in Connecticut and New Jersey during the war, including Cheshire
Academy, established in 1794 and transitioned to military in 1862.
Even with those additions, the real cement that brought military format to become
a central character of Episcopal schools would emerge after the war through the
philosophy of William Augustus Muhlenberg (1796-1877) and the actions of James
Lloyd Breck (1818-1876). According to Prehn (2011), Muhlenberg established the
standard for Episcopal education. This standard was not military, but it blended with the
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concept of a military school well. For example, Mehlenburg felt the education o f the time
was focused development of “men of letters” (p. 29) and neglected the most important
“formation of Christian character” (p. 29). This focus on character was not the only
theme blending the military and Mehlenburg’s school concept. In terms of school
discipline, Mehlenburg was a reformer and emphasized “moral education [with a] steady
and firm system” (p. 19) rather than that found with corporal punishment. Both character
and discipline easily translated into the military school with character central and a
disciplinary system supported by demerits and associated punishments.
James Lloyd Breck was one of the Muhlenberg school-style crusaders. Prehn
(2011) calls him “one o f the most inspiring and romantic figures in the entire history of
the Episcopal Church” (p. 39). His years working as a missionary with American Indians
support this image well. Breck’s writings take the Muhlenberg philosophy a step closer
to the military school concept with its “spiritual warfare and Christian knighthood” (pp.
71-72) imagery.
He worked closely with Bishop Henry Benjamin Whipple, the first bishop of
Minnesota. They established the Shattuck School in 1858 and Saint Mary’s school for
girls. The Shattuck School started military drill in 1866, the same year Beck went to
California, and transitioned to a full-military format in 1904. Saint Mary’s became a
boy’s military school from 1884-1915. Bishop Whipple also established Saint James as a
military school in 1901, and it merged with the Shattuck School in 1964.
The influence o f Breck’s philosophy encouraged those schools’ conversion to a
military format years after he had gone. But in California, he started a military school in
his first years in San Mateo County, St. Augustine Military College in Benicia in 1867. It
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joined the nearby St. Matthew’s Military School, founded by Reverend Alfred Lee
Brewer in 1865 (St. Matthew Parish, 2010). Reverend Brewer’s cadets, uniformed in
West Point-style gray, were organized into two small cadet companies and a 14 cadet
band. The school conducted field training for five or six days in May and was equipped
with rifles and a Parrott field gun (Hamilton, 1897).
The Episcopal Church would continue some orientation toward military schools
well into the 20th century. Prominent among those schools were Racine College in
Wisconsin, founded in 1852 and transitioned to military in 1899; Bishop Scott Academy
of Oregon, founded in 1852 and transitioned to military in 1887; as well as Sewanee
Military Academy in Tennessee, founded in 1868 and transitioned to military in 1908.
The Bishop Scott Academy in Oregon transitioned under the leadership of Dr. J.
M. Hill, a Yale graduate. The school received high praise in a survey of military schools
of the Pacific Coast:
The academy is more than a preparatory school; for it fits young men for various
callings of life ... graduates of this school filling with honor the highest positions
of trust and responsibility in the power of corporations or communities.
(Hamilton, 1897, p. 478)
Apparently this school prided itself in the degree of responsibility given its cadet
officers, as they were “required to assist the faculty in enforcement of rules and
regulations, and in so doing a high sense of personal honor and splendid esprit of corps”
(Hamilton, 1897, p. 478). This school operated until 1904 and was replaced by the Hill
Military Academy, with Dr. Hill again at the helm in 1901. The nonsectarian Hill
Military Academy operated very successfully for over 60 years and closed in 1962.
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The final two military schools were the S Bar H Ranch School of the Wyoming
Episcopal diocese, which converted to a military format in 1938, and the Northwest
Military and Naval Academy, a school established in 1888 and procured by the Episcopal
Church in 1941 after it had moved from Illinois to Wisconsin. The church in 2011 could
boast of no fewer than five prominent, thriving military prep schools: Texas Military
Institute (TMI), established in 1893; Saint John’s Military School in Kansas, established
1887; Saint John’s Northwestern Military Academy, Wisconsin established ini 884;
Howe Military School in Indiana, transitioned to a military school in 1884; and St. John’s
Military School in Kansas, established in 1887.
The Texas Military Institute in San Antonio is a military school that became
coeducational in the 1970s. The school evolved into an Episcopal prep school with two
student bodies attending the same classes, one military and one civilian. Between 2000
and 2006, the enrollment for cadets grew from 86 to 121. St. John's Northwestern
Military Academy in Wisconsin is the consolidation of St. John’s Military Academy,
established in 1884, and Northwestern Military and Naval Academy, established in 1888.
The two schools combined in 1995 and took the St. John’s Military Academy campus in
Delafield, Wisconsin. The school is all male, grades seven through 12. Enrollment has
grown considerably in recent years, from 104-120 in the 1990s to 294 in 2010 (Rogal,
2006). Howe Military School in Indiana is a coeducational boarding school with
enrollment of around 200. The school has both a high school and grades five through
eight. St. John's Military School is a boarding school with grades six through 12 and an
enrollment of 193 in 2010.
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Table 3
Episcopal Military Schools
Opened or
*Transition

School

Location

1881

Bordentown Military Institute

New York

1897*

Burlington Military (Academy) College

New York

1887*

Bishop Scott Academy

Oregon

1866

Cambridge Military Academy

Maryland

1854*

Catonsville Military Institute/St Timothy Hall Military

Maryland

Academy
1862*

Cheshire Military Academy

Connecticut

1880

Croton Military Academy

New York

1900

Harvard Military School (purchased by church 1911)

California

1857

De Veaux School

New York

1857

Epworth Military Academy

Iowa

1843

Everest Military Academy

Connecticut

1908

Garden Military Academy

Texas

1857*

Highland Military Academy

Massachusetts

1907*

Hitchcock Military School/Military Academy

California

1895*

Howe Military School

Indiana

1869

Jarvis Hall Military

Colorado

1898*

Kearney Military Academy

Nebraska

1886

Kemper Hall Military Academy

Iowa
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1858

Kenyon Military Academy/College Preparatory School

Ohio

1929

Midwest Junior School

Illinois

1888

Northwestern Military Academy (Church assumed

Illinois

control 1911)
1891*

Porter Military Academy

South Carolina

1899*

Racine Military School & College

Minnesota

1938*

S Bar H Ranch School for Boys

Wyoming

1890

St Alban's School

Illinois

1867

St Augustine Military College

California

1892*

St. Austin's Military School

New York

1890

St Alban's Academy

Kentucky

1879

St Paul’s Military School

New York

1875

St James Military Academy

Missouri

1901

St James School

Minnesota

1887

Saint John's Military School

Kansas

1856*

St. John's Classical and Military School

South Carolina

1884

St John's Military Academy

Wisconsin

1865

St John's Military Academy

New Jersey

1879*

St John's Military School

New York

1889*

St John's College

Maryland

1866

St Matthew's Military School

California

1894*

St Mary's Hall

Minnesota
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1844

St Thomas Hall Military Academy

Mississippi

1904*

Shattuck Hall Military School

Minnesota

1908*

Sewanee Military Academy

Tennessee

1858

Starrs Military Institute (later known as Port Chester

New York

Commercial, Collegiate, & Military Institute)
1854

Vermont Episcopal Institute

Vermont

1870

Worrall Hall Military Academy

New York

Catholic Church. The Catholic Church has contributed 49 military schools to the
military school movement since 1847. The church’s association with military schools in
the United States was a much slower process in the 19th century than that o f the Episcopal
Church. This was likely due to the early makeup of the U.S. population, as well as the
timing of the surge in immigration of Catholics particularly from Ireland. St. John’s
Academy was founded in 1833, in Alexandria, Virginia, when the Catholic education
movement in the United States was in its infancy. Mob violence against the Catholics and
their associated immigration occurred between 1834 and 1854 in Massachusetts, resulting
in the death o f a nun and the destruction of a convent and two churches. In 1842, riots
also occurred in New York, and ini 844, a Philadelphia riot caused 13 deaths and five
Catholic churches were torched (National Catholic Educational Association, 2011;
Condon, 1910).
But Alexandria, Virginia, was a cosmopolitan port town with four Methodist
churches, three Episcopal churches, two African American churches, a Baptist church,
and Quaker congregation. Reverend John Smith, a Jesuit and a “eloquent, whole souled
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Irishman” (Hurst, 1991, p. 54) established St. John’s Academy, which functioned until
1841. Whether it was a military school from the start is unclear, although at least two of
the school’s alumni served in the Mexican War (Robbins, 1983).
The school was military when it reopened in 1847. That change may have been
under the parish’s stewardship of Reverend Joseph M. Finotti, an Italian Jesuit who had
studied to be an officer in the Austrian Army. Among his publications were Diary o f a
Soldier (1861), and The French Zouave (1863) (Wilson & Fiske, 1888). Or it may have
been the school’s principal, Richard L. Carney, who had been a student at the school
prior to its closure. Carney expanded the school from seven students to 72 in four years.
The extensive curriculum included Greek, Latin, French, and English. Carney’s brother
served as mathematics professor (Robbins, 1983). With more than 70 cadets in 1853, the
mayor of Alexandria had complaints about the school’s use of the streets, likely for drill.
He regretted writing Carney, but this led to the school looking into the purchase of the lot
next door for drill (Alexandria Library Special Collection, 1853, Alexandria City records
Box 019II).
In 1861, “the cry of battle resounded through the land .. .a hundred St. John’s
men armed the Gray” (Alexandria Library Special Collection, 1883, Saint John’s
Academy fiftieth anniversary speech). Close to one hundred alumni and students enlisted
in the 17th Virginia Infantry, and at least eight died in service. With the advent of the
Civil War, Alexandria was occupied by Union Troops. Whether the school maintained its
military character with “cadet gray coat and pants trimmed in black” (Robbins, 1983, p.
28) and blue cap with “SJA” is not known, but the school remained open during the war.
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Enrollment swelled as many schools in Alexandria closed and new students included the
sons of Union officers including two Union military governors.
The school was the only Catholic military school in the United States for over 30
years. In its initial class in the 1830s were the Civil War commander of the Mount
Vemon Guards, Company E 17th Virginia, and Congressman Bernard G. Caulfield.
Caulfield had left Virginia for Chicago in 1852. He became part o f the Sons of Liberty
plot during the Civil War to liberate 7,000 Confederate prisoners of war at Camp Douglas
and eventually take Illinois into the southern cause. Caulfield fled Illinois after the plot
was discovered by the Secret Service and remained with Confederate exiles in Mexico
until 1867. Upon returning to the United States, he served as a U.S. Senator from Illinois
twice and was one of the founders of the Chicago Democratic Party.
St. John’s Academy also conducted an elementary school while maintaining the
military requirements for the older cadets. St. John’s Academy claimed to be the oldest
boarding school in Virginia and the only military school providing cadets with full field
equipment, which they started using on summer trips by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal
to Shepherdstown and Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, 1873-1877. The cadets were present
at the dedication of the Washington Monument in 1885. Richard L. Carney led St. John’s
Academy for 45 years and in 1892, upon the death of Carney’s wife, he left the school
and became a priest. Turning administration over to Captain William H. Sweeny
appeared to be a fatal error for the school as it closed in 1895 with only seven students
(Robbins, 1983). St. John’s Academy would be the only Catholic military school until
Xavier Military High School in New York City converted to a military format in 1898.
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By the time St. John’s Academy had closed, four additional Catholic military
schools had been established. Among those was St. Leo Military Academy/College of
Florida, one of the only two Catholic military colleges ever established, founded in 1880
by the Benedictines. The school functioned as a military college for 23 years
consecutively, after which it adopted that orientation for only short periods, the first from
1908-1909 and the second from 1918-1920 due to World War I.
The other college was Spring Hill College in Mobile, Alabama, which adopted the
military format from 1918 to 1920 due to the war. “The colleges yielded to the army
bugle, and dining rooms were transformed in to mess halls” (Kenney, 1931, p. 348). This
action was done at the same time the Department of the Army authorized the college to
have a Student Army Training Corps (SATC) unit and later an ROTC on campus. But the
college took the additional step of requiring every student to be in uniform at all times
while on college grounds and emphasized military discipline during defined periods. This
included the school’s high school students, who were organized into a cadet company, as
well as college students who were physically able to pass the ROTC requirements.
(Spring Hill College, 1918). In 1920, the school enrollment was down to 103 and
declining enrollment caused a loss of army support for ROTC, so the college reverted to
its prior nonmilitary format (R. Weaver, personal communication, March 9,2011).
The All Hallows College was a secondary military school established in the
Mormon-dominated Salt Lake City in 1886 by the Catholic Bishop, Lawrence Scanlan. It
was meant to serve not only Catholic boys of the city, but also the growing Catholic
population of ranchers and miners in Utah. The first year, the gray-clad cadets numbered
115, o f which 49 were boarders. Within three years, the school almost failed when an
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outbreak of diphtheria struck 30 to 35 cadets and hospitalized eight to 10 cadets. The
school quickly recovered and, with the support of the Society of Mary (Marist Order),
grew to 225 cadets in 1909 with about half of those being boarders. The college was not
only known for the superior military training of its cadets, but also for its athletics, where
it did very well against other prep schools and universities (Harris, 1909).
The circumstance of the school’s closure appears to have been a combination of
competition and discord between the Diocese and the Marist Order. By 1915, other
western states had established a number of boarding schools which drew off many
potential boarding students from Montana, Oregon, Washington, and Colorado. The next
year the Diocese wanted to purchase the school that was under the corporate ownership
o f the Marist Order (Harris, 1909). They wanted to weather the declining student
population crisis, but it appears the financial burden shared between the two church
organizations was never resolved satisfactorily and the school closed.
The Marist Order would later establish Marist Military School for Boys in
Georgia in 1901. The cadets numbered 125 in 1917 and were uniformed in gray, with
military drill and discipline an essential part of the school. The foundation of the school
was “the principle that religion is the primary element of life, and that without religion as
a fundamental education in the ordinary sense has little moral efficiency” (Knight, 1917,
p. 2499). This school successfully operated as a military school until it became
coeducational and demilitarized in the 1970s.
The Society o f Mary (Marianists) as opposed to the Marist Order converted their
boys’ secondary boarding school in San Antonio, Texas, Saint Mary’s College, to a
military format in 1919. The school would continue as a military school in a city, which
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had at one time four other military schools, until 1932. That year the school became
Central Catholic High School, which, although no longer a military school, maintains a
very strong JROTC program.
The remaining schools founded in the late 19th century were all located in New
York and founded by Christian Brothers. That order would embrace the military format
more than any other, with the establishment of seven schools. Their first military school
was La Salle Institute o f Troy which transitioned to a military format in 1891. This
school was followed by Christian Brother Academy in Albany which transitioned in
1892, and Sacred Heart Military Academy in Brooklyn which transitioned in 1898.
La Salle Military Academy was established to meet the demand for a Catholic
boarding school near New York City in 1883 and was known then as the Westchester
Institute. Three years later, the school was renamed the Sacred Heart Academy. In 1898,
amid the patriotic emotion of the Spanish American War, Brother Hilarion, a Civil War
veteran, and Captain T. Moynihan started military training and the school converted to a
military school. In 1903, the name was changed to Clason Point Military Academy. With
the cadet corps reaching 225, the school moved to new facilities in Oakland, New York,
and was renamed La Salle Military Academy. During the cultural upheaval of the 1960s,
enrollment suffered but Brother Louis DeThomasis, Class of 1958, took over the
leadership from 1977 to 1984, and revived academic and military standards. The resulting
increased enrollment required the organization of a sixth cadet company. Unfortunately,
after his departure, subsequent administrations did not show the same devotion to the
school. Military became optional in 1999, and the school closed in 2001 (Dans, 2009).
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New York’s last Christian Brothers’ military school, Cardinal Farley Military
Academy, was established during World War II in RhineclifF. Outside New York, the
order founded the De La Salle Military Academy in Kansas City in 1910. They
transitioned Saint John's College High School in Washington, DC, in 1915; Christian
Brothers College Military High School in Missouri in 1936; and Cretin (Military) High
School in Minnesota during the First World War.
In many ways, the most successful in the establishment of lasting Catholic
military schools were the Benedictines. They established three military schools,
Benedictine Military School/High School in Georgia in 1902, Benedictine High School in
Virginia in 1911, and Marmion Military Academy in Illinois in 1935. Marmion’s military
program became optional in 1993, and with it, the habitual wearing of military uniforms
requirement ended, although a strong JROTC program continues. Both Benedictine
Military School/High School and Benedictine High School continue today as military day
schools with single-sex education. The Georgia school’s military program is mandatory
for freshman and sophomores. It not only continues as a military school, but also
maintains over 90% as cadets. Benedictine High School in Richmond, Virginia,
enrollment has been around 278 cadets and will open a new 50-acre campus in the fall of
2012 (Benedictine High School, 2011).
The Brothers of the Holy Cross established Sacred Heart Military Academy in
New York in 1883, and much later, Sacred Heart Military Academy in Wisconsin in
1955. The latter school was moved to Indiana and renamed Le Mans Academy, where it
functioned until 2003 (Rogal, 2009).
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Leonard Hall was established by the Xaverian Order as a Catholic college
preparatory school for boys. Destroyed by fire in 1920, the school was expanded to
include a space for boarding students, but the Great Depression almost destroyed the
school financially and moved its focus to elementary education. Perhaps as a means of
attracting more students, the school became a unique combination of Catholic and
military junior naval school on the eve of the United States’ entry into World War II in
1941. In 1968, enrollment had grown to 200, with 160 as boarders. The antimilitary
culture of the 1960s quickly took its toll, and in 1972, the Xaverians closed the school
(Leonard Hall Junior Naval Academy, 2011).
But the Leonard Hall story did not end because the day students’ parents banded
together and formed a corporation that opened the school the following September, and
the Leonard Hall Junior Naval Academy continued in operation as a private school
(Leonard Hall Junior Naval Academy, 2011). In 2010, the school had a modest 51 cadets,
Grades 6 through 12. Supervised militarily by a retired noncommissioned officer,
students carried on its traditions in their naval-style uniforms.
The story of the Catholic military school would not be complete without a
description of the continued contribution of various orders of nuns. Eight orders
established military schools. The Benedictine Sisters established Linton Hall Military
School in Virginia in 1922. The school discarded the military aspect for a few years in
the 1930s but returned to the military format until 1989. The Sisters of Divine Providence
established the Moye Military School (Academy) in Texas in 1938, and operated it as a
military school until 1959. The Sisters of Mercy opened St. John's Military Academy in
Los Angeles in 1905 and it remained open until 1968. The Sisters of the Blessed
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Sacrament opened St. Emma Military School as the St Emma Industrial and Agricultural
College in Virginia in 1895. It operated as an African American military school until
closing in 1972. The Dominican Sisters converted Bishop Quarter Junior Military
Academy, Illinois to military in 1936, and it operated until closing in 1968. In 1945, the
Pallottine Sisters established the boy’s boarding school, St. Patrick’s Military Academy
in New York, and it operated until 1983 or 1986.
The Sisters of St. Francis of Penance and Christian Charity to this day maintain an
association with the military school concept. They operate one of only two exclusively
grade school-orientated military schools in the country, St. Catherine's Military Academy
in California, established in 1889 as a Catholic girls’ school. In 1894, the school
transformed to a boys’ orphanage. By 1916, the number of orphans had decreased to the
point where the sisters hired male teachers as positive role models and changed the focus
to a Catholic male day school. In 1923, Captain D. M. Healy was hired as Commandant
of Cadets and the transition began to create the St. Catherine’s Military School. This
transition was undertaken after the sisters had conducted “extensive research” (St.
Catherine’s Military School, 2010, History). In 2010, the school had 150 male cadets,
Grades 4-8.
Historically, the order had also founded St. Aloysius Academy and Military
School in New Lexington, Ohio, in 1915, and St. Aloysius Military Academy,
Fayetteville, Ohio, in 1938. The schools operated until the 1960s and 1980s respectively.
The Stella Niagara Cadet School of New York was founded in 1908 and operated as a
military school until 1971. Enrollment ranged from 91 in 1937 all the way to 300 in 1963
(Dietz & Freiermuth, 2010; Rogal, 2009).
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The Sisters of St. Joseph established the final Catholic military school in 1952
when they transitioned the Nazareth Hall Cadet School in New York. The Sisters felt that
the military format “provides an excellent incentive and practical means for the
realization of the ideals which inspired the school's foundation. Sister Marie Paulus
explained that Nazareth Hall's program differs from that of a military academy because
“a military academy is run thinking of war. Our cadet program is to train the boys in
leadership and discipline, give them the opportunity of responsibility, and to maintain
high scholastic standards” (K. Urbanic, personnel communications, October, 21, 2011).
Another motivation was linked to the influence o f the threat of Communism during the
Cold War. Mother Rose Miriam Smyth, head of the congregation, wrote to all the Sisters
in January 1951:
The world crisis alarms all who think. We have an obligation to help to the utmost
o f our ability. If we remember that whatever is in the mind and heart o f a zealous
teacher will be in the minds and hearts of her pupils, we will not dare to fail our
hourly and momentous opportunities. (K. Urbanic, personal communication,
October 19, 2011)
Table 4
Catholic Military Schools
Opened or
*Transition

School

Location

1886

All Hallows College

Utah

1941*

Barbour Hall Junior Military

Minnesota

1902

Benedictine Military School/High School

Georgia

1911

Benedictine High School

Virginia

1936*

Bishop Quarter Junior Military Academy

Illinois
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1942

Cardinal Farley Military Academy

New York

1894*

Christian Brother Academy

New York

1936*

Christian Brothers College Military High School

Missouri

1917*

Cretin (Military) High School

Minnesota

1910

De LaSalle Military Academy

Missouri

1891*

La Salle Institute

New York

1898*

La Salle Military Academy (Clason Point Military

New York

Academy)
1918

Hall o f the Divine Child

Minnesota

1922

Linton Hall Military School

Virginia

1941*

Leonard Hall Naval Academy

Maryland

1901

Marist Military School for Boys

Georgia

1935

Marmion Military Academy

Illinois

1923

Marymount Military Academy

Washington

1924

Mount St Joseph Semi-Military Academy

New York

1938

Moye Military School (Academy)

Texas

1935*

Nazareth (Nasareth) Hall Military School

Ohio

1952*

Nazareth Hall Cadet School

New York

1883

Sacred Heart Military Academy

New York

1955

Sacred Heart Military Academy

Wisconsin

1940s

St Patrick’s Military Academy

New York

1913*

St Mary's College (Institute)

Texas
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1923*

St Catherine's Military Academy

California

1922

St Clement Military School

Massachusetts

1937

St Joseph Junior Military School

Pennsylvania

1895

St Aloysius Academy

Pennsylvania

1915

St Aloysius Academy and Military School

Ohio

1938

St Aloysius Military Academy

Ohio

1932*

Saint Joseph's College and Military Academy

Kansas

1906*

College of Saint Thomas

Minnesota

1915*

Saint John's College High School

Washington DC

1905

St John's Military Academy

California

1903

St Joseph's Military Academy

California

1937

St Joseph Junior Military School

Pennsylvania

1847*

St John's Academy

Virginia

1895

St Emma Military School

Virginia

1880*

St. Leo Military Academy/College

Florida

1905*

St Thomas Military Academy

Minnesota

1924

Mount St Joseph Semi-Military Academy

New York

1942*

St Edwards Military Academy

Texas

1945

St Patrick Military Academy

New York

1908

Stella Niagara Cadet School

New York

1918

Spring Hill College

Alabama

1898*

Xavier Military High School

New York
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Presbyterian. The Presbyterians established 24 military schools including two
which opened prior to the Civil War (Webb, 1958). The oldest among them was the
Classical and Mathematical Academy of Bedford, Pennsylvania. This school was opened
by Reverend Baynard R. Hall in about 1834, and it operated for about five years (Hunter,
1937).
The next Presbyterian military school was the Alexander Military Institute in New
York which was described as a “Classical, Commercial, and Military Boarding School”
(Steiger, 1878, p. 62) with a capacity for 30 cadets. It was first opened in 1845 under the
direction of William S. Hall and was known as the Alexander Institute until 1857.
th
General Munson I. Lockwood, former commander 7 Brigade New York State Militia,
ran the school after that for six years under the name Hampton Military Institute. In 1863,
Mr. Oliver R. Willis took charge and the school was again officially renamed the
Alexander Institute, although it was often called the Alexander Military Academy. The
school was a short distance from the Presbyterian Church and provided, as part of its
curriculum, military drill and all courses needed to enable its cadets to continue to college
(Steiger, 1878). The school would continue until at least 1919.
The other pre-Civil War school was the Yonkers Collegiate and Military Institute
in New York. This school was established sometime between 1852 and 1854 by Dr.
Washington Hasbook. He was followed by a series of superintendents to include M. N.
Wiseman and Frederick Norton Freeman, an 1856 Norwich graduate, who would later
lead Englewood Military and Collegiate Institute of Perth Amboy, New Jersey (Theta Chi
Fraternity, 1927). Benjamin Mason was the principal from about 1863 through at least
1879. The school may have closed for a time starting in 1880 but reopened and had an
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enrollment of 40 cadets in the early 1890s under the direction of Colonel H. S. Farley
(Hamilton, 1897).
During the Civil War, the Warring's Military Boarding School was established in
Poughkeepsie, New York, by Dr. C. B. Warring, PhD. Enrollment in 1879 was 37 boys
and 2 girls (United States Congress, 1880). The school operated at least as late 1903. In
the closing days of the Civil War, Reverend David McClure opened the California
Military Academy in Oakland with the help of his brother, Major Stewart McClure. The
school was very successful and enrollment reached 125 cadets the year prior to the
September 1873 fire which destroyed the school. The McClures rebuilt and by 1875, the
school employed nine professors and had 176 cadets (Commissioner of Education, 1875).
The Cadet Corps was even large enough to maintain a small cadet band by 1873.
Ownership passed to a long-time professor, Colonel W. H. Obrien, in 1884, and the
school operated until at least 1908 (Baker, 1914).
Ten more Presbyterian military schools were established in the 19th century:
Montrose Classical & Military School, New York, 1871; Sweetwater Military College,
Tennessee, 1874; Suffolk Military Academy, Virginia, 1875; French Camp Military
Academy, Mississippi, 1885; Danville Military Institute, Virginia, 1890; Putnam Military
Academy, Ohio, 1890; Clinton Liberal Institute established a military prep school, New
York, 1891; Tamalpais Military Academy, California, transitioned in 1892; ChamberlainHunt Academy, Mississippi, transitioned in 1895; and Hoge (Memorial) Military
Academy, Virginia, transitioned inl895.
The Clinton Liberal Institute in Fort Plain, New York was actually four schools in
one: Fitting School, School of Fine Arts, School of Business, and the Fort Plain Military
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School. The military school was a boys’ prep school associated with the college under the
direction of a regular army officer, Lieutenant Harry L. Hawthorne. Hawthorne was a
hero in the Indian Wars and detailed to support the school (Secretary of War, 1892). The
school opened in 1891 and was fully equipped with 150 rifles and all the associated
equipment. The military school functioned until it was destroyed by fire in 1900 (Fort
Plain Museum, 2010).
Reverend Arthur Crosby founded the Tamalpais Academy in 1890 and
transitioned it in 1892 to a military format. His objective was “to instill in boys those
habits which alone insure success in whatever walk o f life they may wander” (Hamilton,
1897, pp. 476-477). Enrollment in the late 1890s was approximately 60 cadets, who were
uniformed in West Point style and equipped not only for armed drill, but also had two
cannons for training. The school conducted an annual encampment and training
supported by an active-duty Army artillery lieutenant. The school was identified in 1897
as one of the two best military prep schools on the West Coast (Hamilton, 1897).
In the 20th century, the remaining seven military schools were established
including the final Presbyterian military school, Schreiner Institute in Texas. Schreiner
was founded in 1879 and transitioned to a military format in 1923 with 95 cadets. Under
the new military format, the school had over 300 cadets by 1933. The school expanded to
include both a high school and junior-college military programs. As the United States
entered World War II, there were 74 high school cadets and 293 college cadets. Schreiner
Institute would continue as a military school and peak in enrollment at 505 in 1946, but
with enrollment challenges, they dropped the military school environment in 1972
(Hedgpeth, 1998).
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Table 5
Presbyterian Military Schools
Opened or
Transition

School

Location

1904

Alabama Military Institute

Alabama

1905

Anniston University School

Alabama

1922

Alabama Presbyterian School for Boys

Alabama

1863*

Alexander Military Institute

New York

1902

Auburn Military Seminary

Kentucky

1834

Classical and Mathematical Academy

Pennsylvania

1865

California Military Academy

California

1895*

Chamberlain - Hunt Academy

Mississippi

1890

Clinton Liberal Institute and Military Academy

New York

1890*

Danville Military Institute, VA

Virginia

1895

Hoge (Memorial) Military Academy

Virginia

1871

Montrose Classical & Military School

New Jersey

1885

French Camp Military Academy

Mississippi

1891*

Greenbrier Military School

West Virginia

1917*

McCallie School

Tennessee

1892*

Mount Tamalpais Military Academy

California

1917

Onarga Military School

Illinois

1890

Putnam Military Academy

Ohio

1923*

Schriener Institute

Texas
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1874

Sweetwater Military College

Tennessee

1875

Suffolk Military Academy

Virginia

1863

Warring's Military Boarding School

New York

1880

Wentworth Military Academy and Junior College

Missouri

(Under control of church 1919)
1854

Yonkers Collegiate and Military Institute

New York

Baptist. The Baptist Church has had associations with nine military schools. The
oldest was the Vermont Academy, founded as a “direct instrumentality” (Croker, 1913, p.
503) of the Baptist Convention in 1871. The school converted to a military format in
1885, and an active-duty officer was assigned to the school in September 1891.
Enrollment in 1882 was 138 students, of which 62 were cadets and 76 nonmilitary
females. The cadets were organized into two companies. They wore blue uniforms and
were reported to have good moral character (U.S. War Department, 1892). The school
continued to function as a military school until 1908.
Howard College o f Alabama was established in 1841 in Marion. Colonel John H.
Murfee, a VMI graduate and former commandant of cadets at the University of Alabama
who was wounded while leading his cadets in Civil War combat, took leadership of the
college in 1871. Murfee quickly adapted the college to a military format much like the
two institutions with which he was most familiar. He was no stranger to the conversion of
schools to a military format, having done so at Westwood Military Academy and
Lynchburg College. His charm and energy captured the people of Marion, and he earned
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their loyalty through his delivery of “discipline, methods of instruction, moral culture,
and practical education” (Sean Flynt, personal communication, February 9, 2010).
The Baptist Convention of Alabama did not see the justification of divinity
students having to live the life of a military school cadet and relations soured. In 1884, a
group o f divinity students moved off campus. When the convention demanded the
college support their academic needs, Murfee refused and was backed by the board of
trustees. The Baptist Convention resigned its relationship with the college in protest. The
military college continued until 1887, when the Baptist Convention, after meeting in the
economically booming Birmingham, found a way to get around Murfee and hold on to
the college. They moved the school to Birmingham.
Murfee would not move and Marion embraced him and his plan to continue the
school as the Marion Military Institute. The school kept almost its entire faculty and an
unknown number o f its cadets and was still open in 2011 as one of the nation’s five
military junior colleges with enrollment of 400. By contrast, Howard College’s corps of
cadets continued and operated as a military school with a voluntary corps of cadets, but
numbers waned. In 1913, the new President James H. Shelburne, stating the program
competed with athletics, ended the Corps in 1913 (Sean Flynt, personal communication,
February 9,2010).
Fork Union Military Academy in Virginia, established in 1898, converted to
military school requirements in 1903. The school still operates as a military school,
educating sixth through 12th graders and offering a fifth year o f high school. In 2010, it
had 535 cadets in a very rural location with a very Baptist foundation.
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Table 6
Baptist Military Schools
Opened or
*Transition

School

Location

1891

Bailey Military Academy

South Carolina

1918*

Bethel College

Kentucky

1897

Buie's Creek Academy

North Carolina

1903*

Fork Union Military Academy

Virginia

1887*

Howard College

Alabama

1919*

Locust Grove Institute

Georgia

1911/20*

Pillsbury Academy

Minnesota

1907

San Marcos Baptist Academy

California

1885

Vermont Military Academy

Vermont

Methodist. The Methodist Church became involved with military schools very
early and primarily in the South. The first o f seven military schools was St. Charles
Military College in St. Charles, Missouri. It was established in 1832 and operated until at
least 1916. The first president was Reverend John Hunter Fielding (1796-1844), Trinity
College of Dublin, Ireland graduate, who was a Methodist minister who taught and
served as president of the Methodist Madison College in Pennsylvania. He taught at
Augusta College in Kentucky as professor of mathematics. In May 1835, Fielding
resigned his position at Augusta College to become the first president of St. Charles
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College, a position he held until his death in 1844 (Olson, 1961; Fielding, February 1,
1834).
The population of St. Charles County was almost equally divided between those
with southern sympathies and those siding with the North, primarily German immigrants
(National Historical Company, 1885). On May 17, 1861, a regiment of Union troops
occupied St. Charles and disarmed the cadets at St. Charles Military College. The town
had organized a company 11 days earlier, the Dixie Guards, which became G Company,
2“*Missouri Volunteer Militia for Confederate service. Union control of the county fell
into the hands of a regiment recruited by Colonel Arnold Krekel, who was also a county
judge. His regiment, St. Charles County Regiment of Home Guards (Krekel’s Dutch)
“stood a dread menace to active southern element[s]” (National Historical Company,
1885, p. 182).
St. Charles Military College closed and Reverend Tyson Dines and his family
occupied the school for safekeeping. In December 1862, Krekel, who had also been
curator of the college, converted the school into a prison for southern sympathizers. How
long the school remained closed is unclear. After the war, the former Missourians
associated with the school laid claim to the school against the wishes of the former board
members and Methodist Church. The situation was addressed by the state supreme court
in 1868, the property returned to the Methodist Church, and the school reopened
(Leftwich, 1870). The occupation and use of the school by the army became an issue in
1902 during the 57th Congress. Records indicate that the United States treasury paid the
school reparations (U.S. Congress, 1903).
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The school did reopen and continued under the Methodist Church into the 20th
century, enrolling an average of about 70 cadets annually. In early 1900s, its president
was Reverend George W. Brice, followed by Colonel Herbert F. Walter. Colonel Walter
served as president for seven years and was a graduate of Southwestern University in
Texas but had also been a cadet at Texas A&M for a year.
As the Civil War approached, two other Methodist military schools of note were
established. The first, Lynchburg Military College in Lynchburg Virginia, was a direct
result of the coming conflict and sectional divide that even affected the church. Madison
College was established in Uniontown, Pennsylvania in 1830. By 1855, it had evolved
into a Methodist college with a southern faculty, a northern board o f trustees, and a
student body split between the two regional factions. As tensions rose between the faculty
and board, there was a student fight between a young man from Ohio and the Bailey
brothers from the South. The resulting hard feelings spread to the faculty and caused a rift
with the trustees that never healed (Hadden, 1913).
At the 1855 commencement, the college president announced plans to open a
Methodist College in Virginia the following September. The entire faculty resigned along
with 85 of 90 southern students, or about half the student body. Madison College had
military training where students wore uniforms at drill, but the new school was a military
school down to the design of its building (Hadden, 1913). The resulting college in
Lynchburg, Virginia, was housed in a castle-like structure much like Virginia Military
Institute (Potter, 2007). The president, Samuel Cox, a Yale graduate, used his old naturalscience teacher, James Thomas Murfee, VMI Class of 1853, to function also as
commandant o f cadets. Also joining the faculty as both a member of the mathematics and
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military departments was another VMI alumni, James E. Blankenship. Captain
Blankenship would enlist his cadets into the 11th Virginia Infantry Regiment at the
beginning of the war.
Lynchburg College’s first commandant, James Thomas Murfee, had a long
association as a distinguished educator in military schools. After two or three years in
Lynchburg, he became the co-principal of Westwood Academy in Lynchburg and
transitioned that school to a military format. In 1860, he became the commandant of
cadets at the University o f Alabama and led its cadets in combat during the war. After the
war, he continued as commandant there until taking the presidency of Howard College,
as described earlier in the Baptist military schools section.
The other Methodist military school that opened with the approach of the Civil
War was Bastrop Military Institute in Bastrop, Texas. The school opened in 1851 as the
Bastrop Academy under Reverend Martin Ruther, a Methodist, and with the support of
the Bastrop Educational Society. The academy’s coeducational enrollment declined to 94
male and female students with the advent of the “Common School System” offering
nearly free education. Colonel Robert Thomas Pritchard Allen, a West Point graduate, the
founder o f the Kentucky Military Academy in 1845 left that institution in 1854 due to
poor health, and went to Bastrop (Bastrop County Museum, 1975).
In 1857, he converted the male department of the school into a military school.
Initially the academy occupied the first floor of the school building and the Bastrop
Female Institute the second floor. The attraction of a military school took the male
enrollment to 92 the first year. So successful was the military institute that the cadets
enrolled from as far away as Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi in 1859. The cadets
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carried rifles while on dress parade every evening of the weekdays. The uniform was blue
with brass buttons and red-striped pants. The academics were demanding with a four-year
course which included calculus, natural history, botany, mineralogy, survey, mechanics,
and Latin (Kesselus, 1987).
During the Civil War, the school struggled as Colonel Allen departed to command
the 17th Texas Infantry and was replaced by his brother Robert Allen. Although many of
the older boys left for military service, the school continued with declining enrollment
until 1864 (Kesselus, 1987). The school remained closed until 1867 and operated for one
year as a nonmilitary school. In September 1868, under the leadership of John Garland
James, VMI Class of 1866, as president and his brother, Fleming Wills James, VMI Class
of 1868, as commandant, the school was renamed the Texas Military Institute. The
brothers had fought as cadets with Virginia Military Institute at the Battle of New
Market. In 1870, the school moved to Austin atop a hill in a castle-like structure. There it
operated as a nonsectarian school with enrollments of 100 cadets until 1879. That year
the school closed as a result of the establishment of Texas A&M, where the faculty
departed for employment along with John Garland James as Texas A&M’s second
president (McKeithan, 2011; Virginia Military Institute Archives Online Historical
Rosters, 2011; Young, 2011).
With the commencement of the Civil War, Randolph Macon College, Boydton,
Virginia, had severely declining enrollment. “So great was the depletion in the number of
students, and so great the excitement that prevailed throughout the country, that the
College authorities deemed it inexpedient to hold the regular commencement exercises
[early].” (Irby, 1894, p. 153). The college hoped to prepare its students for military duties
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and survive as an institution by reinventing itself as a military school. “A regular uniform
was prescribed; drills were daily observed, and other things of a similar character were
enjoined, all looking to the preparation o f the student for the duties that awaited him in
defense of his country.” (Irby, 1894, p. 155).
The college president, Reverend William A. Smith, was appointed as colonel, and
James E. Blankenship, previously mentioned with Lynchburg College, was appointed as
major professor of mathematics and military science (Irby, 1894). At the Battle of First
Manassas, Major Blankenship’s short-lived service in the field proved that he was a
better asset in a school environment than in leading troops in combat. The college
functioned on a military footing from 1861 to 1863, with enrollment down to 56 cadets
when the school closed.
When the college reopened in 1866, it did so without its military trappings. But
with the popularity of the military school concept, particularly in Virginia boarding
schools, two of the college’s associated prep schools, Randolph-Macon Academy in
Bedford established in 1890 and Randolph-Macon Academy in Front Royal, transitioned
to military schools in 1920 and 1910 respectively. Although Randolph-Macon Academy
in Bedford closed in 1934, Randolph-Macon Academy in Front Royal remains a military
school to this day. The school has a nonmilitary lower school and a military upper school
with grades nine through 12, which numbered 305 cadets in 2010.
The final Methodist military school was established in 1919, when Carlisle
School, Bamberg, South Carolina, founded in 1892, became an all-male military school.
The Carlisle School merged with Camden Military Academy in 1977 and was no longer
associated with the Methodist Church. Camden Military Academy’s website states that
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the school incorporates the traditions of Carlisle Military School, whose students, which
had numbered close to 300, transferred with the merger (Rogal, 2009).
Table 7
Methodist Military Schools
Opened or
*Transition

School

Location

1857*

Bastrop Military Institute (Texas Military Institute)

Texas

1855

Lynchburg Military College

Virginia

1920*

Randolph-Macon Academy, Bedford

Virginia

1910*

Randolph-Macon Academy, Front Royal

Virginia

1861*

Randolph-Macon College

Virginia

1832

St Charles Military College

Missouri

Other denominations. The Congregational Church established four military
schools starting with the transition of the Betts Military Academy of Stamford,
Connecticut, in 1860. This school operated until 1908, but in the meantime, the
Congregationalists converted Bunker Hill Military Academy in Illinois under Reverend
Samuel L. Stiver to a military format in 1883. The school prospered with the change to a
military format and in 1913 had 65 cadets from Grades 6 through 12. Also converted to
military format by the Congregational Church were the Kamehameha School in Hawaii
in 1914 and the Allen-Chamber School of Massachusetts in 1917.
The Reform Church established two military schools including Massanutten
Military Academy, still in operation in Virginia in 2011. Massanutten Military Academy
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was established by the church in 1899 and converted to the military format in 1917
during the First World War. The school’s coeducational enrollment of sixth through
twelfth graders has varied from 236 to 158 between 2000 and 2010. The other Reform
Church military school was Riverview Military Academy in Poughkeepsie, New York.
This school also converted during a time of war in 1862 and operated until 1920.
The Lutherans established the Collegiate Institute, in Mount Pleasant, North
Carolina, prior to the Civil War as a nonmilitary school. After being closed for two years,
Reverend L. E. Busby reopened it, and five years later the school adopted military
uniforms and discipline. The school continued until financial problems brought on by the
Great Depression caused its closure in 1933 (North Carolina Department of Cultural
Resources, 1962, Mount Pleasant Collegiate Institute).
The Moravian Church had two military schools both in Pennsylvania. The first
was the Nazareth Hall Military Academy, a very old school established between 1743
and 1759. In 1861, the first year of the Civil War, the school adopted a military format.
The school was said to develop “all that is best in discipline and training, while even
teaching the doctrine of peace” (Mannering, 1914, p. 914). The cadets were organized
into two companies and their drill was said to be to such “perfection. . . even the most
ardent peace advocate could not help applauding the military proficiency and the manly,
alert appearance” (Mannering, 1914, p. 914). The school operated until at least 1929.
Their second school was Gettysburg Military Academy and was in operation in 1918, but
little more is known (Webb, 1958).
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Table 8
Congregational, Reform Church, Moravian, and Lutheran Military Schools
Opened or
*Transition

School

Location

Congregational Church Military Schools
1917*

Allen-Chamber School

Massachusetts

1860

Betts Military Academy

Connecticut

1883*

Bunker Hill Military Academy

Illinois

1914*

Kamehameha School

Hawaii

Reform Church Military Schools
1917*

Massanutten Military Academy

Virginia

1862*

Riverview Military Academy

New York

Moravian Church Military Schools
1861*

Nazareth Hall Military Academy

Pennsylvania

1918

Gettysburg Military Academy

Pennsylvania

Lutheran Military School
1908*

The Collegiate Institute

North Carolina

African American Military Schools
Although military training was conducted at several African American colleges,
there were two schools that adopted a military school format. Both were established in
the period between the closing of the Civil War and the start of the Spanish American
War. Both schools were located in Virginia and were founded by Caucasian former
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Union Army officers. The first school was established by General Samuel C. Armstrong
as Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute in 1868. General Armstrong was a
graduate o f Williams College and had served with the 125th New York Infantry at
Gettysburg prior to commanding the 9th Regiment of United States Color Troops in the
final battles of the Civil War (Lindsey, 1995).
By 1872, the school had transitioned to a military format for its male students.
Male cadets drilled at five in the morning, followed by breakfast and a day devoted to
academics. Cadets were uniformed in military blue and marched to the noon meal. In
1901, the male students were organized into a battalion of six companies: two companies
of day students, three companies of boarding students, and one company of boarding
American Indians. The barracks were regularly subject to room inspections (Cooley,
1901). The battalion was supported by a 25-cadet band. There were also extensive
periods devoted to religion and Bible study, with church attendance required daily, and
each cadet assigned a specific seat (Spivey, 1978).
Army officers from nearby Fort Monroe supported military training, although
their repeated requests for rifles were consistently rejected. In 1892, school discipline
included conduct court martials, fines, extra drills, and confinement. The cadet routine
included two company-drill periods daily, inspections, and morning and evening
formations (Bailey, A.M., 1892 May). The next year, General Armstrong died and was
buried on campus. The military system appears to have continued until sometime after
1901. The Hampton legacy included 90% of its graduates, including Booker T.
Washington, becoming teachers and playing important roles in the education of African
Americans and the historical Black Hampton University (Spivey, 1978).
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The second African American military school was founded as Saint Emma’s
Military School in Powhatan, Virginia. The school opened in January 1895 as the St.
Emma Industrial and Agricultural College. In its first eight months there were only 19
male students. The military requirements were always an integral part of the school
(Smith, 1949). Possible influences include the benefactors, Colonel and Mrs. Edward
Morrell of Philadelphia. Colonel Morrell was a Civil War veteran who enlisted as a
private and rose to lieutenant in the 5th New York Cavalry. He was a Union College
graduate and after the war worked as a professor of Greek and Latin at Fort Edward
Collegiate Institute in New York. By 1898, he had been promoted up through brigadier
general in the Pennsylvania militia.
The second influence was the success of the Hampton Institute. That school’s
popularity, along with that of Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, made them a model for
educational efforts with African American youth (Smith, 1949). The third influence was
that of the Catholic Church’s successful adoption of the military school format as
previously explored. By 1907, the cadet corps was described as being clothed in
regulation cadet uniforms and drilled regularly. Also, the corps by that time had a brass
band as part of its organization. (“St. Emma’s,” 1907). The enrollment continued to grow
with 150 cadets in 1929. The curriculum, at least up until the late 1940s, was focused on
cannery, farming, equipment repair, engineering, accounting, and management. As the
only other agricultural school in Virginia, St. Emma’s was second only to Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech).
In 1919 after a War Department inspection, the school gained federal funding
through inclusion of an ROTC unit. In 1947 under the Holy Ghost Fathers, the trade
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school became a more academically oriented military high school where college
preparation and military bearing were central. In keeping with this, the school officially
became St. Emma’s Military School. With Father Egbert J. Figaro leading the school,
enrollment peaked at 370 cadets in 1964 (Chenevert, 2011). The corps included African
Americans from across the nation, as well as cadets from Africa and the Caribbean. A
demanding new cadet-training program demanded uniform excellence in their gray
jackets with white caps and trousers. Equipped with Ml rifles, the cadet battalion
included a band. But by 1972, declining enrollment forced the school to close, not
because of antimilitary sentiment, but as a result of school desegregation and an
increasing number o f African American families choosing to enroll their sons in
integrated schools (Smith, 2011).
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Chapter 9: The Spirit of 1898 and Peak of Military School Representation
The period between the Spanish American War and the Great Depression
coincided with a peak in the popularity of the military school format and the initial
development of a significant opposition to both military schools and military training in
schools. Much of the motivation of the latter grew from the high cost of human life from
the First World War. On the other hand, the Spanish American War was a period of
enthusiastic unification. It was a time when the divided nation came together for what
was promoted by journalists as a noble cause. The mood in the United States was very
patriotic and supportive of the military school concept. The image of former Confederate
General Joseph Wheeler, West Point graduate, and General William R. Shatter, Union
Medal of Honor recipient recalled to active military service in Cuba, serving side-by-side
increased patriotic feelings for a nation seeking reconciliation.
As the war with Spain approached, the midshipmen of the United States Naval
Academy, who graduated early in April 1898, and cadets from a southern military college
proclaimed they were “all sons of Johnny Rebs . . . ready to march in six hours” (Temple,
1996, p. 486). Several military colleges, including the Virginia Military Institute and
Virginia Tech, volunteered their service as they had done in the Civil War:
We hereby tender to the Governor of Virginia the services of the Virginia
Polytechnic Institute [Virginia Tech] Corps of Cadets, consisting of four
companies of infantry, one light battery of artillery, commissioned and
noncommissioned, staff and band for the defense of our country in the event of
war. (Temple, 1996, p. 489)
Despite the fact that both Virginia Tech and Virginia Military Institute’s corps of
cadets were members of the state’s active militia, the requests were turned down. Perhaps
the memory of the deaths of young cadets of Virginia Military Institute on the field
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during the Battle of New Market played a part in the governor’s decision. But back on
campus, the atmosphere was affected:
The spirit of war was everywhere. There was a vague uncertainty, an indefinable
something in the air. Among the cadets there was a listless longing for the end of
the academic session. Many resigned from college and joined the armed forces.”
It was a ripe recruiting ground at military colleges. When Sergeant Loving came
to Virginia Tech, he left with six recruits for Company G, 2nd Virginia Regiment,
and six more followed later. (Temple, 1996, p. 492).
As the volunteers mobilized for war, the 2nd Virginia Infantry lacked its
authorized band. In response, the band director at Virginia Tech resigned from the
college and enlisted 25 men to fill the regiment’s need. These men included 15 Virginia
Tech Cadet Band members from the classes of 1898 through 1903, five former members
of the Glade Comet Band, a town organization that supported the corps until it organized
its own band in 1893, and four alumni (Temple, 1996). Although the 2nd Virginia Infantry
Regiment did not see action, the cadet’s service was reflective of the military spirit of the
time and a legacy carried on proudly more than 100 years later by wearing the drum
major’s baldric (sash) o f Virginia Tech Regimental Band.
The spirit of 1898 extended well into the next decade. Then in 1916 the Mexican
border crisis associated with Poncho Villa resulted in an American incursion into Mexico
as part of the Punitive Expedition under General John Pershing, occurred. On June 30,
the First Squadron began several weeks’ training for deployment to the Mexican border.
This training ended the summer vacations for Norwich Cadets as they were an integral
part of the Vermont National Guard and constituted the First Squadron of the 1st Vermont
Calvary Regiment. Norwich’s president, Colonel Ira L. Reeves, as the regimental
commander, and his cadets and members of the faculty, as the First Squadron, were
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called to active duty. Despite Colonel Reeves’ best efforts to send his regiment to the
border, the War Department sent the cadets back to Norwich University and they were
demobilized (Guinn, 1966).
Peak of Military School Representation
The Spanish American War brought on a patriotic resurgence in the United States,
which helped expand the military school concept. In the years between 1898 and 1907,
approximately 83 military schools were founded or existing nonmilitary schools were
converted to the military format. Between 1903 and 1926, no fewer than 278 to 280
military schools operated in the United States. This was the peak for the number of
military schools in the United States. It was a period when the military uniform and
military concept o f school was favored throughout the country.
The patriotic feelings o f the period were even manifested through children
dressed in a style call Dewey suits, which hailed Admiral Dewey, famous for his defeat
of the Spanish fleet in the Philippines in 1898. One of the children dressed in the Dewey
manner was the son of Wesley Peacock, the headmaster of Peacock School for Boys
established in 1894 in San Antonio (Peacock, 2000). Between 1894 and 1900, the
Peacock School for Boys grew from 20 students to more than 100, and two new buildings
were constructed. In 1900, Wesley Peacock began transitioning to a military school
format. Peacock added a military department, with the addition of Virginia Military
Institute alumni on his staff, required the upper school students to wear uniforms, and
officially changed the school format and name to the Peacock Military College
(Academy) (Peacock, 1990).
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The 1900 presidential campaign included militarism as a major issue. The
Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan, took a dim view of the fact that the
United States, with no prior tradition of a large standing army, expanded the army from
25,000 soldiers in 1896, to 275,000 soldiers during the Spanish American War. President
McKinley, on the other hand, advocated military reforms and expansion of American
influence, which required expansion of the regular Army, greater control of the state’s
National Guards, and pacification and protection of the gains the United States made in
the Spanish American War (Possner, 2009). The mood of Americas helped defeat Bryan
and ensured the election of McKinley along with his war-hero running mate, Theodore
Roosevelt.
War Department Instructors and the Establishment of ROTC
The limited detailing of active-duty army officers under the 1866 Morrill Land
Grant Act to Land Grant Colleges expanded. In 1888, this was extended to schools and
colleges providing a stipulated level of enrollment and military training. The Act also
provided these schools with arms and equipment to support the training. Where the Act
of 1866 detailed 20 officers, in 1870 the number was increased to 30, and through a series
of increases, the total in 1892 was 100 Army officers and 10 Navy officers (Hadley,
1999). These officers joined faculties with full pay and allowances at no cost to the
school. Later, in 1893, the schools that did not recruit an active-duty officer could request
the assignment of a retired officer by assuming the responsibility to pay him the
difference between active-duty pay and a retired pension (Gignilliat, 1916).
Further benefiting military schools that secured an officer, the officers could
request to teach other subjects (Penn, 1916). One o f the schools that took advantage of
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the military offer and transitioned to a military format was the Fairfield Seminary in New
York. Established in Fairfield in 1885, the school was a coeducational, private, boarding,
nonmilitary school with an enrollment of 207. The school was a private college
preparatory school and included prelaw and premedical courses. But with public
education’s expansion in New York state, and students having the ability to stay at home
and attend public school, enrollment suffered and placed the future of the school in doubt
(Dieffenbacker, 1996).
The headmaster, Frank Wame, used his political connections to help the school
secure the 1891 assignment of Captain George R. Burnett, a wounded Indian War
veteran, and later another retired officer, Lieutenant Warren R. Dunton, and the seminary
became the Fairfield Seminary and Military Academy. The change gave the school’s
small faculty an addition to the staff with minimal expense and gave the school a unique
feature over the public schools. In 1892, the school operated with 51 male cadets and 43
females and would continue operating until 1901 (Dieffenbacker, 1996).
In 1916, the National Defense Act established the ROTC. By 1926, there were
118 colleges and 100 secondary schools with these military-training units. Not all
military schools had Reserve Officer Training Corps, but this vastly expanded the
military representation and funding from the federal government for those schools that
did (U.S Congress, 1926). Prior to World War I, the ROTC peaked at 191 institutions, but
“due in part to the antiwar [antimilitary] movement during the 1930s, a number of
institutions discontinued ROTC training” (Cardozier, 1993, p. 16).
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The Impact of the Pacifist Movement
“In these days, pacifist propaganda attempted to undermine every institution with
the name military attached” (Terry, 1934, p. 9). This was a reflection of the time provided
by the Illinois Military Academy in the 1930s. The period between 1923 and 1933 was
when the post-World War I pacifist movement started to make a negative impact on
military schools and their reputation (Hadley, 1999).
This movement really started the momentum just after the Spanish American
War, during the same time as the Philippine insurrection from 1899 to 1902. The AntiImperialist League functioned from 1898 to 1921 and included among its 30,000
members the former President of the United States, Grover Cleveland, journalists, labor
leaders, and educators. Their platform was the opposition to annexing Hawaii and the
Philippines, as well as increases in the power and size of the federal government
including the institutionalization of large-standing armed forces (Tucker,2009).
Among the educators in the pacifist movement was Paul B. Barringer, president
of Virginia Tech from 1907 to 1913. Dr. Barringer was also the vice president of the
Anti-Imperialist League of Virginia. While president of Virginia Tech, he recommended
that military requirements at Virginia Tech be abolished for juniors and seniors. Both
recommendations were rejected and he resigned and returned to his medical practice
(Andrew, 2001).
World War I, with its incredible human toll prompted young Americans to rethink
those patriotic feelings o f 1898. Young people of the period had acquired a more
independent point o f view in contrast to that of those raised in the 1890s. “A potent factor
in the disillusionment o f youth was the World War” (Calkins, 1932, p. 52). Nack (2005)
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described the post-World War I feelings in the United States as “a growing sense of
disillusionment that would swell throughout the 1920s and ... define public sentiment
toward the Great War” (p. 2). The growing antimilitary sentiment was reflected in the
literature of the “Lost Generation,” college student’s protests, popular cinema and
congressional actions.
The “Lost Generation” is a term which describing a generation “uprooted by
Word War I and subjected, as a result to intense philosophic despair and disillusionment
with traditional ideals and beliefs, especially the values of prewar middle class America”
(Hamblin, & Peek, 1999, p. 234). Among the generation’s authors who highlighted the
futility of armed conflicted were John Dos Passos in his work Three Soldiers, published
in 1921 and the 1929 publication of Ernest Hemingway’s, A Farewell to Arms. These
works and others provided an image for those who had not fought in the war, the ugly
truth of war and a “catalyst for the public to develop “peace consciousness” (Nack, 2005,
p. 9).
In the late 1920s students at Midwestern civilian universities voted to abolish
mandatory military training; similar protests occurred at eastern civilian colleges as well.
In 1927, the American Federation of Youth, an umbrella for approximately 50 groups
called for resistance against being “drafted as cannon-fodder for future imperialistic
wars” (Peterson, 2005, p. 137). In 1934 a nation-wide student strike was conducted
involving 25,000 college students. Three years later a similar strike involved 50,000
students. Further contributing factors to a growing antimilitary climate were films
highlighted by the classic All Quiet on the Western Front. This film won the Academy
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Award for best picture and best director, as well as nominations for cinematography and
script in 1930 (Cormack, 1994).
Amid the antiwar feelings, the United States government withdrew the United
States Marines from Nicaragua in 1927, and Congress passed the Kellogg-Briand Pact
and the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was ratified by the
United States and 61 other nations by 1928 calling for outlawing war. The Neutrality
Acts addressed prohibitions against merchant and the munitions industry that supported
belligerent nations (Nank, 2005).
As a result of the antimilitary feelings in the United States, military schools were
viewed by many as part of a program to “hoodwink youth which must furnish the raw
material for adult w ars.. . , The soldier mentality is utterly inconsistent with the spirit of
modem youth” (Calkins, 1932, p. 52). Among the many groups that challenged the
military school movement was the Committee on Militarism in Education (CME)
established in 1925:
[Its purpose was] to combat military training requirements at public schools and
universities. The CME fought to remove military training, in the form of Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC), from high schools and to eliminate compulsory
ROTC service at state universities. Throughout its fifteen years of existence, the
CME endeavored to oppose militarism in all institutions dealing with youth.
(Swarthmore College Peace Collection, 2011)
In 1926, Congressional hearings were held to consider the abolishment of
compulsory military training at public schools and state colleges. The focus of this
hearing was not military schools, but those schools that were not essentially military and
had adopted a mandatory military-training requirement. The danger that faced the
military school movement was twofold. Part of the goal of the proponents was to limit the
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funding to provide active-duty Army trainers for programs, particularly at the high school
level. The second danger lay with the attacks on the positive attributes that the military
school movement claimed was provided by their format of education. Although a great
deal of testimony included the concern for the general militarization o f public education,
there were attacks on the very image of the military school. Among the accusations was
that the War Department was “making goose steppers out of school boys” (U.S.
Congress, 1926, p. 17). The CME characterized military training in school as both
murderous and un-Christian:
An army exists to kill men, when ordered, in the nation’s quarrel regardless of its
justice; it should train men to that single end. If we object to any o f our citizens,
those specializing in murderous and un-Christian activities, we should abolish the
Army. If we want an Army, we should recognize it for what it is. We should not
tell lies about it being a school of citizenship or manual training, not cluttered up
its drill grounds with disciplines of these irrelevant arts. (U.S. Congress, 1926, p.
18)
Articles that questioned the positive elements of military school education became
more frequent. In a 1928 edition of the Rotarian Magazine, Reverend Ernest Title called
for a nationwide protest against the expansion of military training and the philosophy of
militarism. He saw the increase of military training not only in military schools, but
through the institution of ROTC as “raising a generation. . . impregnated with the idea
that war is inevitable” (Davies, 1983, p. 91). The 1930 Outlook Magazine article was
more focused on military schools. The author, Archibald Rutledge, was the head o f the
English department of the nonmilitary Mercersburg Academy and portrayed military
schools as “summer camps . . . where much is made of uniforms, drills, discipline and
horseback riding” ( p. 91). His view of military school discipline was that it was
“necessary of course for an army but it is abnormal for children” (p. 92). In summary,
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Rutledge thought the military school concept was an attempt to combine “true education”
with military training resulting in a combination of “mating beauty with the beast” ( p.
91).
In 1931, the Prevention of War Council called on the legislature of Oklahoma to
end support of ROTC as a “costly waste.” This action may have been inspired in part by
the establishment of the Oklahoma Military Academy, which was supported by both state
and federal funds and served initially as a secondary preparatory school that later
expanded to include a junior college (Rogers State University, 2009, History). The fact
that Oklahoma Military Academy was a public institution made it an important target for
the Prevention of War Council as it received both federal and state funding for military
training at the high school level.
The criticism of the relevance of military schools inspired administrators to look
internally to ensure they offered a quality education. This further focused the military
schools to strive at the secondary level to send their cadets on to college well prepared for
college and careers outside the military. An excellent example in 1927 was Culver
Military Academy’s Committee for Academic Improvement. Under the leadership of
Leigh R. Gignilliat and Alexander F. Fleet, the committee helped improved Culver’s
academic administrative organization, procedures for faculty selection, stricter academic
standards, and a broadened curriculum (Davies, 1983).
Also involved with the defense of the military format was Professor Michael V.
O’Shea, a well-known educator of the period. Despite encouragement from his associates
to condemn the military school format, he assisted in the format’s defense. He supported
military schools for the education of boys as a student-focused effort, rather than crushing
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individuality. He saw the “military schooling setting as requiring the child to work in a
group to achieve a social, rather than an individual goal [and providing a vehicle for]
achievement into wider interest and achievement demanded by wider social life” (p. 97).
Fire
Clyde R. Terry, an Ohio Wesleyan graduate and former World War I Army
chaplain opened Kansas Military Academy in 1919 (Rogal, 2009). On the night of
January 10,1927, the fire at the Kansas Military Academy trapped Cadet J. Kenneth
Lum, an eight-year-old boy, on the second floor. When the fire chief called his men back
to beat the flames from the second floor room, Colonel Clyde Terry climbed the ladder to
the window and entered the room. The dense smoke and burning ceiling and walls made
it impossible to see. Crawling into the room, Terry felt his way to the bed. Carrying
Cadet Lum as far as the window, the Colonel passed out as he tried to push the boy out
the window. Observing the attempted rescue, the firefighters pulled the two from the
burning building. They were unable to revive the young cadet, but saved Terry who had
suffered serious bums (Carnegie Foundation, 1919).
th

Fire, particularly in the early 20 century, was a real danger for boarding schools.
Unlike most schools that suffered major fires, the Kansas Military Academy did not
close. Terry took five of his teachers and 44 cadets by train to Aledo, Illinois, and with
the financial help o f the Aledo businesspeople, they reopened the school under the name
Illinois Military Academy (Guinn, 2008). Within seven years, the school grew to include
first through twelfth grades, a 13-member faculty that included a United States Naval
Academy graduate as commandant, and enrollment of 100 cadets to include a small
junior college (Terry, 1934).
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Terry’s good fortune with support in his newfound home in Illinois, demonstrates
the importance o f strong community support for private military schools. In September
1896, a fire at another military school, Missouri Military Academy, closed the school. All
86 cadets escaped, and in October, the founder, Colonel Alexander F. Fleet, with five
staff and 72 cadets, traveled by train to Culver Military Academy in Indiana where there
was dormitory space (Davies, 1983). Although Colonel Fleet never returned to Missouri,
the Business Association of Mexico, Missouri, along with the superintendent from the
closed Alabama Military Institute (due to fire), rebuilt Missouri Military Academy and
reopened it in 1900 (Missouri Military Academy, 2011, History). Other schools would
survive their fires and rebuild including Chamberlain Military Institute in 1911, Homer
Military Academy in 1914, Randolph Macon Academy, Front Royal, Virginia in 1927,
and Valley Forge Military Academy in 1929 in Pennsylvania.
A tragic fire occurred in 1906 that burned North Hall, Milner Hall, and the school
Annex of Kenyon Military Academy in Ohio. The early morning fire occurred while 85
cadets slept. At role call formation, several cadets were missing and the falling walls of
the burning building nearly made victims of their rescuers. The bodies of three cadets
were found in the debris: Cadets James Fuller, 18 years of age, Everett Henderson, 18,
and Winfield Kunkel, just 15. The Kenyon Military Academy closed the next year. Major
fires ended many associated schools (“Three students die,” 1908).
Rogal (2009), in his book on American precollege military prep schools, named
fire as the “traditional demon of military schools” (p. 67). The following examples of
military schools that closed as a result of fires in the early 20th century confirm Rogal’s
statement.
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Table 9
Military School Closings Due to Fire
Year of
School

Fire

Location

1855

Maryland Military Institute

Maryland

1895

Pullman Military Academy

Washington

1898

Worthington Military Academy

Nebraska

1900

Clinton Liberal Institute

New York

1900

Alabama Military Institute

Alabama

1902

Claverack College and Hudson River Institute

New York

1904

Rockland Military School in New Hampshire

New Hampshire

1908

Betts Military Academy

Connecticut

1908

Nebraska Military Academy

Nebraska

1912

Wilson Military Academy

New York

1915

Rock River Military Academy

Illinois

1915

Tupelo Military Institute

Alabama

After 1908, the number o f fires decreased partly because of safety measures
enacted following the major tragedy at the Lakeview Elementary School in Collinswood,
Ohio. On March 4,1908, the public elementary school caught fire due to an overheated
steam pipe and killed 172 children and two teachers. National reaction resulted in reforms
including outward opening doors, fire inspections, and stricter laws associated with safety
and fire prevention (Neil, 1998). As a result, there was a new awareness about safety
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issues and new construction for military schools included fireproof barracks. Examples of
schools with new improved construction after the 1908 tragedy included Staunton
Military Academy, Blee’s Military Academy, Culver Military Academy, Northwestern
Military and Naval Academy, Tennessee Military Institute, Texas Military Institute in
San Antonio, and Augusta Military Academy. Missouri Military Academy advertised that
their buildings destroyed by fire were replaced by fireproof ones. New York Military
Academy claimed in 1912 to have “the most complete fire-proof military school in the
United States” (Cosmopolitan, 1912, p. 26).
The Great Depression and Other Challenges
The Great Depression took its toll on the military school movement. Particularly
hard hit were the smaller military schools that had little endowment to fall back on and,
with declining enrollments, became insolvent and closed (Trousdale, 2007). The Great
Depression started in 1929, and reached its depth in 1933 and extended into the onset of
World War II 1939-1941. During that period construction, which had peaked in 1925,
had fallen 47% by 1932. By 1933 the Consumer Price Index had fallen 18% from 1929
levels and the Gross National Product fallen by 29%. Unemployment rose from 3.2% to
24.9% at a time when only eight states had any type of unemployment compensation and
these were totally inadequate (McElvaine, 2009).
Between 1929 and 1938, discounting the military schools that transitioned to
nonmilitary schools, 51 military schools closed. Those schools that survived took a
variety of actions to remain economically viable. Carlisle Military School in South
Carolina had a steady decline in enrollment from 110 to about 50. Despite cutting the
tuition from $470 to $380 per year, the Methodist Church withdrew support and was
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forced to lease out the school. What steps James F. Risher took after leasing the school
were not documented, but he took the school back to 100 cadets in 1936 and, as the
depression ended, there were 150 cadets for the school year 1938-1939 (Rogal, 2006).
Enrollment at Culver Military Academy in Indiana dropped from 695 cadets in
1929 to a low of 335 in 1934. In an effort to encourage enrollment, tuition was decreased
from $1,500 to $1,100 per year. There was a net profit of $30 per cadet in 1929, but by
1934 the school took a loss of $60 per student. In 1932, two teachers were offered free
room and board as payment. From 1932 to 1938, the economic crisis caused the school to
make a significant reduction in teaching staff. In 1932 and 1933, staff or faculty positions
were reduced by ten; betweenl934 and 1936, faculty decreased by an additional 40,
leaving a total of 73 faculty. Before summer enrollment in 1935, the school tried to
increase its income and reduce costs by reducing salaries (Davies, 1983).
It is no wonder that so many small military schools were forced to close. From
1932 to 1933, private schools had one of the smallest enrollment numbers in history.
Despite this, administrators such as Colonel L. R. Gignilliat of Culver and James Risher
from Carlisle Military School took the actions required to save their schools from
financial ruin. The top 25 private military boarding schools in 1932 were still able to
attract 8,069 cadets with an average enrollment of 323 (Steams, 1934). Those that
survived the depression did so through determined fiscal management.
Legal challenge. In 1922, there was a major legal challenge to private military
schools. That year, the State of Oregon Compulsory Education Act amended the state
constitution, passing by a vote of 115,000 to 101,000. This act required children ages
eight to 16 to attend public school. At the time, there were two private military schools in
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the state, Hill Military Academy and the Oregon Military Academy. The preliminary
campaign to amend the state constitution was undertaken by a committee of the Scottish
Rite Masons. They stressed the importance of “children being democratically trained in
the common schools” (O’Hara, 1923, p. 484). The Ku-Klux Klan was an open supporter
of the act and could produce 14,000 members in the state. Fighting against the act were
the Catholics, Lutherans, Seventh Day Adventists, Episcopalians, and at least 20 wellknown Presbyterian ministers. The law required 10,000 private and parochial school
students to transfer to public schools. Such a law could have become a challenge to the
majority of nation-wide military schools as other states adopted similar laws (O’Hara,
1923).
The Sisters of the Holy Names, representing their elementary and high schools,
along with Hill Military School, challenged the law in court. By the time the court
challenge reached the United States Supreme Court in 1926, the Oregon Military
Academy had closed. The Sisters argued that the act was a violation of a “parents’ choice
of school, rights of schools and teachers rights to engage in a useful business profession”
(Imber & Van Geel, 2010, p. 20). Hill Military Academy claimed the act “violated the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution against deprivation of their
property without due process” (Imber & Van Geel, 2010, p. 20). The Supreme Court
sided against the state and in favor of Hill Military Academy and the Sisters of the Holy
Name (“Pierce v. Society,” 1926).
Public education. Between 1879 and 1886, enrollment in private school
plummeted from 73% to 32%; in 1889, it was down to 18% and 11% in 1910 (Hadley,
1999). This was due to expansion of the availability of public education at the primary
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and secondary levels. The expansion of public education did not incorporate, for the most
part, the military school format. Many smaller military boarding schools and most
nonboarding military schools were faced with challenges in enrollment as their cadets
and potential cadets were incorporated into free public education. This forced many
military schools to close, and a number of their administrators took positions in public
school district leadership. City University’s founder, Professor Edward Wyman, of St.
Louis School became President o f the Board of Directors of Public Schools, and St.
John’s Academy’s Reverend Richard L. Carney became superintendent o f public schools
in Alexandria, Virginia (Catholic Educational Review, 1911).
The dramatic decline of private schools, along with an expansion of public
education, came at a time of heightened post-Civil War patriotic spirit. The advent of
public education resulted in the closure of many smaller nonboarding military schools
with their functions absorbed into public education. At the same time, the patriotic
feelings of the period helped increase private boarding military schools, resulting in
military schools occupying a larger portion of the total private school population. A few
years prior to the First World War, military schools and preparatory departments of
private colleges accounted for 73% of private school enrollment (Hadley, 1999).
World War I
Military schools again contributed to the military efforts of the United States in
another war, World War I. The Supreme Allied Commander during the war, French
General Ferdinand Foch, visited the United States after the war and said there were two
things he was most impressed with: the size of the country and the widespread network of
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military schools. Although no nationwide accounting of World War I military school
contributions has been made, there are individual examples.
Table 10
Examples o f Military School Contributions to World War I Effort
World War
Service

School

Location

2,686

Culver Military Academy

Indiana

2,297

Virginia Tech

Virginia

2,217

Texas A&M

Texas

1,549

Clemson

South Carolina

1,407

Virginia Military Institute

Virginia

800

Pennsylvania Maritime Academy

Pennsylvania

710

New Mexico Military Institute

New Mexico

495

Norwich University

Vermont

450

Gordon Military College

Georgia

450

Massachusetts Maritime Academy

Massachusetts

371

North Georgia College

Georgia

350

Pennsylvania Military Institute

Pennsylvania

316

The Citadel

South Carolina

300

New York Maritime Academy

New York

106

Linsey Military Academy (School)

North Carolina
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One Hundred and Twenty Years of Growth in Military Schools Ends
From 1898 to 1926 was a period in educational history of the United States in
which the military school format was generally accepted as a positive force for the
education of young boys and men. For 116 years, from 1802 to 1926, the number of
military schools had grown and peaked. But after that time, there was first a growing
questioning of the military nature of schools that slowed growth, and then the Great
Depression and the advance of public education that would cause the first decrease in the
number of military schools in the United States.
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Chapter 10: The Second World War through the 1950s
During the period between 1903 and 1926, the number of military schools in
operation was approximately 278 to 280. In the 12 years from 1939 and 1950, that
number had decreased by 50 military schools to 228. Despite the demise of more than 50
military schools, military school enrollment was the highest in history. The reason for
this was threefold. Cadets enrolled in the Land Grant colleges outnumbered West Point
enrollment. The surviving military schools’ enrollments were increasing with a
recovering economy and a national change in attitude towards military schools, which
coincided with the approach and advent of World War II and the involvement of the
United States.
In 1935, the enrollment at West Point was authorized to increase to 1,960 cadets.
But seven years later in 1942, the cadet enrollment at the three Land Grant military
colleges each exceeded 2,000, Texas A&M having 6,543 cadets, Clemson 2,364, and
Virginia Tech 2,490, for a total of 11,397 cadets. Since their establishment, the Land
Grant military colleges were steadily increasing their cadet enrollment. Their combined
enrollment in 1938, prior to the war in Europe, was significant at 9,044. By 1942, the
military colleges were also experiencing their largest enrollments to date. The Citadel had
1,980 cadets, Virginia Military Institute 761, North Georgia College 536, Norwich 528,
and Pennsylvania Military Institute 232 cadets.
The popularity of military education at the college level was indicated by its
growth. In 1923, when Virginia Tech made participation in the corps voluntary for
juniors and seniors, the vast majority of returning junior and senior cadets remained with
their classmates in the barracks and with their cadet company. Their experience in the
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corps produced cadets who were devoted and felt “close camaraderie fused with selfdiscipline, personal honor, respect and fidelity” (Temple, 1996, p. v iii). Virginia Tech’s
president, Paul Barringer, contrasted it with his experience as a University of Virginia
graduate. “At the University [of Virginia] we had an academic like affection, but here it
is like a personal matter if you touch the Virginia Polytechnic Institute [Virginia Tech].
It is like a loyalty I have never seen” (Temple, 1996, p. viii).
From 1938 to 1942, there were 10 military junior colleges offering one or two
years of college, six maritime academies, and several primarily secondary military
schools. The military junior colleges functioning at the time were Gordon Military
College in Georgia; Georgia Military College; Kemper Military Academy in Missouri;
Marion Military Institute in Alabama; New Mexico Military Institute; North Texas
Agricultural College; Valley Forge Military Academy & College in Pennsylvania;
Wentworth Military Academy and College in Missouri; Schreiner Institute in Kerrville,
Texas; and Texas Military College in San Antonio. Together these schools and colleges
had approximately 2,100 college-level cadets.
In 1942, the six maritime academies, including the new federal United States
Maritime Academy, had a combined enrollment of approximately 2,500. This number
includes the Maine Maritime Academy, established with just 28 cadets, and the other four
academies, including Pennsylvania Maritime Academy, California Maritime Academy,
New York Maritime Academy, and Massachusetts Maritime Academy. These maritime
academies had an enrollment of approximately 3,175 cadets and midshipmen. There were
also schools that were primarily secondary in nature but offered one or two years of
military programming. These colleges included Allen Military Academy (one year),
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Edwards Military Institute in North Carolina, and the Oklahoma Military Academy with
a college enrollment of approximately 200 cadets.
With the 2,496 cadets authorized for West Point in 1942, a similar number
authorized for the Naval Academy, and the Coast Guard Academy with 219 cadets, the
total military school enrollment at the college level was approximately 26,100. In 1942,
the United States had 172 military schools and military junior colleges with a combined
enrollment of approximately 34,800 cadets at the primary and secondary school levels.
The total enrollment of military schools in the United States in 1942 was approximately
61,000 cadets and midshipmen enrolled in primary, secondary, and college-level
education.
As the United States involvement in World War II approached and the Great
Depression receded, antimilitary sentiment by the pacifist movement weakened. The
onset of World War II created a “common bond, a shared purpose, and a spirit that
cemented relationships and concern for one another. There was conflict among
individuals and groups as there always had been, but dedication to winning the war took
precedence over all concerns” (Cardozier, 1993, p. IX). The changing social attitude
toward the military and military schools was mirrored by Hollywood’s themes.
Hollywood’s Promotion of Military School Image
One of the first indications that Hollywood was reflecting a positive image of
military schools was a series o f films addressing the United States Naval Academy. The
first in 1933, Midshipman Jack, was followed by three films in 1935, Annapolis
Farewell, Shipmates Forever, and Annapolis Salute. Soon after the premier o f these
films, Navy Blue and Gold focused on the Navy football team and, like other movies, was
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a positive story of military school life. In fact, a New York film critic commented that he
wondered how the academy recruited their midshipmen “before Hollywood took up its
pious burden of glorifying it” (Suid, 1996, p. 31).
In 1938, Brother Rat with Ronald Reagan and Eddy Albert was released. This
film was about the Virginia Military Institute and much of it was filmed on location. The
theme emphasized the institute’s honor code, its military heroes, and “ideals and
unbending honor” (Vaughn, 1994, p. 97). In 1939, a positive image complete with the
popular Jackie Cooper was set and filmed at Culver Military Academy, The Spirit o f
Culver. After the war started, The Major and the Minor was released in 1942, and starred
Ginger Rogers. The movie was set in a military secondary prep school and was heralded
as “one of the year’s freshest and funniest movies” (The Major and the Minor, 1942).
Also in 1942, Ten Gentlemen from West Point was released, and it was a historical look
at one of West Point’s early classes (Umphlett, 1984). We Never Been Licked was filmed
in 1942 on the Texas A&M campus. The setting for an espionage plot was filmed around
the military traditions of the “Aggie Corps.”
After World War II, Hollywood movies through the 1950s continued to reflect the
positive attitude in the United States regarding military schools. The Spirit o f West Point,
released in 1947, was a football story but featured two cadets who were tempted to turn
their professional choices of service over self. The film emphasized the academy’s honor
code and ethical and gentlemanly conduct (Herbeck, 2003). James Cagney and Doris Day
stared in The West Point Story, a musical that featured a Broadway director trying to help
West Point cadets put on their annual show (Lockhart, 1951).
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In the 1950s, there were a number of films depicting military schools in a
positive, light-hearted manner. In 1952, Donald O’Connor starred in a comical series
with a West Point theme, Francis Goes to West Point. In 1955, The Private War o f Major
Benson starred Charlton Heston as a hardened combat veteran who softens to the needs of
his cadets (Budahn, 2000). The same year, The Long Gray Line starring Tyrone Powers
and Maureen O’Hara told the story of a positive relationship between an Irish sergeant
athletic coach and his family. It featured generations of cadets including MacArthur,
Bradley, and Eisenhower (Umphlett, 1984). The films produced in the 1930s through the
1960s supported the public positive sentiment toward the American military school.
Military School Associations
Between 1914 and 1950, two associations were formed among military schools.
The first was formed in 1914 by military school owners and administrators. Educational
associations were not a new concept at the time. The National Educational Association
was established in 1861 and Maine Educational Association in 1866. The Patterson’s
American Educational Directory in 1918 listed 117 associations representing various
types o f schools, teachers, and administrators.
The Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States was
formed through the efforts o f Colonel J. C. Woodward of Georgia Military College. He
contacted each of the military colleges, military junior colleges, and military secondary
schools and invited them to attend a conference in December 1913 in Washington, DC.
As a motivation, the colonel proposed two questions. He asked if their institutions were
not performing a “far greater service for education in general, and training of our citizen
soldiers in particular, than is generally known? Why have we so long labored without
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more definitely organizing effort” (Hadley, 1999, pp. 20-21). Colonel Woodward alluded
to the need for an organization to promote “national policy, relationship to the War
Department, obtaining more assistance from the Government and gaining more public
interest” (Hadley, 1999, p. 21).
The meeting was conducted in the Ebbit House in Washington, DC. Attendees
included representatives of Augusta Military Academy in Virginia, Culver Military
Academy of Indiana, New Mexico Military Institute, Virginia Military Institute, and
Virginia Tech. As a result of the meeting, the association was established the next year in
1914. This was just in time to make a significant long-term impact not only for military
schools, but military training in schools in general.
In 1916, the Congressional Committee on Military Affairs held hearings on a bill
to “increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States” (U.S.
Congress, 1916, p. 1). At that time, Europe was deep into the First World War and
defense was paramount in the minds of the government. Sebastian C. Jones, the second
president o f the Association, led the delegation to the hearings. Jones was the
Superintendent of New York Military Institute. He described the association as having
grown to membership of 42 military schools with 10,000 cadets, several colleges with
enrollments o f 1,000, private schools with enrollments of 300 to 450, and several other
schools with enrollments of 150 tol75 (U.S. Congress, 1916). The hearings included
testimony not only from Jones, but also by representatives from the following association
military schools: Columbia Military Academy of Tennessee, Culver Military Academy of
Indiana, Georgia Military Academy, St. John’s College of Maryland, and Virginia
Military Institute. The hearings and the resulting congressional action established the
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ROTC programs, and the act included advantageous support and recognition for military
colleges and schools.
The second military association established was the National Association of
Military Schools in 1950. At its height of membership, it represented 126 schools. The
founder was Colonel W. C. Tommy Atkinson, a long-time superintendent for the Army
and Navy Academy in California. The original members of the association were Army
and Navy Academy, Colorado Military School, McCallie School in Tennessee, and
Roosevelt Military Academy in Illinois (Hadley, 1999).
Beginning in 1956, membership which had been limited exclusively to military
schools was expanded to include both private and public schools and public school
districts that had Junior ROTC or National Defense Cadet Corps programs. The National
Defense Cadet Corps is an organization that is similar to JROTC but does not receive
funding for instructors. The purpose of this association was comparable to the
Association o f Military Colleges and Schools of the United States in that their goal was
to provide a united voice for obtaining federal support of its associated membership
(Hadley, 1999).
The National Association of Military Schools was successful in its mission, but
with declining enrollments of military schools in the 1960s and many schools
transitioning to a civilian format, the association encouraged amalgamation with the
Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States. The president of the
National Association of Military Schools, Colonel Keith Duckers, from St. John’s
Military School in Kansas, and Colonel Charles Stribling of Missouri Military Academy,
president of the Association o f Military Colleges and Schools of the United States, were
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personal friends, which helped to facilitate combining organizations. In 1972, the same
year that Colonel Atkinson, the founder of the Association of Military Colleges and
Schools of the United States (AMCSUS) retired from the leadership of the Army and
Navy Academy, the National Association of Military Schools merged into AMCSUS
(Hadley, 1999).
The Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States maintained
its membership as military schools. The membership consisted of military colleges and
universities, including maritime academies, junior military colleges, and private military
schools. In 2011, the members included 26 private military schools, five junior colleges,
and nine military colleges or universities including the maritime academies. Oakland
Military Institute College Preparatory Academy was the first public educational school to
be admitted in the association. Since 1914, the association successfully advocated for a
variety of issues associated with common themes of interest. Between 1923 and 1995,
there were 133 topics addressed at the association’s annual meetings. Examples of topics
addressed include administration, advantages of military schools, alumni publications,
asbestos problems, athletics, difficult cadets, business/financial management, coeducation
in military schools, cooperation among military schools, development/fund raising,
ethical relations among schools, faculty, federal military inspection ratings, the honor
system, insurance, military training, private schools compared to military schools, and the
value of military education. The topics reflect the challenges faced primarily by the
private secondary schools, which comprised the majority of the member schools.
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The War Department on Campus
West Point’s continuity was heavily impacted during World War I, with the Class
of 1918 graduating in November 1917, the Class of 1918 in August 1917, and the Class
of 1919 in June 1918. To make matters worse, the losses in casualties among officers in
France resulted in the sophomore and junior class who were presented to be new cadets
on November 1,1918, were all commissioned as lieutenants for service in France
(Cowley & Guinzberg, 2002). West Point, like all military colleges, depended on a class
system that ran smoothly, and the First World War prevented that transition.
After the war, General Douglas MacArthur became the superintendent of West
Point and made positive changes that resulted in his being named the Father of Modem
West Point. MacArthur was an alumni of both West Point and Texas of Military Institute
(called West Texas Military Academy prior to 1926). He moved to outlaw hazing,
expand the sports program, establish senior privileges, and modernize both academic and
military training (Cowley & Guinzberg, 2002).
In the Army’s quest to avoid the mistakes of the World War I disruption, West
Point, at the onset o f World War II, established a more orderly three-year curriculum.
The Class of 1943 graduated in January 1943 and the Class of 1944 in June 1943. The
traditional four-year curriculum would not be reestablished until September 1945
(Cowley & Guinzberg, 2002). Likewise, the United States Naval Academy accelerated
their program and the Class o f 1941 graduated in February 1941, the Class of 1942 in
December 1941, and the school converted to a three-year curriculum with additional
academies conducted in the summer that included 88% of the four-year curriculum’s
academic instruction (Sweetman, 1995).
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The Land Grant military colleges were not offered an orderly alternative but seen
as an almost immediate source of soldiers in World War II. In 1918, most of the older
cadets in the Land Grant military schools were enlisted in the Army’s Student Army
Training Corps. These cadets became part of the enlisted military force of the Army or
Navy and in 1919 were intended to feed officers into the Army. The Land Grant military
colleges and other military college campuses had both an Army unit that included former
cadets and a corps o f cadets. Because the war ended in November 1918, the Army
quickly demobilized due to the Spanish flu epidemic, and the war had little impact on the
Land Grant military schools with the exception of enlistments from the ranks of many of
their faculty and cadets.
During World War II, the profile for military colleges was very different from
prior decades. After 1942 until the end of the war in 1945, many college-level military
schools experienced a repeat of the situation that beset many southern military schools
during the Civil War. The enrollment of the Cadets Corps at the Citadel, Clemson,
Pennsylvania Military Academy, Texas A&M, Virginia Military Institute, and Virginia
Tech declined in enrollment an average o f 75% between 1942 and 1945. The cadet
enrollment in 1945 was down to 427 at the Citadel, 757 at Clemson, 93 at North Georgia
College, 134 at Norwich, and 27 cadets at Pennsylvania Military Academy. There were
1,992 cadets at Texas A&M, 207 at Virginia Military Institute, and 211 at Virginia Tech.
Virginia Tech’s experience was similar to that of the other Land Grant military
colleges. In 1942, the corps of cadets at Virginia Tech was 2,640 strong. They were
organized into a brigade o f two regiments totaling five battalions with each oriented to a
particular branch o f the Army: one infantry, one engineer, and three coast artillery. By
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1945, the Corps was reduced to a cadet battalion of two companies numbering only 211
cadets. Most o f the underclassmen were 18 years or younger and many of the upper
classmen were either classified as “4 F” and rejected from military service or awaiting
report dates for active military training (Coulter, 2000).
What transpired at Virginia Tech was similar to what happened at West Point
during World War I. The curriculum was accelerated and class loads were heavy.
Seniors were called to active duty, followed by juniors (McCormick, Newberry, &
Jumper, 2004). In most cases, these cadets were commissioned as officers. As the war
accelerated, many cadets simply enlisted. By February 1943, the vast majority of senior
and junior cadets had departed, and those remaining were assigned to the Army
Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which had been activated on campus. Before the
war ended, 3,387 men passed through the ASTP at Virginia Tech, the vast majority of
them not former students.
The Army Specialized Training Program was established to train soldiers for
technical skills associated with engineering, communications, medicine, dentistry,
personnel psychology, and foreign languages (Keefer, 2011). The commandant
supervised active-duty organizations of the armed forces, including the ASTP, a
Specialized Training and Reassignment Unit (STAR), and an Army Specialized Reserve
Training Program Unit (ASTRP) composed of 2 9 6 ,17-year-old high school graduates
and a naval preflight unit (Coulter, 2000). Those still in the ASTP in February 1944
regardless o f their training were assigned as riflemen in the hard-hit infantry divisions in
the European theater after heavy losses in Italy and France.
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The war reduced the collegiate level of military school enrollment outside the
federal military academies and maritime academies by about 75%. Cadets were replaced
by soldiers, and after a short time, those soldiers were no longer former cadets, but men
who had no knowledge of the military traditions or military school ethos of those
institutions. A small number of younger cadets and upper classmen labeled unfit for
active duty maintained the institutes’ traditions as best they could. A greater challenge to
those traditions would emerge after the war.
World War II
The contributions of military schools to the war efforts in World War II have
never been completely documented. In 1944, Colonel R. L. Jackson, superintendent of
Western Military Academy, calculated the contribution of military secondary schools and
military junior colleges to the war effort. General Melton G. Baker of Valley Forge
Military Academy in Pennsylvania estimated that in 1941, military schools provided
50,000 officers for the war effort in 1944 (Hadley, 1999). Using these numbers as a
starting point, and adding the officers of the maritime academies and federal military
academies, along with officers produced by military schools late in the war the total
number of officers contributed to World War II by military schools probably approached
95,500 individuals.
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Chapter 11: Vietnam and the Decline of the Military School
Events of the 1960s along with the Vietnam War changed the perception of
military schools and the military in general. The idealism reflected in President John F.
Kennedy’s “ask not what your country can do for you” speech died a slow death with his
assassination, Robert Kennedy’s murder, Reverend Martin Luther King’s violent death,
and the Vietnam War protests. Replacing patriotic idealism was a youth counterculture
associated with long hair, rebellious dress and behavior, and political activism. All these
behaviors ran counter to the military school ethos.
In 1975, Newsweek Magazine contrasted earlier decades:
The nation’s military academies regularly turned out battalions of neat, generally
well-disciplined lads, whose handsome uniforms were often the envy of their
civilian peers, and whose patriotism and values were for the most part mirror
images of those that had been imparted to them by their parents and their military
instructors (Hadley, 1999, p. 148).
The article went on to say that military schools fell from favor due to “national
frustrations over the War in Vietnam” (Hadley, 1999, p. 148). This was a period where
soldiers returning from Vietnam would change from their uniform when they arrived at
the airport, because military dress was greeted with insults and degradation. The
increasingly antimilitary national mood was reflected in a “public anathema toward
military education” (Hadley, 1999, p. 124).
Young people diminished the value of a military school education and questioned
the most basic of the military school ethos. Dr. Wiley Lee Umphlett, who has written
extensively for the film industry, purports that movie themes and messages in the 1940s
reflect sociocultural changes in social behavior and the mood o f America. He stated that
the “displaying o f a code o f honor and standard of behavior that are no longer credible,
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the spirit theme of movies like the Spirit o f West Point is as old fashioned today as the
patriotic mood that inspired it” (Umphlett, 1984, p. 96). This comment says as much
about that earlier period as it does of the post-Vietnam War period and its attitudes
toward the military school ethos.
The 1960s and 1970s and, to a lesser degree, even the early 1980s were heavily
influenced by the anti-establishment generation. Originating in the latter part of the
1950s, Beat or Beatnik culture and its influence inspired youthful rebellion against
traditional values that characterized the military school culture. A series of events pushed
the countercultural movement to expand and touch the lives of millions. This influence
played heavily on high school and college-age students.
During the 12-year period between 1966 and 1978, 73 military schools closed or
transitioned to nonmilitary format. At least 33 of these schools that made the transition
also dropped JROTC. For those schools still operating in 2011, there was little or no
mention in their publications that they had functioned as military schools in the past.
During the same 12 years, only five military schools were newly established. Three of
these schools were associated with Puerto Rico or the heavily Cuban-influenced
population of Miami. The Caguas Military Academy, established in 1975, is one of seven
military schools in Puerto Rico in operation in 2011. Both the Miami Aerospace
Academy and the Inter American Military Academy operated in Miami, Florida, during
the 1970s and into the 1980s. The other two schools that opened during this period of low
popularity of military schools were General MacArthur Military Academy in New Jersey,
which operated from 1966 to 1975, and the Penn Military Academy, Hesperia, California,
which was active around 1968 until 1970. The state of California offers an excellent
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example of how the educational landscape changed for military schools in a very short
period of time.
In 1963 there were 20 military schools operating in California. Fourteen years
later in 1979, California only had four military schools: Army and Navy Academy,
California Maritime Academy, St. Catherine's Military Academy, and Southern
California Military Academy. Only Army and Navy Academy was a secondary boarding
military school. The military schools in California that closed during that period had
operated for an average of 42 years. Mount Tamalpais Military Academy closed after
operating for 80 years from 1892 to 1971.
Some military schools attempted to adjust their programs accordingly to survive.
Examples of schools that were successful included Texas Military Institute in Texas and
St. John’s College High School in Washington, DC. In 1972, Texas Military Institute
(TMI) admitted females then allowed them the option to be cadets. Two years later, TMI
made the Corps of Cadet optional for male students (Coulter, 2002). With a military
school format that harbored dual students bodies, civilian and cadet, the school continued
to be successful.
One school that made adjustments unsuccessfully was Columbia Military
Academy in Tennessee. Established in 1905, the school was a victim of three social
changes: the antimilitary feeling associated with the Vietnam War, desegregation, and the
changing attitudes of young students. The antimilitary feeling during the 1960s made it
difficult to recruit cadets to enroll willfully in a military boarding school. Another factor
also came into play. With the desegregation of public schools in the early 1960s, local
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day academies opened across the country. These schools were additional competition to
military boarding schools that were already finding it difficult to retain cadets.
Columbia tried to transition from a military boarding school to a military day
school. They admitted females in 1969 that were offered the option to participate in the
military program. By 1978, too few male students wanted to participate in the military
program, indicating that the “discipline and rigor of military training . . . central to the
success and pride” had lost its appeal and the school closed. (Columbia Military
Academy Alumni Association, 2011, History).
Apparently it was not only the students who no longer saw the utility o f military
schools, but the parents as well. Western Military Academy of Illinois was established in
1868 and transitioned to military in 1892. In 1972, declining enrollment caused the
school to close. The closure was attributed to parents who did not want to send their
children to military schools (Soloman, 1998).
The 1960s and 1970s were an intense period of antimilitary feelings in the United
States. Military secondary schools, as well as junior colleges and military colleges,
suffered declining enrollments and closed. Three military colleges were particularly hard
hit. Norwich University suffered the indirect effect of declining freshman classes as
fewer young men chose to enroll in military colleges. Norwich, a private college, found
itself faced with a financial crisis. Between 1966 and 1975, cadet enrollment at the
university dropped from 1,292 to 914. The decline in enrollment contributed to the
operating deficit of the university. Financial support decreased from $426, 091 in 1970,
to $81,856 in 1974 (Kraus, 1978). Had it not been for endowments and increased
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enrollment beginning in 1975, the university’s future might have gone the same way of
so many other military secondary schools.
The antimilitary movement also impacted Pennsylvania Military College and
Virginia Tech. Neither of these schools was protected by the isolation provided by a
purely military campus. Pennsylvania Military College was established in 1853 by
Theodore Hyatt. He transitioned the prep school into the Delaware Military Academy in
1858. The school moved to Pennsylvania in 1862 and adopted its Pennsylvania
designation. Like Norwich, the school was privately owned by the Hyatt Family. By the
1960s, the location of Chester, Pennsylvania, had become an urban environment,
complete with flames of petroleum refineries and the Delaware River shipyards close by.
Just five miles away from Chester was Swarthmore College, which had a pacifist
tradition and therefore supported an active antiwar movement.
Between 1962 and 1966, Pennsylvania Military College (PMC) started an
evolution from a military college dominated by a uniformed cadet corps into a college of
two student bodies, with the civilian numbers overshadowing the military. The school
enrolled veterans as civilian male students, but in 1966, the administration opened
enrollment to other male students including “students whose educational and career
objectives do not coincide with cadet living” (Kraus, 1978, p. 178). In 1967, the school
began enrolling female students.
Amid the urban environment, hostile students from Swarthmore College, and a
growing nonmilitary population at PMC, the corps of cadets numbers dwindled.
According to the Pennsylvania Military College president, this was because of “the
antimilitary climate of the nation” (Kraus, 1978, p. 184). The Citadel, Virginia Military
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Institute, and North Georgia College began to experience modest gains in enrollment in
1971, while Pennsylvania Military College reached its lowest cadet enrollment. Those
three military colleges that saw gains were isolated from many of the direct social effects
because o f their rural environments and military campus, unlike Pennsylvania Military
College.
In 1960, Pennsylvania Military College had 650 cadets making up 65% of the
total enrollment. As the environment at military colleges deteriorated through external
and internal influences and administrative enrollment decisions, cadet enrollment
decreased in 1966 to 590, in 1969 to 450, and in 1970 to 331 cadets. In 1971, cadet
enrollment was 277, just 18% of total enrollment. Furthermore, the demise of the military
college was also attributed to Philadelphia’s influential Quaker pacifist tradition, which
faced a cadet alumni population that was largely socioeconomically blue collar and did
not have the political influence to counter their desires (Kraus, 1978).
Declining cadet enrollment was not only a matter of smaller incoming freshmen
classes, but also the defection of upper classmen cadets. In 1969,22% of cadets chose not
to return to the school. The 1969 yearbook described a civilian college and praised the
college president as he “had placed the past in proper perspective and had given emphasis
to the today and tomorrow of Pennsylvania Military College” (Kraus, 1978, p. 181). In
1972, the school changed its name to Widener College and disbanded its corps of cadets.
The school followed the recommendation of a management study and buried its 113-year
military tradition as a “good marketing decision” (Kraus, 1978, p. 181). The alumni and
remaining cadets, now civilian students, became highly embittered.
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Until 1970, Virginia Tech seemed to be isolated from the antiwar and
countercultural movement because it was “located in the Appalachian Mountains of
Southwest Virginia in a region known for its cultural isolation and social and political
conservatism” (Virginia Tech, 2011, Context). The civilian student body was
characterized by antiwar activists as “apathetic” and a “lousy cow college . . . [where]
nobody cares” (MacGregor, 1970, p. 3). There were few, if any, activities at Virginia
Tech during the 1969 nationwide campus protests, known as the “Moratorium against the
Vietnam War.” Like Texas A&M, where a handful of students conducted a short march,
Virginia Tech was known as a conservative school focused on academics, coupled with a
strong military tradition. In 1970, a small group of civilian students at the university
would threaten the campus tranquility.
With the invasion of Cambodia in April and a growing dissatisfaction among
some students with the administration’s conservative Student Life Policies, the signs of
an antiwar and counterculture movement began to emerge. In 1970, Virginia Tech had a
student population of 11,000 civilians and 973 cadets. The cadets were housed in military
barracks and were uniformed for class in their gray class uniforms or blue dress uniforms
in a style similar to the West Point cut.
On April 14,1970, protesters gathered to disrupt Tuesday afternoon cadet corps
drill as the corps marched off the upper quadrangle to the centrally located drill field.
Company A, the lead unit, was diverted from its destination in an effort to avoid physical
confrontation. Company B and the other companies of the corps arrived at their drill
location to see Company I surrounded by protesters. They were forced to march and
push their way through the gauntlet of chants and attempts at humiliation; protestors had
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toy guns, an upside-down American flag, and a large plastic pig. Members of the civilian
student government attempted to get the protestors to end their activities to no avail. The
last company marching off the drill field was surrounded, and only through the
maintenance of cadet discipline and assistance from a few civilian students were leaders
and cadet senior-staff officers able to march the company back to their barracks, avoiding
violence.
The event resulted in a closing of ranks among the cadets coupled with feelings of
isolation in the upper quad. The university administration acted quickly, suspending 10
student-demonstration leaders and obtaining a court injunction against further action.
After a 200-person student march on the main administration building in response to the
demonstration, the campus returned to normal.
But the following month at Kent State in Ohio, four students were shot and killed
by National Guard soldiers. At Virginia Tech, demonstrators occupied Cowgill Hall,
which disrupted classes, but the occupation ended quietly. Williams Hall was then
occupied by 168 demonstrators. The state police responded to administration requests and
demonstrators were forcibly removed; all were loaded on tractor trailers for their trip to
the jail. The 107 students involved were suspended (Virginia Tech, 2011, Evidence).
“The campus climate, once serene, became polarizing. Students found
themselves forced to make a stand on both campus and national events” (Virginia Tech,
2011, Evidence). The result was that enrollment in the corps declined from 541 in 1972
to 355 in 1977. The negative civilian image of the campus, along with a less conducive
environment, made recruiting cadets a difficult task. It would take many years of
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concerted efforts and a united front of alumni, cadets, and the commandant’s office to
increase enrollment of Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets.
Following the Vietnam War, Hollywood portrayed through their films a poor
image o f military education. Films released in the 1980s included three films portraying
military schools in a bad light. In 1980, The Lords o f Discipline depicted a military
college as an institution of bigotry where an African American cadet had to be protected
from death threats. Taps, released in 1981, was particularly demeaning as it addressed the
closing of a military school and the devoted cadets who threatened violence to sustain the
institution. These films were followed in 1986 by a two-part miniseries made for
television. Dress Gray depicted a military college where the murder of a freshman cadet
is covered up by administration. The 1980s films depicted military schools “as
dehumanizing institutions, where nonconformity was severely punished” (Prunier, 2005,
p. 5).
The antiwar movement and rebellious-youth culture enforced by Hollywood’s
representation of military education helped to diminish the number of military schools to
levels not seen since the 1840s. In 1980, only 81 military schools remained in the United
States, and that level would further decrease until 1998 when there were only 74 military
schools.
Coeducation and a Court Case
Prior to the 1970s, documentation of the existence of female members o f a corps
of cadets at military schools is difficult to find and perhaps does not exist. Several
schools’ female students functioned as auxiliary organizations but did not appear to be
under military requirements. There is some documentation that at two schools, their
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auxiliary function may have included military-style uniforms and some elements of
participation in the corps of cadets well prior to the 1970s. The Fairfield Seminary &
Military Academy, a private secondary military school in New York in the late 20th
century, and the Atlantic Air Academy in New Hampshire, which functioned from 1945
until 1949 or 1953, may have had female cadets, but the research has yet to be
discovered.
In the 1970s, among declining enrollment, many all-male military schools not
only enrolled female students but also offered female membership in the schools’ corps
of cadets. Among the schools that opened its military programs to female cadets at the
secondary school level were Lyman Ward Military Academy in Alabama in 1973, Texas
Military Institute in 1974, New York Military Academy in 1975, San Marcos Baptist
Academy in Texas in 1975, and Leonard Hall Junior Naval Academy in Maryland in
1976. At the college level in 1973, two military junior colleges, Kemper Military School
in Missouri and Valley Forge Military Academy in Pennsylvania, began enrolling female
cadets. The same year, the corps of cadets at Virginia Tech organized an all-female
company, L Squadron. The following year in 1974, the United States Merchant Marine
Academy and Norwich University enrolled female cadets, as did Texas A&M with its
organization of the all-female Company W -l. These changes did not receive a great deal
of press coverage, but what press was received was positive in nature.
The remaining federal military academies followed with enrollment of female
cadets and midshipmen at West Point, United States Naval Academy, United States Air
Force, and the Coast Guard Academy in 1976. This change gained a great deal of positive
attention in the press. On the other hand, the legal battles to keep two state-supported
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military colleges all male did not reflect well on military schools in general. In 1989
Virginia Military Institute, and in 1990 the Citadel, rejected applications from females
based on their all-male policy (Amstein, 1997).
In 1993, federal courts ordered the last state-supported military colleges to enroll
female cadets. Both the Citadel and Virginia Military Institute, with heavy alumni
support, fought the order in court and raised funds to create alternative, all-female
military college programs in their respective states. Through Virginia Military Institute’s
efforts, the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership was established in 1995 with 42
female cadets at the all-female Mary Baldwin College. Neither the Citadel-proposed
alternative female military college nor Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership
satisfied federal courts.
The Citadel enrolled a single female cadet in the fall of 1994. With college
personnel unprepared and the male corps of cadets hostile, the first experience failed.
Four more female cadets were enrolled the next year and the misconduct associated with
harassment from underclassmen resulted in two departing and disciplinary action against
a male cadet. The Virginia Military Institute learned from the Citadel’s mistakes, and
according to Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, former superintendent of the Air Force
Academy, “no other military college had done so much to prepare for the arrival of
women” (Brodie, 2000, p. v). VMI enrolled 30 women along with 430 male cadets in
their 1997 incoming class. The college also obtained nine female upper class cadets from
Norwich University and Texas A&M (Rosenberg, 1997). The Virginia Military
Institute’s president, General Josiah Bunting, felt the larger number and the steps with the
faculty would create a “genuine cohort. . . to form a support system” (Amico, 1999, p.
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76). This approach was successful, and the same year the Citadel, learning from there
prior experiences, enrolled 27 female cadets to join the two female upperclassmen
remaining from the prior year. Part of the success there was due to one of the two
remaining cadets being the daughter of the newly assigned commandant o f cadets,
General Emory Mace (Campbell & D’Amico, 1999). In 2010, the United States Naval
Academy had 16% female cadets, West Point 15%, Norwich University’s corps of
cadetl4.4%, Virginia Tech’s corps of cadets 14%, Texas A&M 11%, Virginia Military
Institute 9%, and the Citadel 8%.
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Chapter 12: Resurgence of an Old Educational Tradition
During the 1960s and early 1970s, a period of strong antimilitary sentiment, the
focus of education was on the social and emotional growth of students and equality of
education. Society voiced concern with the quality of education and its impact on the
preparation of graduates for careers (Hoy & Miskel, 2008). This was a period of
increased federal influence and desegregation. In response to concerns about the quality
of education was the emergence of the magnet school concept. The first magnet schools
emerged in the early 1970s with specialized curricular or instructional themes. To
achieve racial balance, as well as meet the demands of urban parental pressure, federal
grants were established to open magnet schools. By 1982 one third of urban districts had
magnet schools (Murphy & Shiffman, 2002; Blank, 1990). Amid the growing
dissatisfaction with public education and the search for alternatives, military public
schools started to appear as magnet public schools with minimal notice from the public.
In 1980, Richmond, Virginia, public schools opened Franklin Military School, an
inner-city high school. Richmond was not without a precedent for this, as the John
Marshall High School, also in Richmond, became a military school within a public high
school in 1915. The influence of Virginia Military Institute and Virginia Tech graduates
in the Richmond area were likely a factor. In 1915, male students were given the option
to be members of the John Marshall High School Corps of Cadets, which operated far
beyond its JROTC requirements. Cadets drilled and marched in conducted formations
daily and were routinely uniformed in Virginia Military Institute-style uniforms. The
strict military program at Marshall continued until 1971 when declining numbers and
antimilitary feelings caused its demise. Franklin Military School, when it opened in 1980,
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received some attention but no public protest. The same relatively quiet opening occurred
for Cleveland Junior Naval Academy in St. Louis, Missouri, and Marine Academy of
Science and Technology in Highlands, New Jersey, in 1982.
The 1983 Report from the National Commission on Excellence in Education
began what Hoy and Miskel (2008) called the “first wave” in educational reform (p. 293).
The report, published under the Reagan Administration, alarmed the public with a list of
comparisons of United States education with other countries. Statistics placed the
effectiveness of the U.S. educational system in question. Among the most alarming
findings were that the functional illiteracy rate was approximately 13% for 17-year-old
students and was as high as 40% for minorities. Standardized test scores were the lowest
in 26 years; the College Board's Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SAT) had been in a continual
decline since 1963. Students in the United States, when compared to other industrialized
nations, never placed first, or second, and were last in seven of the 19 academic tests.
Among the recommendations from the 1983 reports was to incorporate the use of
standardized achievement to certify advancement, identify needs for remedial help, and
identify eligibility for advanced courses (National Commission on Excellence in
Education, 1983).
The political mood o f the United States regarding school effectiveness was voiced
by President Reagan and the National Governor’s Association. In his 1984 inaugural
address, the President called for more competition among schools, promoted by high
academic standards because without them, he stated, there could be “no excellence in
education” (Fitzharris, 1993, p. 112). Despite these concerns, there were no new public
military schools for almost 10 years until 1993, when the Murray-Wright Junior Naval
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Academy opened in Detroit. Four years later in 1997, the Kenosha Military Academy in
Wisconsin opened with no or little opposition.
In 1993, a military school in Detroit opened as another movement in education
was in its early stages: the charter military school. In 1993, the military school in Detroit
opened as another movement in education was in its early stages: the charter military
school. The first of these schools was the Willamette Leadership Academy, originally
opened as the Pioneer Youth Corps School in Oregon. The charter school movement
began just two years prior in Minnesota in 1991. By 2000, there were 2,306 charter
schools in 34 states. By 2007, that number had grown to 4,132 charter schools serving
1.1 million students (Johnson, 2009). Charter schools would become a significant factor
in the resurgence of military schools.
The six public and charter military schools established between 1980 and 1997
were important not because they started the resurgence of military schools but because
they were the prelude to a movement in military public education that would accelerate
dramatically beginning in 1999. Several prominent educators and politicians moved to
the forefront as proponents of public military schools and others as anti-military and
educational groups opposing them.
Military School Proponents
There are five individuals whose efforts played an essential role in the increase of
public military and charter schools. Four o f these individuals are associated with multiple
school establishments: Mayor Richard Daley and Arne Duncan established schools in
Chicago; Paul Gust Valias established schools in Chicago, Philadelphia, and New
Orleans; Bert L. Bershon, with the Charter Military School Development Corporation in
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Florida, founded three military schools in that state; and Governor Jerry Brown of
California founded a military school in Oakland. The governor used his public
prominence to wage the fight to establish the Oakland Military Institute College
Preparatory Academy in Oakland.
The two most prominent figures, Mayor Richard Daley and Governor Jerry
Brown, have little in their backgrounds which would lead one to predict they would be
champions of military schools. Both Mayor Richard Daley and Governor Jerry Brown are
attorneys, have served in their respective state Senates, and are from prominent political
families. Mayor Daley’s father, Richard J. Daley, was the mayor of Chicago from 1955
until his death in 1976. Richard Daley was also head of the Daley “political machine,”
which played a critical role in the election o f John F. Kennedy to the Presidency.
Governor Brown is the son of Pat Brown, who served as governor of California from
1959 to 1967.
Mayor Daley had no military background and did not attend a military school. In
spite o f this, he became a leader of the military school movement not only in Chicago,
but also in California through vocal support of Governor Brown’s efforts there. From
1999 until the end of his term as mayor in 2010, a total of six public military high schools
were established in Chicago: Chicago Military Academy in 1999, George Washington
Carver Military Academy in 2000, Phoenix Military Academy in 2000, Admiral Hyman
George Rickover Naval Academy in 2005, Marine Math and Science Academy in 2006,
and the Air Force Academy High School in 2009. Chicago has the largest concentration
of military schools, public or private, of any city in the United States.
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Governor Brown was another unlikely candidate to be a proponent of military
schools. As a California State Senator and California Secretary of State, he was a strong
critic of the Vietnam War. He ran for the Democratic nomination for President against
William Jefferson Clinton and was successful in the state primaries of Maine, Colorado,
Vermont, Connecticut, Utah, and Nevada. Two of his biggest supporters were Jane Fonda
and Tom Hayden, both well known for their anti-military feelings. He is both the
youngest California governor, having served as such from 1975 to 1983, and the oldest
governor, elected at age 72 in 2010 (Brown for Governor, 2010).
From 1998 to 2008, while serving as Mayor of Oakland, Jerry Brown became a
strong military school proponent. His only military background was as a high school
JROTC cadet. In Oakland, Mayor Jerry Brown unsuccessfully fought the Oakland School
Board for the establishment of the Oakland Military Academy. He then went to the State
of California Department of Education, which authorized the formation of Oakland
Military Academy as a charter school (Associated Press, 2000).
The military school concept garnered support from Senator Diane Feinstein, who
had been mayor of San Francisco “when it still had the reputation as a sort of urban
theme park of the left,” in the words of the New Democratic Leadership Council (DLC).
Senator Feinstein hailed Governor Brown’s efforts to establish a charter military school
as the “Idea of the Week” in December of 2000 (Democratic Leadership Council, 2000,
p. 1). The governor o f California at the time was Gary Davis, a graduate of Hollywood
Military Academy, a private military school that closed in 1969. Also publically
supporting Brown’s efforts to establish military schools was Mayor Richard Daley.
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In 2010 Jerry Brown was elected as the 39th governor of California, having
served previously as the 34th governor. On the platform of his victory speech were several
cadets from Oakland Military Academy. On October 8, 2011, he signed California Senate
Bill No. 537 California Cadet Corps. Among the provisions in the bill was that
The Adjutant General may enter into a cooperative agreement with the governing
board of a school district or a county office of education for the purpose of
establishing, pursuant to existing statutory authority in the Education Code, a
military academy to be operated as a charter school, pursuant to Part 26.8
(commencing with Section 47600) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Education Code,
or as one of the existing alternative education options, available under the
Education Code. The program would provide a structured, disciplined
environment that would be conducive to learning in a college preparatory
environment. In addition to academic skills, students would develop leadership,
self-esteem, and a strong sense of community. An academy established pursuant
to this section shall comply with the Education Code. (California Senate, 2011)

This action may lead to the opening of more military charter schools in California
in addition to the four already operating in 2012. Steps taken in late 2011 to establish a
military charter school in Riverside County support this conclusion (Jacobsen, 2011).
Two professional educators also associated with pushing the military school
movement into public education were Paul G. Valias and Arne Duncan. Valias, as
Chicago Superintendent of Public Schools, opened the Chicago Military Academy in
1999. This school signaled the beginning of a resurgence of military schools in the
United States (Palmer, 2001). During his tenure as school superintendent in Chicago,
Paul Valias opened two additional public military high schools. He left Chicago in 2001
to become Superintendent of Public Schools in Philadelphia. Among the many changes
he made as superintendent there was the establishment o f the Philadelphia Military
Academy at Leeds in 2004 and the Philadelphia Military Academy at Elverson in 2005.
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In 2007, in the wake of hurricane Katrina, Valias took over the Recovery School District
o f New Orleans (Ruth, 2010). Prior to his departure in 2010, he laid the groundwork for
the opening o f a sixth military school. The New Orleans Military Maritime Academy
opened in the fall of 2011 as a charter military secondary school (Purpura, 2010). While
Valias had previously served as an officer in the Illinois National Guard for 12 years, his
replacement in Chicago had no experience in the military that might indicate continued
support of the military school format.
Valias was replaced in Chicago in 2001 by Arne Duncan, who in 2009 became
the United States Secretary of Education. Duncan, a Harvard graduate, played
professional basketball in Australia and worked for many years as the director of the
Ariel Education Initiative, a nonprofit educational foundation. Duncan served as the
superintendent of Chicago Public Schools until 2008, becoming the longest serving bigcity superintendent in the country. His actions were credited with an all-time high in
elementary students meeting or exceeding state reading and mathematics scores, high
school student gains on American College Testing (ACT), Advance Placement Course
passage, and an increase in college scholarships. During his tenure, another three military
schools were opened (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).
More so than any of the other proponents mentioned, Burt L. Bershon’s
background in the military most likely led him to champion the military school
movement. He was a graduate of Culver Military Academy, a prominent private high
school in Indiana; he also graduated from the Wharton School of Finance and served in
the Air Force. Bershon was the founder and president o f the Charter Military Schools
Development Corporation, which successfully established the Sarasota Military Academy
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in Florida in 2003. In 2010, this school had 723 cadets and the best academic indicators
in Sarasota County. Bershon unsuccessfully tried to establish a charter military school in
Cincinnati, Ohio, but was thwarted by a coalition o f anti-military groups and the
teachers’ union. He shifted his attention back to Florida and helped establish a charter
military school in Palm Beach. The school failed, but in 2008 he helped open the Francis
Marion Military Academy in Ocala, which prospered and graduated their first senior
class in the 2010-2011 school year. (B. L. Bershon, personal communications, November
4,2009). His plans for an additional eight schools ended with his death in 2011. His goal
was to achieve the admission of a charter military school into the Association of Military
Colleges and Schools of the United States. Oakland Military Institute College Preparatory
Academy joined the association the year he died.
The condition o f public education in California and across the country led to a
search for alternatives to the failing education system. That search led to the return o f the
American tradition of military schools among other strategies. While serving as Mayor of
Oakland, Jerry Brown referred to his city’s public schools as a “disaster” (Brown, 2001,
p. 1). Only 1,660 of Oakland’s 3,757 students graduated in the Class of 2000 and only
377 were prepared for college (Brown). Proponents of public and charter military schools
in various parts of the United States declared three principal advantages to their offering
the military format: a positive education environment, charter development, and
expanded opportunities.
Jerry Brown (2001), focused on the establishment of a positive educational
environment as his motivation for the establishment of the Oakland Military Academy.
Brown believed that the military school environment is one that fosters an “environment
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where creativity, leadership and intellectual curiosity are deeply respected” (p. 2).
Governor Brown’s experience in a Catholic high school with its JROTC program gave
him the inspiration to seek a similar alternative. Noting that a religious public school
could not be established because of the First Amendment of the Constitution, his
alternative was a military school “with its emphasis on ceremony, discipline, inspiration
and leadership training” (p. 1). Brown saw the military school as a perfectly legal
alternative to help concentrate on building character and discipline in order to create an
environment to prepare students for college attendance.
This similarity between the religious and military school’s environment was also
echoed in Kraus (1978), The Civilian Military Colleges in the Twentieth Century.
According to Krause, both religious and military schools are characterized as having “a
strong commitment to purpose, values and traditions” (p. 438), and religious concepts
and beliefs are similarly emphasized in military schools through “honor, integrity . . .
responsibility, self-respect and physical well-being” (p. 439).
The positive educational environment that Jerry Brown spoke of is visible in the
structure of the Philadelphia Military Academy at Leeds. Cadets follow strict rules, wear
cadet uniforms, student leaders control movement between classes, and the educational
process is free from disruption or danger. Furthermore, the military system “fosters peer
pressure to behave and positions the most accomplished upper-classmen as role models
and authority figures” (Price, 2008, p. 31). The secret to success, according to Price
(2008), is cadets having a positive peer group, a strong focus on motivation and selfdiscipline, close supervision, accountability and consequences, structure and rewards, and
a safe and secure environment.
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The second principal advantage espoused by public charter military school
proponents is the school’s function is character development of its cadets. The Western
New York Maritime Academy, a charter school established in 2004, places that concept
up front as their mission statement: “Leadership and character development are the
inherent cornerstones of the school” (Western New York Maritime Academy, 2011).
Likewise, the Public Safety Academy of California, another charter military school, uses
the terms “leadership and character development” (Public Safety Academy, 2010) in its
mission statement, and the public Philadelphia Military Academy at Leeds mission
contains the terms “leadership education and character” (Philadelphia Military Academy,
2011). Maryland’s public Forestville Military Academy mission describes graduates as
“leaderfsj of character committed to the values of truth, honor, knowledge and service”
(Forestville Military Academy, 2011). Other schools address the same concept through
the identification of core values as does California Military Institute, as well as General
John Vessey, Leadership Academy in Minnesota. Other military schools use the same
concept by the identification of specific character traits such as integrity, ethics, selfdiscipline, citizenship, and moral ideas. This pattern is essentially a numeration of
characters and is character centric.
The final advantage espoused by proponents includes expanded opportunities that
must be divided into three themes. Jerry Brown approached the subject initially in broad
terms: “The principle here is the freedom of parents to educate their children as they see
fit” (Imber & Van Geel, 2010, p. 20). He cited the United States Supreme Court case
Pierce v. Society o f Sisters [this case involved the Hill Military Academy in 1925] as a
guarantee that parents do not have to accept instruction from public teachers. His
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agreement then closed with “these families who want an outstanding education for their
children have every right to choose among a wide array of educational philosophies,
including an academic school operated in collaboration with the California National
Guard” (Brown, 2001, p. 2).
The desire to provide special training orientated toward law enforcement or
emergency services influenced the establishment of a few military schools. For example,
Southeast Academy High School and Public Safety Academy in California state that their
programs help cadets who are seeking “careers in police or military science or public
safety” (Southeast Academy High School, 2011) and “law enforcement, fire emergency
medical services” (Public Safety Academy, 2009) respectively. Most public or charter
military schools would rather take Jerry Brown’s view: “The goal here is to become
leaders in business, government, and the arts. It’s not engaging debates on Star Wars, or
whether to go to the Gulf War” (Goodman, 2002, p. 2). This reflects the evolution
secondary military schools made away from preparing cadets for combat and toward
preparation for leadership in the civil sector.
For the most part, the “expanded opportunity” claims avoid the controversial
subject of military training and recruitment. Opportunities are framed in terms of greater
academic success. In his congratulatory letter from Mayor Daley to Jerry Brown on the
opening o f the Oakland Military Academy, Daley (2001) stated that his first graduating
class from the Chicago Military Academy had a 40% higher city-wide average in reading
and a 30% higher than average score in mathematics. A few years later, similar claims
were made on behalf o f all military schools, citing the Chicago Military Academy again
as having better performance than the rest of the city by 11% in reading and 32% in
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mathematics. In Philadelphia, their first military academy touted attendance rates 8%
above the district average and teacher absentee rates 7% lower (Price, 2008).
Opportunities are not framed by potential advancement upon enlistment in the military,
but rather in terms of military school productivity.
Military School Opponents
The scale of opposition to military schools in public education grew quickly
beginning in 1999, when steps were taken to establish public military high schools in
Chicago, and in 2000, when a charter military high school in Oakland, California, was
being founded. Since then, the controversy has grown, and opposition to a military
component in public schools has been adopted by various groups. Among the national
opposition to military schools in public education are the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), Coalition for Alternatives to Militarism in our Schools (CAMS), Military
Families Speak Out (MFSO), Iraq Veterans Against War, American Friends Service
Committee-Quakers, Code Pink, and Gold Star Families. On a local level, groups such as
Orange County Peace Coalition and Orange County Green Party in California,
Committee for High School Options & Information on Careers, Education & Self
Improvement (CHOICES) in Washington, DC, the Chicago Teacher’s Union, and local
school boards have risen to dissuade the establishment of additional military schools and
have been successful in several cases (Shahfari, 2007).
Excellent sources to better understand the various objections to the military
school concept are Brooke Johnson (2009), From School Ground to Battle Ground: A
Qualitative Study o f a Military-Style Charter School, a dissertation from the University of
California, Riverside; and American Civil Liberties Union (2008), Soldiers o f
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Misfortune: Abusive U.S. Military Recruitment and Failure to Protect Child Soldiers.
Johnson’s qualitative study was conducted in a California charter military school between
2004 and 2008. Johnson was active in the antiwar movement in the United States and
abroad and became interested in a military charter high school when she was “shocked to
learn that 11 and 12-year-olds were attending a military-style school that was publically
funded” (p. 16).
The central theme of her analysis served as a guidepost to curb the influence and
advancement of militarism in U.S. public education and described four methods to fight
militarism in public schools. Johnson (2009) called for
halting the march o f militarism in public education and returning the schoolhouse
to a place for growth and learning, as a way to reduce structural inequality in
education, and level the unequal opportunities of the most vulnerable U.S.
citizens, youth, (p. 152)
Johnson (2009) viewed the charter and public military schools in the context of
the nexus of neoliberalism and militarism. According to Saltman (2007), neoliberalism’s
“economic and political doctrine insists upon the virtues of privatization and
liberalization of trade, while concomitantly places its faith in the discipline [in education]
for the resolution of all social and individual problems” (p. 2). He saw militarized public
schooling “in terms of the enforcement o f globalization through implementation of all the
policies and reforms that are guided by neoliberal ideal” (p. 3). Johnson agreed and called
“the military the literal strong-arm of U.S. global and domestic neoliberal policies
focused on the logic o f free markets and bigger profits” (p. 60). He further cited that there
is an overrepresentation of ethnic minorities within the U.S. military due to poverty,
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joblessness, and increased militarism present in public schools (pp. 60-63). The latter
statement is best exemplified by public military high schools.
Johnson (2009) argued that neoliberalism has encouraged school choices,
including charter and magnet schools, and that accountability and efficiency brought by
the No Child Left Behind Act have increased militarism in school structure and
curriculum. According to Johnson, the “military-style schools . . . are a new and
flourishing trend in public education” (p. 25) and “structural inequalities in the local
school district and in the community push parents and students towards [military schools]
. . . while discipline and uniforms pull in student enrollment” (p. 137). He claimed that
military schools “socialize students into a culture of militarism and w a r . . . [resulting in]
viewing the military as an equally beneficial choice as attending college” (p. 137).
Finally, he described military school culture as dominated by masculine authoritarianism:
“Hegemonic military masculinity is exemplified at the [military school studied] through
condoning violence and the warrior hero archetype” (p. 134).
Johnson (2009) illustrated the three most common objections to the establishment
of military schools: military recruitment, culture of violence and masculinity, and
violation of the United Nations’ Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The military
school environment with its uniforms, rituals, and vocabulary, socializes cadets to accept
militarism as both a “rite of passage” and as “beneficial to their life chances,” according
to Johnson (p. 109). This vulnerability to the acceptance of military service has its
opponents on two levels. First are the objections to the United States’ foreign policy and
the military as a national institution and the military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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“The increasing militarism o f the U.S. public education system needs to be understood in
relation to the growing influence of neoliberalism and "the enforcement of global
corporate imperatives as they expand markets through the material and symbolic violence
of war and education" (Saltman, 2007, p. 1).
This point of view is not limited to the establishment of military charter and
public schools. In 2006, the San Francisco School Board voted to ban the operation of
Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps (JROTC) from district schools. The board
declared its opposition to military recruiting in 2005. In the words of the JROTC Must
Go Coalition, “As this country enters its sixth year of the illegal occupation of Iraq and
Afghanistan, it's time for the school board to go back to its original decision to kick the
military out of our schools” (Enteen & Mecca, 2008, p. 1).
The second level of objection to military recruitment through the establishment of
military schools is that the military is targeting the “poor and working class youth of
color” (Johnson, 2009, p. 151) and “military-style schools are being established
overwhelmingly in poor and working class communities of color” (p. 141). The location
and cadet populations of at least 10 of the 29 public or charter military schools in 2011
supports the assumption that these programs were located in poor and working-class
areas. This action is seen as a detriment because young people are lured into service with
the promise of money for college and career skills. In many cases, according to Johnson
(2009), minority veterans never use the money for college and gain nontransferable skills.
The view of those opposed to military schools is, in many cases, that the military
experience “thwarts life chances rather than expanding the options and opportunities for
these disadvantaged youth” (Johnson, 2009, p. 141).
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The next area of objections to charter and public military schools includes the
military’s hegemonic military masculine culture, which Johnson claims condones
violence and marginalizes women. The military school culture with its uniforms, rituals,
and warrior heroes are seen as legitimizing violence by the glorification of the military
culture and, in some cases with marksmanship training providing an introduction to the
use of guns. The military school culture is seen as emphasizing the military and
marginalizing those cadets, particularly female, who do not take on a tomboy “female
masculinity” (Johnson, 2009, p. 131).
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has become the leading opponent of
military schools, citing the United Nation Optional Protocol on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This treaty
was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 2002, and in 2005, the United States submitted a
binding declaration of the minimum age for voluntary recruitment to 17 (a year older than
required by the treaty) (American Civil Liberties Union, 2008).
The ACLU position is that the JROTC program is a violation of the recruitment
prohibitions o f the treaty. Their view of the program is that JROTC is a military
recruiting tool that promotes “children’s perceptions of a career in the military and
enhances military recruiting efforts” (ACLU, 2008, p. 13). The ACLU identified three
Chicago public military schools where 18% of graduates enter the military. The point of
contention with JROTC in military schools is that they expose children to recruitment
(not induction) in violation of the treaty. Recruitment should be genuinely voluntary with
individuals fully informed of the duties involved in the military, which is not the case for
young cadets, and the ACLU contends that this is a clear violation (ACLU, 2008).
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Military Schools are a Viable Alternative
The objections to the military school in public education centered on three issues:
military recruitment, a culture of violence and masculinity, and violation of the United
Nations ’ Optional Protocol on the Involvement o f Children in Armed Conflict. Objections
against military recruitment centered on the unfair burden it places on minorities, and the
recruitment o f ill-informed young people. Among the public military schools in Chicago,
where minority enrollment was high, the military option was selected by 18% of
graduates one year. The burdens of military service in 2012 can be illustrated by
comparing it with Chicago’s high murder rate, Afghanistan military service was 19 times
more likely to result in being killed (Server, 2012).
But the casualty figures for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan did not support
the conclusion that military recruitment resulted in an unfair burden of national defense
being placed on the minorities. American military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan through
September 2010, numbered 5,670 of which 9.1% were African American and 9.9% were
Hispanics (Fischer, 2010). The proportion of casualties for African Americans was far
less than their percent of the population at 15.4%, while casualties for the Hispanics were
very close to the population at 9.7% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).
In 2009, the legality of military recruitment in public schools was tested in federal
court. The statues of Areata and Eureka California prohibiting military recruiters from
contacting minors were overturned (Stannard, June 19,2009). Military schools by
exposing their cadets to the military culture with uniforms, titles, ceremonies and
vocabulary, provided eighteen year old graduating cadets the opportunity to make a better
informed decision regarding their future.
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Those who enlist after graduation from a military school benefit from Junior
Reserve Training Corps (JROTC) which provides incentives including, in the army, rapid
promotion to rank o f corporal with a significant associated pay increase. Other benefits
are intrinsic to military service and include job skills based on military specialty selected,
job security, structured environment, certification of a work ethic desired by employers
and educational benefits which carry over to post service opportunities. Military school
cadets are better prepared to make an informed decision in regard to enlistment and
benefits from the preparation provided to them in school.
The objections to military schools as promoting a culture of violence and
masculinity were not supported by Hajjar’s (2005) study of a public military high school.
Rather than violence, Hajjar found an environment which promoted civility. The military
schools “through comprehensive academy mores and codes, cadets learn and develop
etiquette, trust, mutual respect, duty and tolerance for others that enhances their civility;
an important life skill” (p. 49). This type of behavior was found to be stronger among
those who had been at the academy for a longer period of time.
Rather than marginalizing female cadets, toleration and behavior echoed “treating
others well and being polite, respectful” was more apparent among cadets (p. 50). The
military school in which Hajjar conducted his study had as its cadet commander a female
cadet who embraced her leadership role and was far from marginalized. The author’s
experience in private secondary military school and a senior military college found
female cadets occupied critical leadership positions far beyond their proposition o f the
cadet population. The Johnson (2009) critical view of the military schools impact on
female cadet development was heavily influenced by a political agenda that viewed the
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military an evil tool of “strong-arm of U.S. global and domestic neoliberal policies”
(p.6 0).
Objections to military schools as violations of the United Nation Optional
Protocol on the Involvement o f Children in Armed Conflict and the Convention on the
Rights o f the Child centered on the military school as a violation o f the recruitment
prohibitions of the treaty. The opponents of military schools see cadets’ exposure to the
military culture as recruitment o f children and not voluntary with adults fully informed of
the duties involved in the military service. But membership in a military school does not
constitute membership in any of the armed forces of the United States. Further, the
United States meets the requirements of the Protocol in that:
the minimum age at which the United States permits voluntary recruitment into
the Armed Forces of the United States is 17 years of age; the United States has
established safeguards to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or coerced,
including a requirement in section 505(a) of title 10, United States Code, that no
person under 18 years of age may be originally enlisted in the Armed Forces of
the United States without the written consent of the person4s parent or guardian, if
the parent or guardian is entitled to the person's custody and control; each person
recruited into the Armed Forces of the United States receives a comprehensive
briefing and must sign an enlistment contract that, taken together, specify the
duties involved in military service; and all persons recruited into the Armed
Forces of the United States must provide reliable proof of age before their entry
into military service (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2010,
p. 2).

Hajjar (2005) concluded that the “unique military subculture builds solidarity,
which in turn develops students’ propensity for education, discipline, civility, leadership
skills and agency.” Overall, students at a public military school “develop critical life
skills and accrue forms of social capital, which should increase their chances of achieving
upward mobility” (p. 45). This educational propensity at was reflected by cadets’
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intention to attend college with 85% of sophomores and juniors desiring to go on to
college. Among the student population where 74% are considered poor or at risk based
on fee or reduced school lunch programs and 90% from minority African American or
Hispanic backgrounds, military school graduates’ propensity for advanced education was
bared out by the 2006 statistics for Chicago high schools in which graduates of the city’s
public schools averaged 48% continuing on to college as opposed to 81.5% for the city’s
public military academies. (Chicago Public Schools, 2007 & Chicago Public Schools,
2006).
Hajjar (2005) concluded that the military school subculture builds leadership
competencies. “Cadets acquire leadership schemata, repertoires, and skills through
classroom lessons and firsthand experience” (p. 51). Tarrant (1982) findings support this
conclusion when he compared private military schools with public high schools that
attendance at the military schools increased the student’s leadership values.
Hajjar defined agency as the capacity to transpose and extend schemas to new
context. Agency entails an ability to coordinate ones’ actions with and against others, to
form collective projects, to persuade, coerce, and monitor the simultaneous efforts of
one’s own and others’ activities (p. 52). His conclusion that military schools enhanced
these skill sets was also supported by Tarrant (1982) which found military schools
supported the development of skills related to technical information such as having a
broad outlook and well-rounded knowledge, managing groups, seeing the larger picture
in relation to own activity. Among Hajjars’ examples of the military school subculture’s
facilitation of agency among cadets where several were female cadets, they adopted the
academy’s codes, cultural repertoire, and embraced a women’s potential. Examples in his
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study were in direct contradiction to a culture of violence and masculinity which
opponents of military schools gave as minimizing women.
According to Hajjars the military school subculture institutionalizes discipline;
self-discipline thrives in its environment. Examples of performances which he cited as
positively impacted by self-discipline were attendance, homework completion, and
adherence of military codes. Attendance in the inner city military school of his study was
93.3% and ranked fifth of 84 inner city public schools. The public military school of his
study was focused on correcting minor military uniform and conduct violations, rather
than having to address “widespread drug distribution and possession, frequent and serious
acts of violence, substantial criminal gang influences, and other illicit behaviors that
plague many inner city schools” (p. 56). When viewed from the perspective of inner city
education, minor military violations of uniform and protocol standards are largely
insignificant, yet to the cadets they were important. Among his conclusions was that the
military school subculture yielded “positive behavioral changed for teenage students,
especial given the inner-city backdrop of this particular school” (p. 58).
The importance of discipline was illustrated by a study by Public Agenda (2004)
found that teachers (97%) and parents (78%) felt that in order for a school to flourish
discipline was needed. However the experience of teachers (85%) and parents (73%) was
that education suffered because of a few “chronic offenders” (p. 2). Teachers (77%)
admitted that their effectiveness suffered due to “disruptive students.” The study further
concluded that schools are addressing effectively serious behavior problems by having
armed police on campus but not when addressing violations of rules which disrupt class,
“Problems with student behavior appear to be more acute in urban schools and in schools
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with high concentrations of student poverty” (p. 3). Teachers from those schools are three
times as likely to cite discipline, and twice as many quit teaching because of the lack of
student discipline. For both teachers and parents seven out of 10 felt the cause of the
behavior problems was “disrespect everywhere in our culture-students absorb it and bring
it to school” (p. 27).
The objections to public military schools do not withstand close scrutiny from an
educational prospective. But the need for a school culture which supports the challenges
to education by an undisciplined student body can be met by the military school format.
Furthermore, the military school culture provides advantages for the propensity of higher
education, civility, leadership skills and agency which increases student’s chances for
upward social economy mobility in their future.
Twelve Years of Dramatic Growth
The number of military schools has increase of 19% since 1998. In 1998, there
were only 74 military schools. The cadet and midshipmen population in 2011 was
approximately 50,550 students with approximately 63% at the college or junior college
level. This figure is close to the 1942 peak of military school population o f 61,000
students. This growth includes and can be attributed to the growth at federal military
academies, the military colleges, maritime academies, and the large number of public and
charter secondary military schools. In Maryland, one of the public military high schools
had 860 cadets, and two of Chicago’s military high schools had enrollments of more than
500. Furthermore, five o f the 13 charter military secondary schools had enrollments
exceeding 500 cadets, and the Sarasota, Florida Military Academy enrolled 700 cadets in
2011 .
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In 1972, the only public military school in the United States closed in Richmond,
Virginia. By 2011, a reorientation o f the military school movement towards public
education had risen, with 29 new public or charter military secondary schools having
been established in the United States. These 16 public and 13 charter schools were
located in 13 different states: California, Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
This increase has taken place in a period of increased popularity of the military.
Gallup polling placed confidence in the military as an institution in the 50th percentile
between 1975 and 1984, with a low of 50% in 1981. From 1985 until 2001, that figure
increased only to the 60th percentile, with the exception of 1991 during the Gulf War
when it climbed to 85%. After the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and the
Pentagon the confidence in the military as an institution has increased to between 73%
and 82% between 2002 and 2011. This, as compared to the next highest rated institutions,
big business at 59% to 67% and the church from 45% to 53%, placed the military at the
height of institutions in the Gallup polls (Gallup Inc., 2011). The impact on the popularity
of military schools benefited from these attitudes as well.
Federal military academies. In 1954, there were five federal military
academies, with the establishment of the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado.
The enrollment of the five academies included 15,661 cadets. In 2010, the three largest
academies in the United States included the United States Air Force Academy, United
States Naval Academy, and West Point; each averaged 4,575 cadets or midshipmen. In
2010, the Coast Guard Academy and the Merchant Marine Academy enrolled 973 and
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964 cadets respectively. Each of these academies requires five-year, post-graduate
military service, with the exception o f the Merchant Marine Academy, which also
requires maritime industry employment or military service.
The establishment of the newest federal academy is patterned after the oldest
military schools associated with Alden B. Partridge and Sylvanus Thayer. The Air Force
Academy’s first superintendent was General Hubert Harmon, West Point Class of 1915,
who was recalled to active duty to lead the academy. The academy’s first permanent dean
of faculty was Brigadier General Robert McDermott, who was originally a member of
Norwich Class o f 1941 then graduated from West Point with the Class of 1943. He was
joined on the faculty by a large number of West Point alumni. The first commandant of
cadets was another West Pointer, Brigadier General Robert Stillman. He also recruited
other military college graduates, including an air officer commander and several air
training officers. These men strived to make the honor code “a foundation for everything
the academy hoped the cadets would be” (Ringenbach, 2006, p. 64) and ensured the
newest academy would adopt the standards founded 150 years before. The code was
almost identical to that of the other established military academies and further established
the connection to the origins of the centric role that honor has in the military school
culture. This historical honor code prevails in what many believe is the most modem and
technological of the federal military academies.
Military colleges and universities. In 2011, there were 12 military colleges and
universities in the United States with total enrollment of approximately 13,000 cadets and
midshipmen. These institutions included two colleges that are essentially military
campuses, two military colleges with the corps of cadets representing a large portion o f a
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dual student body, five maritime academies, and two land grant universities with corps of
cadets and one a female corps of cadets at a private college. Virginia Military Institute
had 1,569 cadets, and the Citadel had 1,899 cadets. VMI and the Citadel are the only
military colleges where the environment has been maintained to be that o f a strictly
military campus and cadet student body. Both the Citadel and Virginia Military Institute
have Army, Navy, and Air Force ROTC as options.
The United States has seven maritime academies, of which the Great Lakes
Maritime Academy is a civilian institution. One already discussed is the United States
Merchant Marine Academy, a federal military academy. The remaining five academies
have dual student bodies with their corps o f cadets numbering 4,398 cadets and
midshipmen. The other academies include the State University of New York Maritime
Academy (established as the New York Nautical School in 1874) with 1,154 cadets and
the Massachusetts Maritime Academy with 1,162 cadets. Located in California, New
York, Maine, Massachusetts, and Texas, the maritime academies have proven to be the
second most viable style of military school after the federal military academies. Each of
the five state maritime academies operating today is state supported and includes a Navy
ROTC as an option.
Norwich University, which opened in 1820 under the direction of Alden B.
Partridge, and North Georgia College, one of the land grant colleges, both have dual
student bodies: civilian and military. In 2010, the Norwich University Corps of Cadets
numbered approximately 1,250 cadets, about 60% of the student body. Norwich has
Army, Navy, and Air Force ROTC as optional programs and is the only private military
college in the United States. North Georgia College includes about 750 Cadets, or 14% of
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the undergraduate population. North Georgia is unique among the military colleges in
that they offer only Army ROTC and have a large number of cadets who also serve as
members of the state’s National Guard.
Two land grant universities maintain a significant corps of cadets. In 2011, the
Texas A&M Corps of Cadets numbered 2,177 within a student undergraduate population
of 39,140, just 5.6% of the student population. Virginia Tech’s corps of cadets grew
dramatically in 2011, from 769 in 2010 to 949 cadets. In 2011, the military population at
Virginia Tech was only 4% of the 23,690 undergraduates. Both schools have Army,
Navy, and Air Force ROTC as options.
The Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) of Mary Baldwin College
was established in 1995. The program grew from the legal battles regarding the admission of
women into the Corps at Virginia Military Institute. Under the leadership of Brigadier
General Michael Bissell, who became commandant in 1999, enrollment at the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership expanded to between 120 and 125 cadets. The cadets’ dress
uniforms are an unusual forest-green color with a West Point-style cut. Perhaps even more
unusual is the fact that Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership is the only all-female
military school in the world (Mary Baldwin College, 2011).
Military junior colleges. In 2011, there were five military junior colleges
enrolling approximately 3,513 cadets in secondary and junior college programs. All five
colleges offered a two-year Army ROTC program that awards an army commission to a
junior officer. Wentworth Military Academy and College and Valley Forge Military
Academy and College are both private; the remaining three colleges are state supported.
All five maintain a secondary military school program except Marion Military Institute,
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which discontinued its secondary program and its private status and became a statesupported junior college in 2009.
Kemper Military School in Missouri maintained a junior college until 2000 and
illustrates the fiscal vulnerability of the two remaining private military junior colleges.
The school was established in 1844 by Frederick T. Kemper and successfully operated as
a civilian male boarding school until Kemper’s death in 1871. The leadership of the
school then fell to Colonel Thomas Johnston, a former student, who in 1864 had enlisted
as a 16-year-old Confederate soldier. Johnston returned to the school in 1868 after
graduating from the University of Missouri (Echo Company, 2011). In 1885, he
converted the school to a military format and in 1899, changed the name to Kemper
Military; there were 502 cadets (Echo Company, 2011). In 1923, the school added a
junior college (Shoemaker, 1943). The school reached its peak enrollment as a military
junior college and military secondary school in the mid-1960s. The school became a
nonprofit college.
When the Vietnam War took its toll on the nation’s military schools, Kemper’s
enrollment dropped in 1976 to 89 Cadets. In an effort to save the school, female cadets
were enrolled in the 1970s, and the junior college’s costly athletic program was dropped
in 2000. By 1980, enrollment recovered to 224 cadets and climbed to 300 by 1999
(Rogal, 2009). Mounting debt and low enrollment placed the school in bankruptcy and
finally resulted in closure in 2002. The school met its demise in the same manner as
many other military schools—due to financial problems, the most common cause of
private military school failures.
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Private m ilitary schools. In 2010, the United States had 40 private military
schools enrolling approximately 9,230 cadets. The average number for military
enrollment of these schools was 230 cadets. The 10 schools with the largest enrollment
averaged 427 cadets. This number compares favorably to the largest military boarding
schools in 1932 when the average was 323 cadets, indicating the well-being of private
military schools in 2010. The vast majority, 37 out of 40, of these private military schools
are secondary schools. Seven of the schools have dual student bodies, several of which
restrict the corps o f cadets to the higher grades, and several of which have volunteer
membership. Regionally, 68% of the schools are located in the South. This can be
misleading, as seven of the 32 schools are actually located in Puerto Rico. Eight percent
of the schools are located in the western states and 15% are in the Midwest. Fifteen
percent of the schools are located in the north.
Between 2006 and 2011, five private military schools were confronted with
financial crises. Three of these closed, including Millersburg Military Institute in
Kentucky, with an enrollment as low as 55 cadets. The school was reported to have been
as much as a million dollars in debt (Rogal, 2009). The other two closures were small,
recently established institutions. Ontario Christian Military School in California opened
in 2006 with 57 cadets but closed in 2009. Eagle Military School of South Carolina
opened in 2002 but closed in 2008, when the economic downturn impacted its modest
enrollment.
From 2010 to 2011, both Oak Ridge Military Academy o f North Carolina and
New York Military Academy were on the verge of closing. Oak Ridge hired a basketball
coach who was also a hedge-fund manager. He donated $471,000 to the school to jump
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start a plan to build a 2.5 million dollar sports complex. In 2011, fraud allegations against
the coach threw the school into a state of financial instability (Wireback, 2011). New
York Military Academy announced it was closing, but quick action by alumni, including
a threat to sue the governing board, resulted in an alumni takeover. Each o f these
examples illustrates the vulnerability of well-established schools, as well as newly
founded private military schools, to financial mismanagement, fraud, and economic
downturns.
Public and charter military schools. In 2011, there were 29 military secondary
schools operating within public education as public or charter schools. Regionally these
schools were located across the United States with nine schools in the Midwest, nine
schools in the West, seven schools in the South, and four in the north. Between 1915 and
1971, there was only one public military school. This Richmond, Virginia, school closed
and was not replaced until the 1980 establishment of Franklin Military School. The
advent of this school was during a quiet but slow growth period in the military school
concept in public education, with the establishment of only six additional public or
charter military schools over the next 17 years.
O f the 16 public military schools operating in 2011, 10 were located in urban
environments in Chicago, Philadelphia, Richmond, and St. Louis. In 2011, enrollment in
these schools included 5,276 cadets; 1,196 cadets were in Chicago. The 13 charter
military schools had a total enrollment of 4,220 cadets. The charter schools were located
in eight different states: California had five, Florida had two, and there was one each in
Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, and Oregon. O f the 29 public
and charter military schools, only four were established before 1999. The most recently

established public charter military schools are the Air Force Academy High School
Chicago; Stanislaus Military Academy in California, established in 2009; and New
Orleans Military Maritime Academy in Louisiana, opened in 2011.
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Chapter 13: Potential Impact of Military Schools in Public Secondary Education
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the efficacy of public and charter
military secondary schools compared to similar nonmilitary public and charter schools.
The primary question for this chapter is whether secondary public and charter military
schools are more effective in addressing attendance, dropout rates, graduation rates, and
adequate yearly progress on state standardized tests than their nonmilitary public school
counterparts. This chapter will include results using comparative data from military
schools and nonmilitary schools with student bodies of similar socioeconomic status.
Attendance, dropout rates, graduation rates, and adequate yearly progress on state
standardized tests were chosen as measures because they have become the national
standards for determining efficacy since the 1980s. The mood in the United States
regarding school effectiveness was voiced by President Reagan and the National
Governors Association. In his 1984 inaugural address, the President called for more
competition among schools promoted by standards, because without them, he stated,
there could be “no excellence in education” (Fitzharris, 1993, p. 112). The 1986 report
from the National Governors Association, Time fo r Results, called for a means to
determine what students could do within a format that offered state comparisons. By
1988, the National Assessment of Educational Progress, a congressionally mandated
assessment program, pushed the concept of student-oriented evaluation tests and helped
strengthen the concept of using standardized tests to evaluate schools themselves. The
Hawkins-Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 1988
provided voluntary testing of school children in writing, science, history, and geography.
Reading and mathematics were added in 1990 (Fitzharris, 1993).
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These amendments helped generate the 1994 Educate America Act, which
established goals set by Congress in eight categories: school readiness; school
completion; student achievement and student citizenship; teacher education and
professional development; mathematics and science; safety, discipline, and alcohol and
drug free schools; and parental participation. This act generated more support for the
concept of nationally mandated standards for schools (Educate America Act, 1994). The
1997 State of the Union message by President Clinton foreshadowed the standards for
public schools and educational accountability. The President called the coming standards
“not federal government standards, but national standards, representing what all students
must know to succeed in the knowledge economy of the 21st century.” There was little
doubt, based on the President’s statement below that the federal government intended to
mandate the adoption of standards of effectiveness.
Every state and school must shape the curriculum to reflect these standards, and
train teachers to lift students up to them. To help schools meet standards and
measure their progress, we [federal government] will lead an effort over the next
two years to develop national tests of student achievement in reading and math.
(Bazzel, 2007, p. 27)
The culmination of this wave in educational reform was the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001, passed with overwhelming bipartisan support, which mandated reporting
and testing of school effectiveness. This has resulted in almost all 50 states developing
standards-based accountability for schools (Hoy & Miskel, 2008). The requirements of
the act included states
setting standards to establish what all students should know, and be able to do in
the core academic subject areas; measuring the performance of students and
schools through standards-based assessments; reporting results to the public,
including student performance on academic assessments and other outcomes such
as rates o f high school completion. (No Child Left Behind Act, 2002)
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Research Questions
Five research questions are addressed in this chapter’s study.
1. Are public and charter military high schools statistically equivalent in
attendance rates to their nonmilitary neighborhood school counterparts?
2. Are public and charter military high schools statistically equivalent in dropout
rates to their nonmilitary neighborhood school counterparts?
3. Are public and charter military high schools statistically equivalent in
Adequate Yearly Progress on state standardized mathematics tests to their
nonmilitary neighborhood school counterparts?
4. Are public and charter military high schools statistically equivalent in
Adequate Yearly Progress on state standardized English tests to their nonmilitary
neighborhood school counterparts?
5. Are public and charter military high schools statistically equivalent in
graduation rates to their nonmilitary neighborhood school counterparts?
These five questions are repeated for each of the nonmilitary school categories:
neighborhood, magnet, and charter secondary schools.
Measurements of Effectiveness
School effectiveness since the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act has
been measured using rates of attendance, dropout rates, graduation rates, and Adequate
Yearly Progress (AYP) on state-mandated tests in specific subject areas. These statemandated tests vary; for example, California uses the California Standards Tests with the
mathematics section administered to ninth through eleventh graders annually, science to
tenth graders, and history to eleventh graders. On the other hand, Florida uses the Florida
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Comprehensive Assessment Test, which is administered annually to ninth through
eleventh graders. Illinois uses the Illinois Standards Achievement Test administered to
ninth through eleventh graders annually. Missouri uses the Grade-Level Expectations
tests for communication arts for eleventh graders and mathematics for tenth graders.
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) achievement is reported as the percentage of students
who have achieved or exceeded state goals on designated tests. The AYP achievement
values used for this study included one average of those percentages (level of
achievement) for mathematics tests and another for English-language arts tests (including
state communication arts or reading tests). The tests and other measures of effectiveness
used in determining Adequate Yearly Progress by state are listed in Table 2. The table
illustrates the different ways in which states have adopted the reporting requirements
under the No Child Left Behind Act.
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Table 11
State Measures o f Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)

State

Academic Subjects for AYP

Other Measures (Rates)

California

English-Language Arts, Mathematics

Graduation, Dropout

Delaware

English-Language Arts, Mathematics

Graduation, Dropout, Attendance

Illinois

Reading, Mathematics

Graduation, Dropout, Attendance

Maryland

Reading, Mathematics

Graduation, Dropout, Attendance

Minnesota

Reading, Mathematics

Graduation, Attendance

Missouri

Communication Arts, Mathematics

Graduation, Dropout, Attendance

New Jersey

Language Arts Literacy, Mathematics

Graduation, Dropout, Attendance

New York

English Language Arts, Mathematics

Graduation, Dropout, Attendance

Pennsylvania

Reading, Mathematics

Graduation, Dropout

Oregon

Reading, Mathematics

Graduation, Dropout, Attendance

Virginia

English, Mathematics

Graduation, Dropout, Attendance
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All schools report graduation rates as required by the No Child Left Behind Act,
but attendance is an optional reporting measure. Two examples of states that do not
require attendance reporting are Florida and California. Florida only mandates reporting
of the number of students absent more than 21 days in a year (Florida Department of
Education, 2011), and California does not require its school districts to report attendance
rates at all (K. Scheff, personal communication, May 2011). Both of these states used
dropout figures as part of the calculation of graduation rate.
Population and Sample
Military schools in public secondary education prior to 1999 were rare. Although
the number of public or charter secondary military schools has increased from four in
1998 to 29 in 2011, the sample size is still limited. The sample for this study was further
constrained by the establishment of seven o f the 29 schools after 2006. These military
schools were eliminated from the study because there were no graduating seniors in the
2009-2010 school year. Another three schools were unavailable because the statistics for
those military schools were consolidated with the district nonmilitary public schools or
consolidated with nonmilitary charter schools that operated under the same charter.
These reductions brought the number of military schools available for study to 19.
These schools were located in 12 of the 14 states containing districts with public or
charter military schools in the 2009-2010 school year, and 15 of the 25 school districts
containing public or charter military schools in the 2009-2010 school year. The 19
schools were all established prior to 2006 and include at least one graduating class to help
complete needed statistical data on effectiveness associated with the No Child Left
Behind Act reporting requirements. The total cadet population of the 28 public or charter
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military schools in operation during the 2009-2010 school year was 4,539 charter school
cadets and 5,276 public school cadets for a total of 9,815 cadets. The enrollment in the 19
sample schools was 7,707 cadets or 78.6% of the total enrollment of charter and public
military schools in the United States. In turn, the 19 schools well represent the total
population of 28 public and charter military schools in 2010.
Data Collection
In addition to the 19 public and charter military schools, data were collected from
more than 500 secondary schools from 12 states for school year 2009-2010. This
comparison group included 151 nonmilitary neighborhood schools, 27 nonmilitary
magnet schools, and 19 nonmilitary charter schools identified as similar in location and
socioeconomic status to individually associated military schools. No Child Left Behind
Act state reporting requirements provided graduation rates, and performance index ratings
were based on the percent of students meeting or exceeding goals on the state
standardized mathematics and English tests. Some of these No Child Left Behind Act
reports also provided attendance rates and dropout rates. In cases where they did not,
other reports were sought from other state and school district education reports to gain the
data. All data was gained from publicly accessible information.
Procedure
The procedure used for control in this study was to individually match the 19
charter and public military secondary schools with nonmilitary neighborhood secondary
public schools, nonmilitary magnet secondary schools, and nonmilitary charter secondary
schools. According to Gay and Airasain (2003), “matching is a technique for equating
groups on one or more variables, usually one highly related to performance on the
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dependent variable” (p. 369). Each of the 19 groups consisted of the scores of one charter
or public military high school compared to the arithmetic means of the scores of all
nonmilitary secondary schools in the same school district or system of a similar
socioeconomic status of a single nonmilitary school category. These nonmilitary
secondary schools were further classified by neighborhood, charter, and magnet schools
categories to provide further understanding of military school effectiveness in public
education. Not all school districts have all three nonmilitary counterpart schools
(neighborhood, magnets, and charter).
Creswell (2009) identified socioeconomic status as a common variable used by
social scientists. Further research has demonstrated that socioeconomic status is highly
predictive in reading, verbal, and mathematics achievement (Mickelson, 2008). In order
to match statistically similar schools, those with dissimilar socioeconomic status were
considered to “not have a suitable match and [were] excluded” (Gay & Airasain, 2003, p.
369). If no schools existed in the school district within the socioeconomic status
parameters, selection of matching schools was extended to neighboring school districts.
The socioeconomic status of the schools was determined by the percentage of students
receiving a free or reduced meals. This was the common means used by all state reports.
Military schools were matched with nonmilitary schools having no more than a 10%
difference in socioeconomic status. This process produced the number o f matched pairs
depicted in Table 3. Not every nonmilitary school’s data provided all five categories
(attendance, dropout, and graduation rates, and mathematics and English tests
achievement).
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Table 12
Number o f Matching Secondary Military Schools to Nonmilitary Schools

Nonmilitary Schools

Military Schools
Public Military Schools

Neighborhood
10

Magnet
8

Charter
8

Charter Military Schools

9

2

6

19

10

14

Total

Data analysis was performed using SPSS software with a 95% confidence level.
The Wilcoxon signed rank test was chosen because the populations could not be assumed
to have normal distributions. The Wilcoxon test provided the z and p values for
assessment and was performed to make comparisons between each military school and
similar nonmilitary schools separately. The Cohen’s d provided the effect size estimate of
the matching difference for better depth of analysis. The equation for Cohen’s d was d =
(M'-M2) / (>/ (S2military schools + S2 other schools)/2.) M 1and M2 are the mean of the
military schools and nonmilitary schools respectively, and S is their standard deviations.
The small sample size required that an additional equation be used for an unbiased
estimate o f the effect size. The unbiased estimate is derived from d unbiased = [13/(4df-l)J * d. The degrees of freedom (df) are the number of school pairings in the test.
See Appendix D for pairings used. Cohen’s d description of effect sizes was used, with
small as .2, medium as .5, and large as .8 (Wilcox, 2011).
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Results
The comparison of military and neighborhood public secondary schools for the
2009-2010 school year appear in Table 13. The Wilcoxon signed rank test showing
statistically significant differences in attendance rate, dropout rate, and mathematics and
English tests achievement. There was no statistically significant difference in the
comparison of graduation rates. Attendance yielded z = -2.856,/? < .01, and the effect
size was large with a Cohen’s unbiased d value o f 1.477. The dropout rate yielded z =
-2.741 ,p < .01, and the effect size was small with a Cohen’s unbiased d value o f -0.359.
Mathematics achievement yielded z = -2.616, p < .01, and the effect size was small and
approaching medium with a Cohen’s unbiasedd value of 0.418. English achievement
yielded z = -2.213,/? < .05, and the effect size was small and approaching medium with a
Cohen’s unbiased d value of 0.458.
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Table 13
Matching Data fo r Secondary Military and Neighborhood Schools

Standard
Variable
Attendance

N

Mean

Deviation

14

Military

.92

.025

Neighborhood

.85

.058

Dropout Rate

16

Military

.02

.215

Neighborhood

.08

.064

AYP: Mathematics

19

Military

.56

.252

Neighborhood

.45

.253

AYP: ELA

19

Military

.58

.223

Neighborhood

.47

.237

Graduation Rate

19

Military

.80

.184

Neighborhood

.77

.133

Cohen's

Cohen’s

Z

P

d

Unbiased d

-2.856

.004**

1.567

1.477

-2.741

.006**

-0.378

-0.359

-2.616

.009**

.436

0.418

-2.213

.027*

.478

0.458

-.684

.494

Note. AYP = Adequate Yearly Progress; ELA = English Language Arts.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
The comparison of military and magnet public secondary schools for the 20092010 school year appear in Table 14. The Wilcoxon signed rank test indicating no
statistically significant differences in attendance, mathematics, English tests achievement,
or graduation. There was a statistically significant difference in the comparison for
dropout rates. Military schools’ dropout rates were lower with a z = -2.293,p < .05, and
a medium effect size with a Cohen’s unbiased d value o f -0.659.
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Table 14
Matching Data fo r Secondary Military and Magnet Schools

Standard
Variables
Attendance

N

Mean

Deviation

8

Military

.93

.018

Magnet

.91

.0397

Dropout Rate

7

Military

.02

.016

Magnet

.04

.034

AYP; Mathematics

8

Military

.54

.315

Magnet

.56

.285

AYP: ELA

8

Military

.64

.270

Magnet

.62

.275

Graduation Rate

8

Military

.82

.179

Magnet

.86

.127

Z

P

-.169

.069

-2.293

.043*

-.420

.674

-.560

.575

-1.260

.735

Cohen’s

Cohen’s

d

Unbiased d

-0.753

-0.659

Note. AYP = Adequate Yearly Progress; ELA = English Language Arts.
*p < .05.

The comparison o f military and charter secondary schools for the 2009-2010
school year appear in Table 15. The Wilcoxon signed rank test indicating no statistically
significant differences in attendance, mathematics, English tests achievement, or
graduation. There was again statistically significant difference in the comparison for
dropout rates. Military schools’ dropout rates were lower with a z = -2.192,/? < .05, and
a large effect size with a Cohen’s Unbiasedd value o f -1.015.
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Table 15
Matching Data fo r Secondary Military and Charter Schools

Cohen’s

Variable
Attendance

N

Mean

Deviation

7

Military

.93

.018

Charter

.92

.044

.02

.020

.08

.074

Z

P

Unbiased d

-.420

.866

.148

-2.192

.022*

©

Standard

-.445

.657

.072

-.622

.534

.184

-1.886

.059

.276

Cohen’s d

Military

10

Charter
AYP: Mathematics

11

Military

.47

.267

Charter

.45

.259

AYP: ELA

11

Military

.58

.237

Charter

.53

.272

Graduation

11

Military

.80

.155

Charter

.84

.142

Note. ELA = English Language Arts.
*p < .05.

©

Dropout Rate
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Conclusions
The study’s conclusions must be tempered by the limited size of the sample and
the single year of data. The data does provide an initial trend with military school
performance as indicated by a one-year (2009-2010) examination. When compared with
socioeconomically similar neighborhood secondary schools, military schools
outperformed them in measures of attendance, dropout rates, and mathematics and
English tests achievement performance. Notably, the Cohen’s d value reflected for both
mathematics achievement and English achievement were approaching medium effect.
Military school performance, when compared with socioeconomically similar magnet and
charter secondary schools, showed significant differences again for dropout rates. A small
Cohen’s d effect for the comparison with magnet schools and a large Cohen’s d effect for
the comparison with charter schools reflected lower dropout rates in military schools.
Dropout rates were statistically lower across the three categories of schools
(neighborhood, magnet, and charter). Although there were many cases of statistically
insignificant differences, none of the neighborhood, magnet, or charter schools
statistically outperformed their military counterparts in any of the five categories of
comparison.
Based on these results, there may be potential advantages of military schools as
alternatives to neighborhood public secondary schools. With the sample size of this study
limited to 19 military schools in one academic year, however, the need for additional
research on this topic is indicated. In the future, after the recently established military
schools graduate their first senior cadets, further study is warranted to examine the five
measures of effectiveness over a several-year period.
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Chapter 14: Military School Culture
The literature on school culture is built upon organizational behavior (Firestone &
Louis, 1999). According to Schein (1999), organizational culture is “the pattern of
assumptions” (p. 29) that members have developed or learned to cope with through the
experiences of the group. These cultures are passed to new members and considered the
acceptable manner to address the challenges of everyday organizational life. These
cultural understandings are found within three levels: artifacts, values, and tacit
assumptions. The strongest of the three are those tacit assumptions that members are not
conscience of and act on without forethought. The strength of organizational culture is
based on the homogeneity of the group, socialization of the group, and length and
intensity o f the shared experiences. Figure 1: illustrates the military school culture in
terms of examples o f artifacts, values and tacit assumptions.
Military school discipline, uniforms, daily ceremonies, and shared experiences
provide a framework through which homogeneity, socialization, and the degree of shared
experiences are amplified. According to Hays (1994), in a study of four military boarding
schools, the military school experience is full of dilemmas and impassioned debates. “Yet
there is an order within it, an order that comes from the feeling that one belongs to
something important to which one can contribute” (p. 219). That feeling of belonging
was reflected by Hajjar (2005) in his study of a public military school where the academy
“promoted a heightened sense of agency and efficacy, fosters a concern for classmates
and others” (p. 54).
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ARTIFACTS
Alumni Heroes, School Historical Symbols

ESPOUSED VALUES

BASIC UNDERLYING
ASSUMPTIONS

Honor Code, Mission Statement, Cadet Prayer,
Academic, Athletic and Leadership Values

Military Structure, Whole Person Concept
(Scholar, Athlete, Leader)

Figure 1. Military School Organizational Culture.
From “The corporate culture: Survival guide: New and revised edition,”
by E. H. Schein, 1999, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Adapted with
permission.

Artifacts of military school culture include uniforms, insignia, and intensity of the
emotions associated with team efforts and unit competition, as well as the manner in
which cadets address their peers, upperclassmen, faculty, and military staff. These
artifacts play a significant role in the socialization process in the private secondary
m if

‘

‘ '

ma
p. v\)). mm umim la

‘ 1 1 11st century described wearing uniforms as an effect that
>u could not tell the rich from the poor” (Trousdale, 2007,
u,y Barry Temple in his experiences at a military college in

the 1930s and also by Leigh R. Gignilliat, the superintendent of Culver Military
Academy from 1910-1939, who described military uniforms, room inspections, and
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military discipline as creating a “spirit of democracy” (Gignilliat, 1916, p. 83) where all
boys had equal opportunity. This is confirmed by Hajjar (2005) in his study of a public
secondary military school in which he concluded that civility and sense of concern for
others were traits enhanced by the school environment.
Values espoused by military schools are generally associated with two codes: one
positive in character and the other negative. The best known of these positive codes is
Duty, Honor, Country from the first American military school, the United States Military
Academy at West Point. Other examples of positive codes include Texas Military
Academy’s core values: spiritual maturity, moral integrity, well-roundedness, and
scholastic aptitude (Texas Military Institute, 2006). Fork Union Military Academy’s
principles include dedication, integrity, and consistency. Norwich University’s guiding
values include eight elements:
We are men and women of honor and integrity. We shall not tolerate those who
lie, cheat, or steal. We are dedicated to learning, emphasizing teamwork,
leadership, creativity, and critical thinking. We respect the right to diverse points
o f view as a cornerstone of our democracy. We encourage service to nation and
others before self. We stress being physically fit and drug free. To live the
Norwich motto— I will try!—meaning perseverance in the face of adversity. We
stress self-discipline, personal responsibility, and respect for law. We hold in
highest esteem our people and reputation. (Norwich University, 2005, p. ii)
The most common negative code is that which a cadet must never do: break the
military school’s honor code. “The fundamental principle governing a cadet’s conduct is
the honor code, which is fundamentally the same at all schools . . . but with variant
phrasing: A Cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal nor tolerate those who do” (Trousdale,
2007, p. 129). That code became a written standard in 1935 at West Point when the
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principal drafter, Cadet Lawrence Lincoln of the Honor Committee, typed it while he was
in the field during summer training:
The code was not my product nor even the product of the entire Honor
Committee; it was the product of years in the Corps developing the Honor System
and hundreds of Cadets passing it on, in part by the Honor Book; but mainly by
word o f mouth and practice. (Sorely, 2009. p. 47)
The honor system or code was not set down by Thayer as some suggest. Thayer’s
source of honorable conduct was the code of ethical behavior that was an expectation for
all commissioned officers in the Army in the 1800s. Among the communicated
behaviors was that an officer and a cadet’s word was his bond (Sorley, 2009). This
behavioral expectation was inherited from the British Army where an officer was
expected to be a gentleman and “a gentleman’s word is his bond” (Matthews, 1999, p.
323).
According to Schein (2009), the final and most powerful element of
organizational culture is shared tacit assumptions. Shared tacit assumptions result in
perceptions, feelings, and behaviors that are learned and taken for granted and are not
debatable. Military schools’ regulations, codes, rewards, and punishments create an
environment in which there are very clear expectations and outcomes resulting from
either failure to act in a certain way or rewards for positive performance. Organizational
rewards in military schools are not associated with salary increases but rather with
rewards that are related to self-esteem, including “reputation, or prestige, recognition,
attention, importance or appreciation” (Maslow, 1987, p. 115). Behaviors of cadets
become automatic, including wearing a uniform cap when outside, removing it when
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inside, saluting, performing military greetings, posture, and behavior in formation and
drill.
The most common source of an organizational culture, according to Schien
(2009), comes from the founder of the organization. These founders shape the culture and
select initial employees who they believe will maintain their vision. They often define
and influence the socialization process for new hires. Using the model of the American
military schools as an educational movement, the founders, Alden B. Partridge, Sylvanus
Thayer, Francis H. Smith, and Stephen B. Luce, shaped the culture and influenced the
initial schools’ leaders. Missouri Military Academy is a good example of how the
influence of the founders of the military school movement has extended into 2011. The
academy was established in 1889 by A. F. Fleet, who was followed by A. K. Yancey as
he reopened the school after a fire. These men attended Fleetwood Academy and Howard
College, respectively. Both military schools were run under the supervision o f men
educated by Francis Smith of VMI when Fleet and Yancey were cadets. Of course, Smith
was educated under Sylvanus Thayer at West Point, and that institution was heavily
influenced Alden B. Partridge. The influences of Missouri Military Academy’s founders
and the influences of the military schools that impacted their lives previously were
evident in the school the author visited in December 2011. It was clear that it was a
military school patterned on the discipline, moral behavior, and character development
model established by the men aforementioned who have had the greatest impact military
schools in the United States.
Stephen B. Luce garnered great influence at New York Maritime Academy and
had direct influence on the establishment of Massachusetts Maritime Academy in 1891,
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the United States Merchant Marine Academy established in 1943, and indirectly helped
to establish the California Maritime Academy in 1929, Maine Merchant Marine Academy
in 1941, and the Texas Merchant Marine Academy in 1962.
Graduates from Partridge’s Norwich University, Thayer’s West Point, as well as
some associated with Smith’s Virginia Military Institute, Texas A&M College, and
Virginia Tech played a major role or held significant positions of responsibility in the
newly founded Air Force Academy in 1954. Many of the military schools in operation in
2011 were not founded by graduates of those institutions; however the military school
model established by the forefathers has clearly been used as the guide for their
operation. This is exemplified at the Army and Navy Academy, which was founded in
California in 1910:
All notable schools have a grand history and great sense of tradition, and the
Army & Navy Academies are no exception. Since their foundings in 1910 our
Cadets have felt loyalty and kinship with our nation’s institutions of military
leadership and training. Our country is proud of the five service academies and
the contributions they have made in the development of our nation. From the
founding of the first military training school, the United States Military
Academy—also known as West Point—in 1802, to the establishment of the
United States Air Force Academy in 1954, the Army & Navy has inculcated their
values, traditions and sense of duty to one’s community and nation. Tradition
plays an important part in our Cadets' educational endeavors and
accomplishments. (Army and Navy Academy, 2011, History and Traditions)
Although Schien is very influential, other scholars define organizational culture
from a different perspective. William Ouchi stated that “organizational culture consists of
a set of symbols, ceremonies, and myths that communicate the underlying values and
beliefs of that organization to its employees” (Ouchi, 1981, p. 244). The military school
culture is heavy in its use of symbols, whether they are uniforms, flags, or salutes,
symbolizing respect and relationship between leader and follower. Ceremonies are
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occasional occurrences in most nonmilitary schools, where in military schools they occur
multiple times a day with formations, parades, and often reveille, with the national flag
raised, and retreat, with the national flag lowered. Myths and stories are often associated
with the school’s legendary alumni, who tell of wartime exploits and athletic victories. At
Texas Military Institute, General Douglas MacArthur is not only remembered as a hero of
World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, but also as the school’s quarterback
and football-team captain. These legends enhance the school’s rich environment and
encourage conversations among cadets that often focus on military relationships,
responsibilities, and interactions.
Military School Culture vs. Armed Forces
The organizational culture of a military school and that o f the armed forces are
not equivalent. In 1935, the president of Fork Union Military Academy summarized the
difference: “Militarism is intensive preparation for war [whereas] military training in a
Christian school is using the magnificent discipline of military life without any of the
evils or spirit of militarism” (Trousdale, 2007, p. 90). The culture of the armed forces is
characterized by combat and the masculine warrior. The armed forces’ organizations,
infantry divisions, fighter wings, and aircraft carriers, unlike military schools, are
organized and function for their service in combat. The primary role of the armed forces
is preparation for and conduction of combat and its culture is synonymous with that
image (Dunivin, 1994). This is stated in the second line of the soldier’s creed: “I am a
Warrior and a member of a team” (U.S. Army, 2010, p. 1).
This ethos of combat has very limited application to today’s military schools.
During the Civil War, six military schools participated in combat (Georgia Military
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Institute, Virginia Military Institute, The Citadel, University of Alabama, West Florida
Seminary, and the Confederate Naval Academy). During World War II, only one, the
United States Merchant Marine Academy, provided cadets as crewmembers of vessels in
combat. Presently, there are only four military schools within the federal military
academies that require post-graduate military service: United States Military Academy,
United States Naval Academy, United States Air Force Academy, and United States
Coast Guard Academy. The remaining schools, including the United States Merchant
Marine Academy, do not require military service, instead it requires maritime service
which could be a maritime lawyer or working in one of the nation’s ports, in turn the
combat ethos is not applicable.
After World War II the amount of tactical military training decreased to a point
where by 2000 it was absent at the secondary level. Military schools are not organized
with a focus on combat. This applies to military colleges and universities as well as
secondary military schools. Between 2006 and 2009, between 35% and 52% of the cadets
who graduated from the Citadel, Texas A&M, and Virginia Military Institute, accepted a
service commission upon graduation. Military high schools that maintain Junior Reserve
Officer Training Corps (JROTC) programs are federally mandated not to conduct any
training related to combat. The violence is instead limited to the athletic fields with
emphasis on developing well-rounded cadet athletes. Military colleges and universities
do not require military service upon graduation, however several military colleges require
attendance in ROTC college classes.
The Citadel, as early as 1920, sought to “prepare men for civil pursuits by giving
them a sound education reinforced by the best features of military training” (Horton,
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2011, December 7). From its earliest years, Virginia Military Institute used military
discipline “as a means of forming and developing individual character” (Smith, 1912, p.
242). Although the cultures of the armed forces and the military schools are different,
there are some commonalities.
Uniforms, rank insignia, saluting, military, common language, and protocols are
similar between the armed forces and military schools. In the armed forces, the rifle is a
weapon to kill the enemy; in the military school, it is an instrument used to teach drill. In
modem military schools drill with arms becomes an exercise in leadership for the cadets,
a means of developing attention to detail, standards, and interpersonal skills, and not a
preparation for service in the armed forces.
According to Fork Union, a school not affiliated with any JROTC program, “the
goal of the military school is not to create ‘soldiers’ but to build ‘solid citizens’ who
embody the values of integrity, honor, duty, self-discipline, and service to others” (Fork
Union Military Academy, 2010, Overview). A public military school, Chicago Military
Academy states that they employ “a military structure to concentrate on academic
achievement and individual responsibility” (Chicago Military Academy, 2010, About
Us). According to Trousdale (2007), in a study o f 10 military boarding schools, “military
schools have justly and correctly shown that militarism and military style discipline in an
educational environment involves wholly different concepts” (p. 392).
A strong organizational culture will determine the means of dealing with external
problems, and consensus is a critical part of that strength. According to Schien (1984),
this process culturally requires consensus in strategy development based on the core
mission, goals, and means to accomplish those goals, as well as criteria for measuring
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success and adjustments to remediation or repair of strategy. The external threat for a
military high school are the less desirable influences brought into the school by its cadets
from their homes and neighborhoods. The military school is countercultural and a strong
socialization process for both cadets and new faculty is critical to help guide and
strengthen methods of dealing with the external problems.
Body, Mind, and Spirit
Military schools develop their cadets in the three arenas of academics, athletics,
and character, which may be identified differently at various schools. These pillars may
be articulated as body, mind, and spirit, or the development of the whole person. Howe
Military Academy, one o f the oldest of the secondary military schools, established in
1884 and still in operation in 2011, and Oakland Military Institute - College Preparatory
Academy, a recently established military charter school established in 2001, provide
excellent examples of development of the whole person.
Howe Military Academy’s operating philosophy is based on the three facets of
academics, athletics, and leadership- body, mind, and spirit-which is a common theme
used throughout military schools. The school is affiliated with the Episcopal Church and
seeks development of the whole cadet through “rigorous academics and spiritual
formation [which produce] self-discipline, physical well-being, leadership, logical
thinking, and communication skills” (Howe, 2010, Our philosophy). Oakland Military
Institute has a similar foundation with three pillars: academic excellence, leadership
development, and physical fitness. Through its “military frame work [the school] inspires
honor and pride within its cadets, cultivating life-long respect, confidence, physical
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fitness, and wellness, and appreciation for others” (Oakland Military Institute, 2010, Our
Mission).
Culver Military Academy, a secondary military boarding school in Indiana,
provides a good example of how the ethos of a military school has evolved over the years
and remained true to their core values:
From its opening in 1894, Culver Military Academy, or CMA as it is commonly
referred to, has remained committed to the education of the whole person. The
traditions and rich history of Culver continue to influence how the leadership and
education in the classical virtues are taught. The leadership system, based on a
military model, is in place to prepare the young men of Culver to serve their
country. The system is effective in providing skills for those few graduates who
wish to pursue a career in the military, however, it more aptly provides essential
and valuable leadership lessons for students who will go on to more traditional
careers within our increasingly global community. Responsibility, accountability,
service, and teamwork are all bedrocks of a Culver education that will benefit
each graduate in everyday life, no matter what path he chooses. (Culver
Educational Foundation, 2010, About CMA)
The model military school program has three facets of development: academic,
character, and athletic. In support of the development of these facets, a military school
has three departments: academic, military, and athletic. The challenge is to integrate these
components within the concept of the overarching military school ethos of character
development. Each o f the three components works toward the development o f character,
a primary goal of the military school.
The integration of these competing departments under a military school culture
provides the administrator with several challenges. First is educating the faculty so they
understand the military school ethos. The second challenge is the integration of
departments that are competing for the cadets’ efforts to maximize academic, athletic,
and character development. The understanding of the military school ethos by faculty
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impacts each department including the military department. Figure 2 illustrates the
alignment of structure and the model cadet.

Academic Department

Academics

Leadership

Military Department

Physical Fitness

Athletic Department

Figure 2. Military School Structure.
An important step in maximizing the impact of the military school culture is
having the faculty cross check each cadet on their performance in each area. Faculty
should report behavioral or academic issues to one another, so together they can address
these issues in all areas and leverage character development. For example, if a football
player’s conduct or performance in English class is not acceptable, forums facilitating
early identification of this issue can bring the invaluable influence of the coach or
military department to assist the English teacher to inspire better performance. When
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faculty is well integrated and engaged, departments do not stand alone; they work as a
unified team. Whether on the football field, the drill field, or in the classroom, everyone
is committed to the development of the cadet and helps develop a better student, athlete,
and leader.
Working together, cadet success can be linked among all three components. This
cooperation among faculty affords a cadet the opportunity to achieve self-esteem through
any one of these avenues, as well as achieve at least a minimal satisfactory performance
in the other two components. The earlier motivational theories of Maslow (1987) apply
here in a very important way. Cadets are no exception to the “desire for a stable, firmly
based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for
the esteem o f others” (Maslow, 1943, p. 114). In the military school environment,
achievement can be met in any of the three components: athletics, academics, or military.
Military schools are based on the whole-person concept and from the author’s experience,
almost all cadets will find a component in which to excel. Achievement in one area
cannot meet all self-esteem needs without satisfactory performance in the other two
areas. This process is described by Trousdale (2007) as a measure of success of the
secondary military school. “If they [secondary military school] have given a boy a sense
of self-worth, self-esteem, pride, and a degree of confidence, they have fulfilled their
mission” (p.382).
For example, a cadet who is an outstanding athlete cannot achieve his desired
goals without meeting requirements both academically and militarily. He will not be
rewarded with military rank or responsibility, and the positive feedback from his coaches
becomes more o f a corrective-counseling tool to impress on him the need for academic
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success. Without the meeting o f expectations in the areas where the cadet does not excel,
that cadet cannot gain the self-esteem needed.
The empowerment of the faculty to address the question of character within the
military school culture is not the only critical empowerment required. Perhaps the most
noteworthy aspect o f the military school culture is the degree of empowerment provided
to cadets. The military school’s robust leadership challenges provide the role models, and
safe place to fail for cadet leaders to form their own leadership styles.
The results of cadet empowerment afford the cadet the opportunity to fail or
succeed and be held accountable. Cadet units compete against each other in drill, uniform
inspection, and for designation as the best company of the year, which often incorporates
grade-point averages. This competition gives cadets the opportunity to fail in an
environment where the results do not damage their grades, career, or salary. Basically, the
military department is a practice field for leadership skills not often taught in nonmilitary
schools. Furthermore, the subject o f leadership is not only addressed in an academic
manner; there are daily events supporting the practice and perfection of leadership style.
An important part of a military school is the empowerment of cadets to become a
part o f a system. An honor committee with cadet membership is the height of that
empowerment. This is where cadets sit in judgment on violations such as lying, cheating,
or stealing. Traditionally, membership of the honor committee is not based on cadet rank
or positions of military responsibility. Universally, it is a symbol of accepting the honor
code and the cadet’s responsibility to the school. Cadet empowerment is the final step in
adoption o f the codes and behavioral norms expected of the cadet.
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Moral Tradition
In 1972 the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia ruled against mandatory
church attendance at the federal military academies and state-supported military colleges
and universities (“Anderson v. Laird,” 1972). The resurgence of military schools within
public education further separated military schools from their traditionally close
relationship with religion. On the other hand, most of the private military schools are
either church sponsored or nondenominational Christian. Despite this, the character
ordination of military schools has enabled the maintenance of a moral tradition.
Hays (1994) examined three Quaker religious secondary boarding schools and
three private military secondary boarding schools and concluded there were similarities.
All three military schools were in operation in 2011. Both the religious schools and
military schools held their moral traditions and provided a set of virtues to emulate. Both
types o f schools have a strong ethic of service and strong moral nature. The military
schools studied by Hayes each had lifestyles that grew from “carefully constructed and
purposeful moral world views” (p.70). These schools gave order to cadet life through a
moral tradition based on military virtues of loyalty, competence, selflessness, integrity,
and pride.
Contrasting the moral traditions or military virtues of the military schools with the
limitations and lack of character focus o f most public education systems reveals that most
public school teachers and administrators shy away from moral issues. Teaching the
moral code and the vocabulary of virtue is basically absent from public education.
Morality, at most, is obeying the law and not committing crimes (Hays, 1990). Between
1997 and 2006, the author, working at military schools at the secondary and college
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levels, saw those two institutions clearly spell out the virtues and codes that cadets are
expected to live by and faculty are expected to model and enforce. Teachable moments
are expected to be used by all educators in order to develop cadet character. Military
schools “by their efforts to communicate a strong moral code, a desire to serve others,
and a sense of responsibility, stand out in contrast to the average public school, where
few teachers have the time, opportunity, permission, or perhaps even desire to teach such
lessons” (Hays, 1990, p. 8).
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Chapter 15: Conclusions
This study has tracked the evolution of the military school in the United States
from the need identified by the Revolutionary War, to creation of the United States
Military Academy at West Point in 1802, and through the 1999-2011 resurgence of
military schools in the form of public educational institutions. This chapter will conclude
that four men had the greatest influence on the military school movement. This chapter
will also illustrate the distribution of military schools regionally from 1802 to 2010. This
statistical evidence was noted throughout the study but in this chapter is brought together
to address the popular concept that military schools are historically largely a part of
Southern culture. This chapter will graphically associate the ebb and flow of the number
of military schools with economic and political events, illustrating the links between the
economic, cultural, and political environment and their impact upon the popularity of
military schools. Finally the chapter will conclude that from 1999 to 2011 the military
school movement had experienced a comeback.
The Men of Greatest Influence on American Military Schools
Since 1802 in the United States, at least 834 military schools have been
established and have educated some of the country’s most distinguished persons in
American history. The military school movement was modeled on West Point, which was
developed as a unique school culture separate from that of the armed forces. This model
was perfected under Sylvanus Thayer, who served as the superintendent of West Point
from 1817-1833. At the same time, Alden B. Partridge expanded the military school
concept outside the confines of West Point, first with the establishment of Norwich
University, and next through his personal involvement in the establishment o f 18 military
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schools as far south as Mississippi and as far west as Missouri. In a short 37 years, up to
the time when the Virginia Military Institute was opened in 1839, at least 43 military
schools had been established. Many, if not most, of these schools were founded, led, or
drew faculty from either West Point or Norwich alumni and were influenced by either
Partridge or Thayer.
Among those alumni was Francis H. Smith, a former cadet who studied under
Thayer at West Point. As superintendent of Virginia Military Institute from 1839-1890,
Smith created a military school that became a cradle for the formation of educators in the
South, particularly in Virginia. His influence, mentoring, and outright promotion of the
skills of VMI graduates as educators influenced an explosion of military schools in the
Southern United States. Of the 138 military schools operating in the United States in the
six years prior to the Civil War, approximately 96 were located in the South. A large
factor in this growth and regional orientation was Smith and his VMI alumni, who
founded or initially led at least 26 schools and provided faculty to many others.
Finally, Stephen B. Luce, United Sates Naval Academy graduate, whose
midshipmen years were influenced by both West Point and Norwich alumni, took the
military school concept and transferred it firmly into the education of the merchantmarine industry. His political lobbying and articles served as the catalyst for the
merchant-marine academy movement. His direct involvement in the formation o f the
New York Nautical School made the military school format the model for educating
officers for the civilian maritime industry. The New York Nautical School (later named
the New York Merchant Marine Academy) would involve the development of a series of
merchant-marine academies including the United States Merchant Marine Academy.
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These military schools, which operate at the collegiate level, have become the second
most enduring type of American military school outside the federal military academies.
Based on their contributions to the formation of a unique military school culture
and the expansion of the military school movement throughout the United States, these
are the four men who should be considered having the greatest influence on the military
school movement: Alden B. Partridge (1785-1854), Sylvanus Thayer (1785-1872),
Francis H. Smith (1812-1890), and Stephen B. Luce (1827-1917). These men
established the model and trained the school leaders and faculty in these founding
military institutions, spreading a unique educational format across the United States.
Regional Historical Orientation of the United States’ Military Schools
Although Francis H. Smith, the alumni of the Virginia Military Institute, and, to a
lesser degree, the alumni of the Citadel have contributed greatly to the popularity of the
military school format in the southern United States, the historical representation of
military schools across the country cannot be ignored. The image of the southern cadet
soldiers of the Civil War and the well-known private military secondary schools,
particularly in the South and in Virginia, have created the misconception that military
schools are a feature unique to the southern culture.
An examination o f the number of military schools and their regional orientation
for more than a century reveals that, prior to the establishment of Virginia Military
Institute, the Northern States and Southern States were nearly equal in the number of
military schools they contained. Since that time, the South has maintained a larger
number of military schools than other regions of the country as depicted in Figure 3.
After the South’s recovery from the Civil War and Reconstruction, the number of
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military schools in operation from 1879-1890 was approximately 204. O f these, 107
were located in the Southern United States, but 96 military schools representing 47% of
the total were operating in other regions of the country. Sixty-five of these were in
Northern States, 21 in the Midwest, and 10 in the West. Between 1903 and 1926, no
fewer than 278 to 280 military schools operated in the United States, representing the
peak in the number o f military school institutions. The Southern States were home to
approximately 46% of these schools, while 23% were in the North, 18% in the Midwest,
and 15% in the Western United States.

300
250
200
■ West

150

■ Midwest
■ South

100

■ North

50
0

Figure 3. Regional Distribution of Military Schools 1802-2010

Political and Economic Factors and the United States’ Military Schools
Political and economic factors play a much greater role in the popularity of
military schools than regional orientation. Figure 4 graphically illustrate the growth and
decline of the number of military schools in the United States and their link to political
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and economic events. The first decline in the number of military schools in operation is
reflected in the period immediately following the Civil War, as many southern schools
failed to reopen or transitioned to nonmilitary as a result of the war and the
Reconstruction Union occupation. This is reflected in the drop from 171 military schools
having operated during 1855-1865 to 147 operating during 1866-1878. This decline was
reversed, as described in Chapter 8, as the Lost Cause and Grand Army of the Republic
positively affected the popularity of the military school concept. This increase in military
school numbers and popularity would continue from approximately the end of
Reconstruction in 1879 through the start of the Great Depression in 1929. Contributing to
this steady rise in the number of military schools was the national patriotic mood
associated with the Spanish American War in 1898 and the expanded popularity of the
military school model with educators and Christian denominations. This led to the peak
in the number of military schools in operation between 1903 and 1926, when between
278 to 280 military schools were operated in the United States.
The Great Depression was the largest contributing factor to the end of the
expansion of the number of military schools established in the county. Between 1929 and
1938, discounting the military schools that transitioned to nonmilitary school formats, 51
military schools closed. Also aiding in this decline were the effects of the post-World
War I pacifist movement, which influenced the transition of additional schools to
nonmilitary structure, publically questioned the value of a military education, and further
encouraged declining enrollments. The result of these economic and political influences
was a decline in the number of military schools in operation during this period.
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This affect was even greater than that of the Civil War or Great Depression.
During the 12-year period prior to large American involvement in the Vietnam War,
1951-1962,211 military schools were operating in the United States. By 1998 there were
only 74 military schools in operation. This drop of 133 military schools reflected a 63%
reduction, the largest change in the history of the military school movement. There had
been a fundamental shift in the nation’s perception of the military and the value of
military schools.
The decline in number of military schools did not reverse itself until 1999.
Coinciding with this was the gradual increase in numbers of public and charter military
schools, new combination in American education. The increase in military school
numbers has continued at a steady rate for 13 years, as depicted in Figure 2, although not
as dramatically as the increases associated with the periods before and after the Civil
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War. In 2010 cadets and midshipmen numbered 60,000, a figure approaching the
enrollment peak of 1944. The political environment, particularly since the Twin Towers
and Pentagon attacks o f September 11, 2001, has been favorable to the military and
military schools. In this atmosphere, the concerns over public education evolved to
encourage the adoption o f the military charter and public military school as a viable
alternative in public education.
The number of military schools and enrollment in them has been heavily
influenced by political, cultural, and economic factors ever since the military school
concept was launched in the United States in 1802. Military conflicts, such as the Civil
War with its resulting Reconstruction period and the Vietnam War, caused significant
declines in the number of institutions. On the other hand, positive feelings toward the
military emerged after the Civil War, from Spanish American War, and after the attacks
of September 11, 2001. These attitudes helped in expanding the number of military
schools, and increasing enrollments. In fact, World War II was responsible for a peak
historical enrollment in military schools. War cannot be judged historically as either a
multiplier or detractor of the military school. The political climate that emerges from the
conflict is by far a more important factor than the conflict itself.
Since 1802, the political climate for military schools has generally been positive.
For the 209 years between 1802 and 2011, there have been only three periods in which
the political climate was unfavorable toward military schools. The first was a product of
fighting in the Southern States during the Civil War, followed by the Union occupation of
the South during the Reconstruction period from 1866-1879. The second was the postWorld War I Pacifist Movement from 1919-1939. The final period was the Vietnam
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War’s antiwar movement, when rebellious youth culture, enforced by Hollywood’s
representation of military education, helped reduce the number of military schools from
the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s to levels not seen since the 1840s. By far the Vietnam
War and its resulting political and cultural hostile environment was the strongest force
historically in countering the military school movement.
The Military School Resurgence
From 1999 until 2011 there has been growth in the number of military schools in
the United States. The 2011 enrollment had reached 50,500 which favorably compares to
the 1942 peak of military school population of 61,000. The number of military schools
had increase 19% from only 74 military schools in 1998 to 91 in 2011. This growth can
be attributed to two causes: the concern to address problems of public education and the
enhanced image o f the military and, in turn, military schools. The expansion of the
historically concept to public education in the form of public and charter military schools
further provided increases in the numbers o f institutions and enrollment. Chapter 13
provided initial indications that that adoption may be warranted, but further study is
needed as these new schools graduate additional cadet classes.
The military’s performance since the September 11,2001, attacks against New
York and the Pentagon has further resulted in an enhanced image of the military,
benefiting military schools. Figures 3 and 4 reflect a steady increase in numbers during
this period but not at the pre-Great Depression rates. An explanation for the slower
growth rate may be the economic decline since 2008 and its resulting closure of private
military schools, as well as its dampening effect on the investments required to establish
new private military schools. The Great Depression demonstrated the detrimental impact
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the economy can have on private military schools. Despite this, the military school
movement appears to be in a steady resurgence. Time will determine whether this trend
can survive economic challenges or a potential return of an antimilitary environment
based on the United States’ continual military involvements overseas. But the potential
exists that the military school movement could be on the road to recovering from its postVietnam War decline and again become a greater force in education.
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Appendix A: Military Schools of the United States 1802-2011
State

Military Schools

State

Military Schools

Alabama

39

Arizona

3

Arkansas

7

California

90

Colorado

3

Connecticut

20

Delaware

5

District of Columbia

4

Florida

32

Georgia

25

Hawaii

2

Illinois

33

Indiana

3

Iowa 3

3

Kansas

4

Kentucky

20

Louisiana

7

Maine 3

3

Maryland

23

Massachusetts

13

Michigan

8

Minnesota

11

Mississippi

21

Missouri

28

Nebraska

4

New Hampshire

8

New Jersey

31

New Mexico

3

New York

77

North Carolina

51

Ohio

13

Oklahoma

3

Oregon

6

Pennsylvania

27

Puerto Rico

9

South Carolina

21

South Dakota

1

Tennessee

27

Texas

44

Utah

2

Vermont

7

Virginia

77

Washington

5

West Virginia

4

Wisconsin

6

Wyoming

1

TOTAL 834
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Appendix B: Military Schools of the United States 2011
Federal Service Academies (5)
United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado 1947,4,619
United States Coast Guard Academy, New London, Connecticut 1877, 973
United States Merchant Marine Academy, King Point New York 1943,964
United States Military Academy, West Point, New York 1802 4,553,
United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland 1845,4,552
Military Colleges and Universities (12)
California Maritime Academy, Vallejo, California 1929, 850
The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina 1842,1,866
Maine Maritime Academy, Castine, Maine 1941 932
State University o f New York Maritime College 1874,1.154
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, Buzzard Bay, Massachusetts 1891, 1,162
North Georgia College & State University, Dahlonega, Georgia 1873, 750
Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont 1819 1,123
Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 1876 2,177
Texas Maritime Academy, Galveston, Texas 1962, 300
Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia 1839,1,569
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia 1872, 769
Va. Women's Institute for Leadership/ Mary Baldwin College, Staunton, Virginia 1842 (1995) 120
Military Junior Colleges (5)
Georgia Military College, Milledgeville, Georgia 1879* 775
Marion Military Institute Marion, Alabama 1842 (1887) 399
New Mexico Military Institute, Roswell, New Mexico 1893* 962
Valley Forge Military Academy & College, Wayne, Pennsylvania 1928* 451
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Wentworth Military Academy and College, Lexington, Missouri 1880 (1882)* 926
♦Includes a high school program.
Private Military Schools (40)
Admiral Farragut Academy St. Petersburg, Florida 1945 NJROTC, 6-12, 348
American Christian Military Academy, San Bernardino County, CA, 1999, 6-12, 38, CCC
American Military Academy, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico 1963, AJROTC 9-12 50
Antilles Military Academy, Trujillo Alto Puerto Rico 1959, AJROTC 9-12 100
Army and Navy Academy, Carlsbad, California 1910, AJROTC, 7-12, 320
Bayamon Military Academy, Bayamon, Puerto Rico, 1975, 7-12 AFJROTC.9-12 445
Benedictine High School Richmond, Virginia 1911? Catholic 9-12, AJROTC, 278
Benedictine Military School, Savannah Georgia 1902, Catholic, 9-12, AJROTC, 309
Camden Military Academy Camden, South Carolina 1942, 7-12 302
Caguas Military Academy, Caguas, Puerto Rico 1975, AJROTC 1-12,165
Carson Long Military Institute, New Bloomfield, PA 1837 (1916) AJROTC 6-12,207
Chamberlain-Hunt Military Academy, Port Gibson, Mississippi 1879 (1930) 112
Christian Brothers Academy, Albany, New York 1859 (1892) Catholic, 6-12, 506
Christian Military Academy, Vega Baja, Puerto Rico 2002, K -12,100
Culver Military Academy Culver, Indiana 1894 9-12,455
Fishbume Military School, Waynesboro, Virginia 1879 (1884), 7-12,170
Florida Air Academy, Melbourne, Florida 1961, 6-12, 350
Fork Union Military Academy, Fork Union, Virginia 1897 (1903) Baptist, 6-13, 535
Hargrave Military Academy, Chatham, Virginia 1909, 7-13, 340
Howe Military School, Howe, Indiana 1884, 7-12, 141
La Salle Institute, Troy, New York 1850 (1891) AJROTC, 9-12, 301
Leonard Hall School, Leonardtown, Maryland 1909 (1941), 6-12, 51
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Low Country Military Academy, Ladson, South Carolina 2009 4-11,15
Lyman Ward Military Academy, Camp Hill, Alabama 1898,115
Marine Military Academy, Harlingen, Texas 1963, MCJROTC, 267
Massanutten Military Academy, Woodstock, Virginia 1899, 7-12,170
Maita Luca Military Academy, Puerto Rico 1992,4-12 65
Missouri Military Academy, Mexico, Missouri 1889, AJROTC, 6-12, 230
New York Military Academy, Comwall-on-Hudson, NY 1889, AJROTC, 7-12,100
North Point Military Academy, Vega Baja, Puerto Rico, date undetermined, 1-9,45
Oak Ridge Military Academy, Oak Ridge, North Carolina 1852 (1866), 7-12, 77
Randolph-Macon Academy, Front Royal, Virginia 1892,6-12, 365
Riverside Military Academy, Gainesville, Georgia 1907, 7-12 350
San Antonio Academy, San Antonio, Texas 1886 (1920), 3-8,217
St. Catherine's Military Academy, Anaheim, California 1889 (1923) Catholic, 4-8, 150
St John’s College High School, Wash, DC 1851, (1915) AJROTC, Catholic, 9-12, 260
St. John's Military School Salina, Kansas 1887, AJROTC, Episcopal, 5-12,193
St. John's Northwestern Military Academy, Delafield,WI. 1884(86) AJROTC,Episc,7-12, 300
St. Thomas Academy, Mendota Heights, Minn 1885 (1905) Catholic, 9-12, AJROTC, 580
Texas Military Institute San Antonio, Texas 1893, AJROTC, Episcopal, 6-12,108
Public Military Schools (16)
Cleveland Junior Naval Academy, St Louis, Missouri 1981, NJROTC, 9-12,236
Franklin Military School, Richmond, Virginia 1980, AJROTC, 9-12,200
Marine Academy o f Science and Technology, Highlands, NJ 1981, NJROTC, 9-12,279
Kenosha Military Academy, Kenosha, Wisconsin 1997 AJROTC, 9-12,132
Chicago Military Academy - Bronzeville Chicago, Illinois. 1999 AJROTC, 9-12, 549
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George Washington Carver Military Academy, Chicago, Illinois 2000, AJROTC, 520
Southeast Academy High School, Norwalk, California, 2000,11-12 158**
Phoenix Military Academy, Chicago, Illinois 2000, AJROTC, 9-12 404
Forestville Military Academy, Forestville, Maryland 2002, AFJROTC 860
Philadelphia Military Academy at Leeds, Philadelphia, Pa. 2004,249, AJROTC
Philadelphia Military Academy at Elverson, Philadelphia, Pa 2005, 319, AJROTC
Admiral Hyman George Rickover Naval Academy, Chicago, Illinois 2005, 9-12 397
Marine Math and Science Academy, Chicago, Illinois 2006, MCJROTC, 9-12, 321
Summerlin Military Academy, Bartow, Florida 1851 (2006) AJROTC 9-12,451
Air Force Academy High School Chicago, Illinois 2009, AFJROTC, 9-10, 126
Stanislaus Military Academy, Turlock, California 2009,9-12, 75
**Police-fire style cadet focus
Charter Military Schools (13)
The Willamette Leadership Academy, Veneta, Oregon 1993, 6-12,115
Public Safety Academy, San Bernardino, California, 1999, CCC, 6-12, 562**
Oakland Military Institute - College Prep. Acad, Oakland, Cal. 2001, CCC, 6-12, 592
Sarasota Military Academy, Sarasota, Florida 2003, AJROTC, 9-12, 700
Delaware Military Academy, Wilmington, Delaware 2003, NJROTC, 9-12, 538
California Military Institute Perris, California 2003, CCC, 7-12, 545
La Sierra Military Academy, Visalia, California 2003, 7-12, 170
Western New York Maritime Academy, Buffalo, New York 2004, NJROTC, 9-12, 325
General John Vessey Leadership Academy, St Paul, Minn 2004, AJROTC, 9-12, 120
Summit Leadership Academy, Hasperia, California 2004,9-12,197**
Bataan Military Academy Albuquerque, New Mexico 2006, USNCC, 9-12,120
Francis Marion Military Academy, Ocala, Florida 2008, AJROTC, 9-12, 130,
New Orleans Military Maritime Academy, Louisiana 2011 MCJROTC, 9,106***
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**Police-fire style cadet focus
*** adding 10 th, 11th, 12th grades annually
Legend: School, Location, Year o f Establishment (Year converted to military school), military
program*, grade levels, number o f cadets 2009-2010 school year.
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps Junior Reserve Training Corps: AJROTC, NJROTC,
AFROTC, MCJROTC. California Cadet Corps: CCC. United States Naval Sea Cadet Corps:
USNCC
Summary:
Federal Service Academies (5)
Military Colleges and Universities (12)
Military Junior Colleges (5)
Private Military Schools (40)
Public Military Schools (16)
Charter Military Schools (13)
Total 91

359
Appendix C: Selected Military School Alumni
“This is where I started, and I thank a merciful God that I am able to come back to the
school again” (Coulter, 2002, p. 11). Remark made by General Douglas MacArthur upon
his return to Texas Military Institute, 1951.

Presidents
James E. 'Jimmy' Carter, President United States 1977-1981, United States Naval Academy
Dwight D. Eisenhower, President United States 1953-61, West Point
Ulysses S. Grant, President United States 1869-77, West Point
Jefferson Davis, President Confederate States of America 1861-1865, West Point
Leon Febres Cordero, President of Ecuador 1984-1988, Charlotte Hall Military Academy
Martin Torriios. President of Panama 2004-09, St John’s Military Academy (Wisconsin)
Ricardo Martinelli, President of Panama 2009-2014, Staunton Military Academy
Manuel Antonio Noriega, Military Dictator Panama 1983-1989, Peacock Military Academy
Secretary of State
Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Secretary of State 1981-82, West Point
George Catlett Marshall, Secretary of State 1945-1949, Virginia Military Institute
Generals and Admirals
Robert E. Lee, General in Chief, Confederate Armies, West Point
Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, Lieutenant General Confederate Army, West Point
John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force World War I, West Point
Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander Pacific 1941-45, UN Forces Korea, West Point.
Chester William Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, US Naval Academy
William Frederick Halsey, South Pacific Area Command, US Naval Academy
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George S. Patton, Jr. Commander 3rd Army 1944-45, Virginia Military Institute, West Point
William Westmoreland, Commander of US Forces Vietnam, Citadel and West Point
H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander Gulf War, Valley Forge Military Academy, West Point
Clifton Cates, 19th Commandant US Marine Corps, Missouri Military Academy
Randolph McCall Pate, 21st Commandant US Marine Corps, Virginia Military Institute
Alfred Richmond, Commandant US Coast Guard 1954-62, Massanutten Military Academy
State Governors
Horatio Seymour, New York 1852-54,62-64, Norwich University
Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, Maine 1866-1871, Whitting's Military and Classical School
Ernest W. Gibson, Jr. Vermont 1946-1950, Norwich University
Gerald L. Baliles, Virginia 1986-90, Fishbume Military School
Joseph Graham Davis, Jr. California 1999-2003, Hollywood Military Academyi_Harvard School
Rafael Hernandez Colon, Governor Puerto Rico 1973-1979,.Valley Forge Military Academy
Senators
Harry Pulliam Cain, Washington 1946-1953, Hill Military Academy
James P. Kem, Missouri, 1947-1953. Blees Military Academy
Barry Goldwater, Arizona 1953-65,69-87, Staunton Military Academy
Harry F. Byrd, Jr. Virginia 1965-1983, Virginia Military Institute
John McCain, Arizona 1987-present, United States Naval Academy
Congressmen
Frederick Charles Loofbourow, Utah 1930-1933, Ogden Military Academy
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Milton H. West, Texas 1933-48, Texas Military Institute
Alvin Paul Kitchin, North Carolina 1957-1963, Oakridge Military Academy
Barry Goldwater, Jr. California 1969-83, Staunton Military Academy
Ike Franklin Andrews, North Carolina 1973-1985, Fork Union Military Academy
James Kenneth Robinson, Virginia, 1971-1985, Virginia Tech
Lamar Seeligson Smith, Texas 1987-Present, Texas Military Institute
Entertainment, Media and Sports
Cecil B. DeMille, Hollywood director, Pennsylvania Military College
Oliver Hardy, Comic Laurel & Hardy, Georgia Military College
Jonathan Winters, Comic, Norwich University
Jim Backus, Actor Gilligan's Island,Kentucky Military Institute
Dan Blocker, Actor Bonanza,Texas Military Institute
Hal Holbrook, Actor, Culver Military Academy
Spencer Tracy Actor, Northwestern Military and Naval Academy
Owen Wilson, Actor, New Mexico Military Institute
Marlin Perkins, Host Wild Kingdom, Wentworth Military Academy
Greg and Duane Allman, The Allman Brothers Band, Castle Heights Military Academy
Stephen Stills, Crosby Still Nash and Young Band, Admiral Farragut Academy
Dale Earnhardt, Jr. Driver NASCAR, Oakridge Military Academy
WilliamS. Paley, CEO CBS 1928-1946, Western Military Academy (IL)
John B. Sias (1947) President, ABC TV 1986-93, The Citadel
Pierson Mapes, President o f NBC 1982 to 1994, Norwich
Sam Donaldson, ABC Newsman, New Mexico Military Institute
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George Steinbrenner, Owner New York Yankees 1972-2010, Culver Military Academy
Roger Staubach, Football Heisman Trophy, New Mexico Military Institute, US Naval Academy
David Robinson, Basketball Hall of Fame, United States Naval Academy
Business
Jack Eckerd, Founder Eckerd Pharmacy, Norwich University
Daniel Gerber, Founder Gerber Baby Foods, St John’s Northwestern Military Academy
Conrad Hilton, Founder Hilton Hotel Chain, New Mexico Military Institute
Jim Kimsey, Founder of America On Line (AOL), St John’s College High School, West Point
James "Bud" Walton Co-founder Wal-Mart, Wentworth Military Academy
Bob McDonald, CEO Procter & Gamble 2009-Presnt, West Point
Robert Pamplin, Sr. President Georgia Pacific 1957-1976, Virginia Tech
William Tiefel,Chairman CarMax 2007-Present, Valley Forge Military Academy
Harry Thayer, President or Chairman of Board AT&T 1919-1928, Norwich University
Donald Trump, Sr. Founder Trump Organization 1984-Present, New York Military Academy
Charles Phillips, President of Oracle Corporation 2003-2010, United States Air Force Academy
Authors and Poets
Lyman Frank Baum, The Wonderful Wizard o f Oz, Peekskill Military Academy.
Edgar Rice Burroughs, Tarzan, Michigan Military Academy
Pat Conroy, The Great Santini, The Lords o f Discipline, The Citadel
Stephen Crane, Red Badge o f Courage, Claverack College
Paul Horgan, Pulitzer Prize Twice, New Mexico Military Institute
Edgar Allan Poe, The Raven, West Point
J.D. Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye, Valley Forge Military Academy
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Appendix D: Chapter 13 Comparisons
Number of Schools by Type for Each Military School Comparison

Military
School
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Number of
Neighborhood
Schools
63
63
11
63
5
20
14
5
10
1
2
10
2
9
4
1
2
1
20

Number
of
Magnet
Schools
11
11

Number
of
Charter
Schools
8
8

11
2
5

8

1

3
5

2
1
2
2
3

5

1
1
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Appendix E: Chapter 13 Comparisons
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